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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the value-relevance of accounting information and the 
relationship between market value and different types of shareholding in the context 
of China. The market valuation theory suggests that market value is in a linear 
relationship with the accounting figures such as book value and net profit. This 
theory has been widely accepted and tested in most developed markets such as the 
U. S. A, the U. K., the Netherlands, France and Germany etc. Generally, accounting 
information is found to be value relevant in these countries, implying that book value 
and net profits are playing significant roles in explaining the market value. Does the 
market valuation theory hold in emerging markets such as China? This is an 
empirical question; it is also the major objective of this thesis. 
China's economic development and institutional settings are unique in many ways. 
Firstly, the whole economic system is in a transitional period in which the planned 
economy is gradually replaced by the market economy. Secondly, the newly- 
emerged listed companies are transformed from the former SOEs and display a series 
of distinctive features. The most significant one is that the nearly two-thirds of the 
shares are controlled by the government and these shares are not tradable. Thirdly, 
despite the phenomenal expansion in size, China's stock market is still a typical 
emerging market plagued by a host of inherent problems. These problems have 
distorted the market infon-nation such as share prices. Fourthly, from the fund-based 
accounting system to the IAS-based accounting standards, Chinese accounting has 
undergone a series of revolutionary changes to bring the accounting regulations in 
line with both international conventions and the overall economic environment of 
China. Despite the fact that China has largely adopted the IASs in constructing its 
accounting regulatory regime, significant differences exist between the two. 
The central objectives of this study are two-fold: 1) to investigate the value relevance 
of accounting figures in the unique context of China; 2) to examine the effects of 
different types of shareholding on the market value of listed companies, in particular 
the state shareholding and legal-person shareholding. The results seem to suggest 
that accounting infonnation contained in the Chinese financial reports, e. g. book 
-I- 
value and net profits, is playing a significant role in explaining the market value in 
China's stock market. This finding is of particular interest because it indicates that 
the market valuation theory can be applied not only to developed markets, but also to 
the emerging ones such as China. As for the relationship between ownership 
structure and market value, the results of this study seem to lead me to believe that 
both state and legal-person shareholdings have significant impacts on the market 
value, however their effects appear to be different. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background Information 
With the gross domestic product (GDP) growing at an average of 9.5 per cent for 26 
successive years, China has become the emerging economic superpower of the world. 
At the end of 2005, China's annual GDP exceeded RMB 18,000 billion (USD 2,250 
billion), suggesting that China has outstripped many of the industrialised countries 
such as the U. K., France and Italy and become the 4h largest economic power next to 
the U. S. A, Japan and Germany'. On the purchasing power basis, China is the 
secondly largest economy in the world only after the U. S. A (Sun and Tong 2002). In 
this sense, it has to be acknowledged that China has achieved a phenomenal success 
in developing its economy (Jonquieres, 2006). 
China's rapid economic expansion in economy in the past two decades has drawn a 
great deal of attention from all over the world and has raised a fundamental question: 
what has driven China's economy to expand at such a phenomenal pace? It is widely 
recognised that the economic reforms and open-up policies started from the late 
1970s have provided the enormous momentum for the economic growth (Tao, 
2004, Fung et al., 2006, Fong and Lam, 2005, Xinhua, 1992). On the principle of 
'crossing the river by touching stones', China has taken an irreversible path to the 
economic reforms and open-up policies, which in turn have brought about a series of 
profound changes in all aspects of the country. 2 
1 Source: All data in this paragraph are from the Yearly Book of China Statistics (2005) published on 
the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC): www. stas.. eov. cn. 
2 'Crossing the river by touching stones' is a famous Chinese saying meaning pragmatism. It was first 
quoted by Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenary Sessions of the Eleventh National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1978 and has been widely accepted as the principle of China's 
economic reforms and open-up policies ever since. 
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Unlike the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union who transformed 
the economy by enforcing a set of radical changes together with full-scale 
implementation of privatisation programme, China has taken a trial-and-error 
approach. This approach has eventually led China to take a gradual and steady 
process in reforming its economic system. China's economic reform started with the 
agricultural sector. The first reform scheme was initiated in 1978 with the focus 
placed upon shaking up the rural economic system. Farmers were allowed to have 
the usage right of land, grow grain crops and retain a part of profits they were able to 
generate. Inspired by the experiences accumulated from the agricultural reform, the 
SOE reform was launched in 1984 to revitalise the ailing state enterprises. The price 
reform started at the beginning of the 1980s, which gradually nurtured the concept of 
market in the planned economy. Non-state sectors such as private economy and 
foreign investments are encouraged to develop to drive the economic expansion and 
absorb the huge labour force. Finally, the transition of economic system from 
centralised planning to the socialist market was announced by the government in 
3 1992 . 
It has to be mentioned that the above economic reforms and open-up policies have 
not only fuelled the massive economic expansion, but also brought out a series of 
changes to China. These changes are summarised as follows. Firstly, among all the 
changes resulted from economic reforms and open-up policies, the most striking 
change would be that China has been transformed from a planned economy to a 
market economy. Secondly, China has gone through a massive-scale privatisation in 
the past decadeS4. Prior to the reforms, the whole economy of the country was nearly 
entirely financed, owned and controlled by the state. Nowadays however, according 
to Fung et al. (2006), non-state-owned and foreign-funded enterprises have 
contributed over 60 per cent of industrial production in the Chinese economy, while 
over 90 per cent of Chinese workers are now employed by non-state sectors. Thirdly, 
3 The term 'socialist market economy' was adopted by the Chinese Communist Party with the 
intention of emphasising the fundamental difference between China's political system and that of the 
capitalist world. 
4 Due to the ideological concerns, 'privatisation' is a fairly sensitive topic and has never appeared on 
the Chinese government-controlled media. However, this does not change the nature of the economic 
reforms. 
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the state owned enterprise reform (SOE reform), the core component of economic 
reforms, has profoundly altered the corporate landscape in China. In particular, the 
recent shareholding experiment has eventually given rise to China's listed companies. 
Fourthly, the open-up policies aiming at encouraging the development of foreign 
investments and global trading has made China an integral part of the world 
economy. With nearly USD 500 billion foreign direct investment (FDI) flooding into 
China during the past two decades, China has become the largest FDI recipient 
country in the world since 2002 (Sun and Tong, 2002). What is more, China's 
international trading (the total of imports and exports) hit the record level of USD 
1,442 billion in 2005, accounting for over 65% of the total GDP5. 
The experiment on shareholding system started from the late 1980s eventually gave 
rise to the listed companies in China. The expansion in the number of companies 
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges has been phenomenal. There 
were merely 10 listed companies back in 1990. However, the number of companies 
floating on the stock exchanges went up to 1381 at the end of 2005. Because the 
stockholding system is a rather recent development in China, the ownership structure 
of Chinese listed companies has some unique features not found in the stock markets 
of most developed economies. Shares of listed companies are normally classified as 
A-shares designated for domestic investors and B-, H- and N-shares designated for 
overseas investors. A-shares are further divided into state shares, legal-person shares, 
tradable A-shares, and employee shares. State shares are those owned by the state, 
i. e., the central government and local governments. Legal-person shares are those 
held by domestic legal enterprises, and non-bank financial institutions. Both state 
shares and legal-person shares are not tradable on the stock exchanges, but the latter 
can be transferred to other legal persons upon the approval of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRQ and other government authoritieS6 . At present, a 
typical listed firm has a mixed ownership structure. The state, legal persons and 
5 Source: All data in this paragraph are from the Yearly Book of China Statistics (2005) published on 
the website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC): www. stas. gov. cn. 
6 The China Securities Regulatory Commission was established in 1992 by the State Council to 
regulate the stock market. It is the major market regulator in China. 
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domestic individual investors are the dominant groups of stockholders, each 
accounting for some 30 per cent of total share outstanding. 
There is strong criticism over the current mix of shares in the listed companies. 
Especially, the criticism is centred on the excessively high percentage of state shares 
and legal person shares which are not tradable on the open market. Firstly, an 
effective corporate governance mechanism is unlikely to be established within a 
listed company that is tightly controlled by the government. Secondly, direct 
government intervention into the firm's day-to-day operation is inevitable. Thirdly, 
the fact that the state remains to be the principal stakeholder could also worsen the 
agency problems that prevail in the modem public companies. 
China's stock market has experienced tremendous growth in size since te inceptions 
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) on the 19th December 1990 and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) on the I` December 1990. The total market 
capitalisation went up from RMB 105 billion (USD 13 billion) in 1992 to RMB 
4,809 billion (USD 580 billion) in 2000 then dropped to RMB 3,243 billion (USD 
405 billion) in 2005. By its peak, the total market capitalisation. accounted for more 
than 50% of GDP in 20007. Within a period as short as 10 years, China's stock 
market has become the third largest one in Asia based on market capitalisation next 
to Japan and Hong Kong and this growth is still continuing (Chen, 2003). 
Despite the fact that it has expanded rapidly in size during the past 15 years, China's 
stock market is still an emerging market. The nature of the emerging market can be 
revealed by a series of significant problems inherent in China's unique institutional 
arrangements, legal framework and economic conditions. Some of the problems are 
caused by the unique institutional arrangements. An example would be the quota 
7 The exact market capitalisation value for all listed companies combined is mystery because the state 
and legal-person shares are not publicly traded and hence no reliable information can be used to value 
them. The market capitalisation figures given here are based on the official estimate published on the 
CSRC website, in which they simply multiply the total number of shares outstanding by the tradable 
A-share price. From Chen (2003), it is clear that this is an overestimation of the true value, because 
the legal-person and state shares are transferred at an average discount of 86% relatively to the 
tradable A-shares. 
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system adapted by the CSRC to approve the IPO, which has sown the seeds of 
widespread fraudulent financial reporting. Some of the problems may exist across the 
world but appears to be more serious in China due to the nature of emerging market. 
For example, speculation is a common phenomenon existing in the entire world but it 
is far more serious in China because China's stock market is dominated by individual 
shareholders. Some of the problems present only in China due to the country's 
unique political and economic conditions, e. g. the government frequently intervenes 
into the stock market and cause enormous trouble to investors and other market 
participants. It is important to understand not only these problems but also the 
underlying cause of these problems. Doing so will give one a much clearer view on 
what's happened in China's stock market. 
On the accounting side of the market valuation, the accounting regime in China has 
also undergone a series of profound changes. The traditional Chinese accounting 
practice and regulations have been heavily influenced by the information needs of 
the planned economy (Winkle et al., 1994). Financial reporting of state firms was 
exclusively serving the administrative targets of the government. In practice, 
accounting performs the simple roles of bookkeeping production activities, allocating 
economic resources, and assisting the government to facilitate economic planning. 
From the perspective of accounting regulations, the accounting regulatory system is 
segmented and complicated by financial and accounting rules that differ among 
enterprises with different types of ownership, among those in different industrial 
sectors and among those with different business natures (Xinhua, 1992). 
To bring the lagged-behind accounting regulatory system in conformity with the 
international norms and ever-changing economic conditions in China, the 
government has made huge efforts to reform the accounting system and construct an 
accounting regulatory framework. At the end of 2005, the Chinese government made 
a significant announcement that China has established its own accounting regulatory 
framework, the Accounting Standards System (ASS), largely based upon the 
International Accounting Standards (McGregor, 2006a). The accounting regulatory 
framework encompasses three levels: the law, the standards and the system. The law 
refers to the Accounting Law and other laws related to accounting such as the 
Company Law, the Auditing Law, and the Securities Law. The standards can be 
- 
broken into two sub-levels: the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises- 
Basic Standards (ASBE-BS) providing a conceptual framework of accounting, and 
16 specific standards with the detailed prescriptions on accounting recognition, 
measurement and reporting for specific economic transactions and items. The 
accounting system is a set of regulations providing detailed code of practices at the 
operational level and can be seen from the Accounting System for Business 
Enterprises (ASBE). 
Despite the fact that Chinese regulation regime has been largely brought in line with 
the international conventions, it will be totally wrong to assume that Chinese 
accounting regulations are identical to the rules in the IASs. In fact, there are 
substantial differences between the Chinese accounting standards and the IASs. The 
differences can be attributed to the unique circumstances of China. Firstly, China is 
in a transitional period in which the influence of the planned economy still remains 
and the market-based institutions are under construction. The overall economic, 
cultural and political environment in which accounting is functioning is 
fundamentally different from that in the developed markets. Chinese accounting 
regulations must be built on and be reflective of this unique institutional settings. 
Secondly, the Chinese accounting profession is still learning how to work in a market 
economy. While the regulations can be issued within a short period of time, training 
the accounting profession towards international practice is a daunting challenge and 
takes a much longer time. 
The comparative approach taken by Roberts et al. (2002) in studying the 
international financial accounting attempts to pinpoint the position of a country's 
accounting regulatory system by looking at four dimensions: 1) professionalism 
versus statutory control; 2) uniformity versus flexibility; 3) conservatism versus 
optimism; 4) secrecy versus transparency. A question was immediately raised: 
Where does China stand in these four spectrums? Clearly, an in-depth understanding 
on China's current position in these four spectrums will provide a useful insight into 
China's accounting regulations in the global context. 
Firstly, in the professionalism/statutory control continuum, China's regulatory 
system of accounting is obviously one which relies exclusively upon statutory 
- 
control (Roberts et al., 2002), this is in sharp contrast with the U. K. and U. S. A where 
the entire history of accounting practice is strongly dependent on professional 
expertise. Second, when it comes to the uniformity/flexibility spectrum, it is rather 
difficult to pinpoint the position of Chinese accounting. The reason is that in some 
areas Chinese regulations offer considerable discretion to managers and accountants 
and in some other areas the regulation-setters simply just draw a line by ruling out all 
other available methods. In fact, it is a great challenge for the government to reach a 
balance between uniformity and flexibility. On one hand, the regulations contained in 
the accounting standards cannot be as sophisticated as those in the IASs because 
doing so will only cause confusion to the newly emerged market. On the other hand, 
accountants in China are used to the traditional practice to follow detailed and 
stringent rules. Too much room for judgement given to the planned-economy-style 
accountants will lead to chaos. Third, how conservative is Chinese accounting? 
While the traditional Chinese accounting did not pay too much attention to the 
concept of conservatism or prudence, the principle of prudence was first introduced 
in the ASBE - Basic Standard. The question as to where Chinese accounting stands 
at the conservatism/optimism continuum against the IASs was empirically 
investigated by Chen et al. (1999). They found, on average, the reported earnings 
determined under the Chinese standards are 20-30 per cent higher than earnings 
reported under the IASs, indicating that the Chinese regulations are less conservative 
than the IASs. Fourthly, the issue of secrecy versus transparency refers to the 
disclosure requirements contained by the accounting regulations. It is acknowledged 
that China has made enormous efforts in increasing the disclosure transparency by 
requiring companies, especially listed companies, to disclose more information. 
However, as argued by Anderson (2000), more information disclosed by the 
company doe not necessarily guarantee the improved transparency and quality of 
information. 
To conclude this section, China's economic development and institutional settings 
are unique in many ways. Firstly, the whole economic system is in a transitional 
period in which the planned economy is gradually replaced by the market economy. 
Secondly, the newly-emerged listed companies are transfonned from the former 
SOEs and display a series of distinctive features. The most significant one is that the 
nearly two-thirds of the shares are controlled by the government and these shares are 
- 
not tradable. Thirdly, despite the phenomenal expansion in size, China's stock 
market is still a typical emerging market plagued by a host of inherent ýroblems. 
These problems have distorted the market information such as share prices. Fourthly, 
from the fund-based accounting system to the IAS-based accounting standards, 
Chinese accounting has undergone a series of revolutionary changes to bring the 
accounting regulations in line with both international conventions and the overall 
economic environment of China. Despite the fact that China has largely adopted the 
IASs in constructing its accounting regulatory regime, significant differences exist 
between these two. 
The market valuation theory suggests that market value is in a linear relationship 
with the accounting figures such as book value and net profit. This theory has been 
tested in most developed markets such as the U. S. A, the U. K., the Netherlands, 
France and Germany etc. Generally, accounting information is found to be value 
relevant in these countries, implying that book value and net profit are playing 
significant roles in explaining the market value. Does the market valuation theory 
holds in emerging markets such as China? This is an empirical question. 
- 
1.2 The Objectives and Implications of the Study 
This study will follow the tradition of empirical work in valuation theory by 
examining the market value of the firm in the form of regression analysis. The 
empirical study will be conducted at two stages. The emphasis of stage one is placed 
upon gaining an overall picture of the value-relevance of accounting information in 
the emerging Chinese capital markets. 
In fact, exploring the issue of value-relevance in the context of China is of particular 
interest. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, China's stock market is an emerging 
market. Despite its phenomenal expansion in size, the market displays a host of 
distinctive features which cannot be found in other markets. Putting China in a global 
perspective, Gao (2002) summarised the characteristics of stock market into 14 
points. These points are abnormal performances, tremendous volatility, insulated 
market, substantial government ownership, irregular expansion, influence of IPOs, 
typical emerging market, pyramid structure, unstable core, out-performance of micro 
stocks, incredible speculation, manufacturing orientation, and disappointing earnings 
of companies. Secondly, China's accounting regulatory system is in a transition from 
serving the planned economy to suiting the needs of the market economy. While the 
new regulations have been mostly b'rought in conformity with international 
conventions, significant differences between the Chinese rules and those in the IASs 
still exist. The striking features appearing on both the market side and accounting 
side seem to raise an intriguing question: Although the market valuation theory is 
proven to be true in most developed markets, does it hold in the unique context of 
China? In fact, to address this issue by exploring the association between market 
information and accounting information in China has both theoretical and practical 
implications - if the accounting information disclosed by Chinese listed firms is 
found to be significantly associated with market values, it certainly provides 
evidence that the market valuation theory holds not only in developed markets but in 
emerging markets such as China. 
In Stage one, two questions will be addressed: 
- 
1. Is accounting information provided by Chinese listed firms value relevant? If the 
answer is yes, are there significant differences in terms of value-relevance of 
Chinese accounting information existing during the studied period and across 
industrial sectors? 
2. Is there any other accounting infonnation playing significant roles in explaining 
the market value of listed firms? If yes, what is that? 
Based upon the findings of stage one, the study at stage two will keep a sharp focus 
on the unique ownership structure in the Chinese listed companies. As discussed 
earlier, nearly all listed companies in China are transformed from the former SOEs. 
To ensure the control over the listed firms, the government on average holds two- 
thirds of the total shares in the forms of state shares and legal-person shares. What is 
more, the shares held by the government are not tradable on the open markets. 
China's corporate ownership structure featured by the exceptionally high level of 
government shareholding is distinctively different in comparison with the rest of the 
world. This actually provides an excellent laboratory for researchers to explore the 
market valuation from the perspective of ownership structure. As pointed out earlier, 
the excessive government shareholding has been the source of all sorts of problems 
prevailing in the Chinese stock market e. g. weak corporate governance, worsening 
agency problems, distortion of market prices and ferocious speculation etc. All these 
issues have been explored and acknowledged by a wide range of people such as 
policy markers, market regulators, researchers, managers and investors. However, 
how does the market as a whole view the government shareholding? Does the 
government shareholding increase or decrease the market value of the listed firms in 
China? Does the state shareholding differentiate from the legal-person shareholding 
in explaining the market value? These questions are of particular importance because 
the research findings will enable us to understand a series of fundamental issues in 
the context of China and these issues are: 
1. Is the government shareholding as a whole (state and legal-person shareholding) 
playing a significant role in explaining the market values of listed firms? If yes, 
what exactly is the association between the government shareholding and market 
values? 
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2. If the state ownership is taken alone, does it influence the market value of listed 
firms? Again, if the answer is yes, how do we associate it with the market values? 
3. Do the legal persons play a significant role in explaining the market value of 
listed firms in China? If yes, does the role of legal persons differentiate from 
that of the state? 
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1.3 A Brief Introduction to the Methodology 
As for the methodology, there are three models available in the finance theory and 
practice (OhIson, 1995, Palepu et al., 2004). These models are: 
Firstly, the discounted dividends model (DDM model) suggests that the value of any 
financial claim is simply the present value of the cash payoffs that its claimholders 
receive and is expressed as follows: 
Go DIV 
+ 
(1.1) 
Whereby V, is the equity value of the firm at time t, DIV , the dividend at time t, and 
r. is the cost of equity capital. 
Secondly, the discounted abnormal earnings model (DAE model) suggests that the 
value of a firm's equity consists of two parts: the opening book value of equity and 
the present value of future abnormal earnings (Palepu et al., 2004). This model is 
frequently expressed as follows: 
00 NIj - r, B VE, -, V, =BVEO+ 
+ 
(1.2) 
Whereby V, is the equity value of the firm at time t, BVEo the beginning book value 
of a firm's equity, NI, the net income at time t, BVE, -, 
the book value of a firm's 
equity at time t-1, and r. the cost of equity capital. 
Thirdly, the modified OhIson Model builds up a linear link between the market value 
of a firm and the information contained in the financial statements - book value in 
the balance sheet and net profits in the income statement (OhIson, 1995). It can be 
expressed in a regression model as follows: 
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AlVj, = ao + a, BV,, + a2E,, +c (1.3) 
Where MV,, is the market value of the equity of firmj at time t, BVj, the book value 
of the equity of firmj at time t, E,, the accounting earnings for firmj at time t, c the 
error term. Note that the modified OhIson model can be interpreted as an empirical 
version of the DAE model, but can be interpreted with and without the restrictions 
imposed by the DAE model. 
With the DDM model being the foundation of the market valuation theory, the DAE 
model and modified Ohlson model are the further developments. In this sense, these 
three models are theoretically consistent with each other. Therefore, it will not make 
any difference by choosing different models in this study. However, in practice, the 
application of the DDM model and DAE model is severely restricted by a number of 
factors. The major obstacle comes from the difficulty in obtaining reliable dividends 
data for the DDM model and estimating abnormal earnings and cost of equity capital 
for the DDM model and the DAE model. However, the modified Ohlson model 
builds up a linear link with the market information, e. g. market capitalisation and 
share prices and accounting information, e. g. book value and net profits. For this 
reason, the modified Ohson model is universally used in the field of market valuation. 
Therefore, I will use this model as a foundation model throughout the study. 
Adopting the above model, accounting researchers have carried out numerous studies 
(e. g. Landman 1986; Barth 1991; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Burstaher & 
Dichev 1997, Stark and Thomas, 1998; Arce and Mora, 2002) to explore the relative 
accounting information content in various countries. On the whole, they have found 
the evidence of value-relevance of both the balance sheet and income statement 
information in developed markets including the U. S., Canada, Australia, the U. K. 
France, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Italy etc. 
This study extends this line of inquiry into the emerging Chinese stock market. As 
discussed earlier, because of the unique institutional setting of the Chinese market 
- 13 - 
and significant differences between the Chinese accounting regulations and 
international conventions, the result of this study have far-reaching implications for 
both theory and practice in China and beyond. After all, accounting and financial 
reporting play a vital role in an efficient market. Major accounting standard-setting 
bodies such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) have adopted this investor- 
oriented information usefulness perspective and specially stated that the primary 
purpose of accounting is to meet the needs of capital markets. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that an important objective of the Chinese accounting reform is to improve 
the usefulness of financial reporting in the stock market (Winkle et al., 1994, Xiang, 
1998, Chen et al., 1999, Chen and Su, 2001). 
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1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides the general 
background information relevant to this study including the features of the planned 
economy, the economic growth, economic reforms and open-up policies and the 
resultant changes, the SOE reform and listed companies and the development of the 
stock market. In particular, it will take a close look at the problems facing the listed 
companies and stock market in China. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the construction of the accounting regulatory framework. The 
whole accounting regulatory regime will be historically examined from three 
dimensions: 1) the development of the Accounting Law and the other related laws; 2) 
the promulgation of accounting standards; and 3) the change of accounting system. 
This chapter will also make comments on the whole process of accounting reform by 
addressing two questions: First, what has China achieved in pushing the accounting 
reform ahead? Second, what has driven China's accounting regulatory system to go 
so far? 
The major theme of Chapter 4 is still on Chinese accounting. However, it puts 
Chinese accounting regulations in an international context by addressing the major 
differences between the Chinese generally accepted regulations and the International 
Accounting Standards. The four-dimension approach used by Roberts (2002) will be 
taken in this chapter to obtain an insight into what position Chinese accounting 
stands in these four continuums. What is more, the financial reports from a company 
will be utilised as an example to illustrate the puzzles of Chinese financial reporting. 
4 
Chapter 5 carries out the regression tests for stage one. The central task of stage one 
is to address two questions: Firstly, is accounting information provided by Chinese 
listed firms value relevant? If yes, are there significant differences in terms of value- 
relevance of Chinese accounting information existing during the studied period and 
across 'industrial sectors? Secondly, is there other accounting information playing 
significant role in explaining the market value of listed firms? If yes, what is that? 
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The study at stage two is to be assigned to Chapter 6. Based upon the findings in 
stage one, this chapter takes a sharp focus upon the unique ownership structure of 
Chinese listed companies and the effects of different types of shareholding on the 
market value of listed companies. In particular, three questions will be empirically 
investigated: Firstly, is the government shareholding as a whole (state and legal- 
person shareholding) playing a significant role in explaining the market value of 
listed firms? If yes, what exactly is the association between the government 
shareholding and market value? Secondly, if the state ownership is taken alone, does 
it influence the market value of listed firms? Again, if the answer is yes, how does it 
associate with the market values? Thirdly, do the legal persons play a significant role 
in explaining the market values of listed firms in China? If yes, does the role of legal 
persons differentiate from that of the state? 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising the major findings. 
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Chapter 2. ECONOMIC REFORMS, STOCK MARKET AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A HISTORICAL REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
China's rapid economic expansion in economy in the last two decades has drawn a 
great deal of attention from all over the world and has raised a fundamental question: 
what has driven China's economy to expand at such a phenomenal pace? It is widely 
recognised that the economic reforms and open-up policies started from the late 
1970s have provided the enormous momentum for the economic growth (Tao, 2004, 
Fung et al., 2006, Fong and Lam, 2005, Xinhua, 1992). Having realised that the 
whole country would have collapsed if continuing to stick to the old path, China has 
started reforming its economic system and opening the door to the rest of the world 
since 1978. On the principle of 'crossing the river by touching stones', China has 
taken an irreversible path of economic reforms and open-up policies, which in turn 
have brought about profound changes in all aspects of the country. 
It should be mentioned that the width and depth of the effects of the economic 
reforms and open-up policies have gone far beyond the scope of this thesis. For this 
reason, the emphasis of this chapter will be placed on the striking changes which are 
relevant to this thesis. I therefore will provide a brief portrait of China's economic 
changes by highlighting four fundamental issues: the SOE reform, privatisation 
scheme, marketisation process and China's economic integration into the world. 
These issues are also highly relevant to the spirit of this thesis because, they, 
combined together, have given rise to the emergence of listed companies and China's 
equity market and they have provided imperative to construct the accounting 
regulatory framework. Therefore, it is worthwhile to have a brief look into these 
issues in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the topics to come. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
outlook of China's economic development during the last two decades from the 
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historical perspective. To gain an understanding of the planned economy, the 
distinctive features of the planned economy is discussed briefly in Section 3. Section 
4 reviews the process of the SOE reform by breaking it into four stages. It argues that 
the emergence of listed companies in China is a historical product of the SOE reform 
and also identifies the major problems facing the listed firms. In Section 5, the light 
will be shed on the growth of China's stock market, in particular, the inherent 
problems that have significant impacts on the market will be discovered. 
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2.2 What has happened in China during the Past Quarter of a Century? 
With the gross domestic product (GDP) growing at an average of 9.5 per cent for 26 
successive years, China's economy has been booming since the late 1970s, when 
China embarked on its economic reforms and open-up policies. At the end of 2005, 
China's annual GDP exceeded RMB 18,000 billion (USD 2,250 billion). In terms of 
total GDP, China has outstripped many of the industrialised countries such as the 
U. K., France and Italy, becoming the 40' largest economic power next to the U-S-A, 
Japan and Germany. On the purchasing power basis, China is the secondly largest 
economy in the world only after the U. S. A (Sun and Tong 2002). Within a quarter of 
a century, China has stood in the world as an emerging economic superpower from 
the aftermath of continuous political and social disorders such as the Cultural 
Revolution which has brought the whole country to the brink of collapse. In that 
sense, it has to be acknowledged that China has achieved a phenomenal success 
(Jonquieres, 2006). 
China's economic growth in the past is better seen from Figure 2.1 that illustrates the 
GDP and GDP growth covering a period from 1978 through 2005. As can be seen 
from Figure 2.1, China has witnessed a tremendous expansion in its GDP from RMB 
568 billion in 1978 to RMB 18,232 billion in 2005, implying that China's economy 
has increased by more than 32 times since 1978. GDP has been on the dramatic 
increase throughout 1980s, but the growth has not been steady with the high of 16.4 
per cent and the low of 3.5 per cent. By comparison, the substantial economic growth 
has taken place since the 1990s, especially 1992, when China announced its central 
task of economic reforms is to establish the market economy on the Fourteenth 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 8. In response to the 
government's decision, China's economy achieved a remarkable jump at 12.3 per 
cent in 1992 and 13.4 per cent in 1993. Subsequently, China has experienced a strong 
and robust economic growth for fourteen consecutive years. 
8 Due to the one-party political system in China, most of the significant policies of the government are 
announced in the party conference such as the National Congress of the Chinese Communist party. 
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Figure 2.1 China's GDP and GDP grovv, th from 1978 through 20059 
On a\era-e, China's overall economy has increased at 9.5 per cent during tile period 
from 1978 through 2005, with the GD11 growth exceeding 10 per cent in II out of 28 
years. The rapid growth of China's economy is better reflected in Table 2.1 that 
provides a comparison between China's GDP growth rate and those of the major 
countries and regions in the world. As can be seen, during the periods from 1991 
through 2000 and from 2001 through 2004, the average GDP growth for tile whole 
world is 2.8 per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively. China far outperformed the world 
with the average growth of 9.7 per cent and 9.4 per cent in the same periods. 
Furthermore, China's economy has been growing much faster than have the major 
industrialised countries e. g. tile U. S., the U. K. and Japan. Compared with developing 
Countries Such as India which is widely regarded as the economic rival of China in 
1) There are three methods to calculate GDP: expenditure approach, production approach and revenue 
approach. The GDP data released by the State Bureau of Statistics of China are derived under the 
production approach. 
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the future, China's economic expansion appears to be much stronger in the above 
periods. Even in the emerging markets in Asia such as Malaysia, South Korea, 
Chinese Taiwan and Singapore, China has achieved much better performance in 
economic growth, especially in the period from 2001 through 2004. 
Emerging 
Markets in 
China U. S. U. K. India Asia World 
1991- 
2000 9.7 3.3 2.4 1.4 5.5 8.1 2.8 
2001- 
2004 9.4 2.5 2.3 1 6 2.7 
Source: Data are the 2004 International Statistics Database, the National Bureau ofStatistics of 
China, wim. slats. gov. cn. 
Table 2.1 GDP growth rates in some countries and regions from 1991 through 
2000 and from 2001 through 2004 
What's hidden behind the explosive economic expansion has drawn a great deal of 
interest across the world (Fong and Lam, 2005). And it is widely believed that the 
economic reforms and open-policies have been the vehicle through which China's 
economy has achieved strong and robust growth during the past two and half decades. 
Faced with great difficulties resulted from the implementation of planned economy 
and waves of political and social turmoil during 1960s and 1970s e. g. the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China was eventually determined to reform its 
economic systems and open the door to the rest of the world. The Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978 was 
widely seen as the watershed event in the recent history of China (Jiang, 1997, Zhang, 
2005, Wang, 2005, Fung et al., 2006, Fong and Lam, 2005)10. It was in this party 
conference that China unveiled the government's ambitions to depart from the old 
path. 
" China's unique political setting of one-party-rule implies that the voice of the Chinese Communist 
Party represents the decision of the government. 
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It is worth mentioning that the economic reforms consist of a comprehensive set of 
schemes covering nearly all aspects of the economic system. These schemes were put 
forth at different times to target different areas and issues. China's economic reform 
started with the agricultural sector. The first reform scheme was initiated in 1978 
with the focus placed upon shaking up the rural economic system. Farmers were 
allowed to have the usage right of land, grow grain crops and retain a part of the 
profits they were able to generate. The main objective was to restore the material 
incentives and production autonomy by encouraging family-based farming and 
individual responsibility (rather than collective farming as practiced before the 
reform started). The success in the agricultural sector soon promoted the debate on 
how to reform the industrial sector. Based upon the experiences accumulated from 
the agricultural reform, the SOE reform was launched in 1984 to revitalise the ailing 
state enterprises. The price reform started at the beginning of 1980s to gradually 
introduce the concepts of the market and market prices. Non-state sectors such as 
private economy and foreign investments were encouraged to develop to drive the 
economic expansion and absorb the huge labour force. Finally, the transition of 
economic system from centralised planning to socialist market was announced by the 
government in 1992 to further deepen the economic reforms. 
It is has to be emphasised that China's economic reforms have taken a completely 
different approach from those of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
(Feltenstein and Nsouli, 2003, Fung, 2003, Fung et al., 2006, Liu and Garino, 2001). 
Unlike the above-mentioned countries who transformed the economy by enforcing a 
set of radical changes together with full-scale implementation of privatisation 
programme, China's economic reforms have been taking an experimental approach. 
This approach has eventually led China to take a gradual and steady process in 
reforming its economic system. Liu and Garino (2001) argue that China's reform 
experiences have been unique, in the sense that it did not start with a blueprint or a 
clear picture of market economy, but with a trial-and-error strategy. Indeed, the 
government's idea of launching economic reforms and open-up policies did not come 
from a clear picture of the future because there are no experiences to be learned. 
'Crossing the river by touching stones' has become the only choice and major 
principle for the Chinese reformers. The central idea of this principle is to discover 
truth via a learning-by-doing process. When necessary experience has been 
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accumulated and lessons learned, progressive improvements followed. In fact the 
experimental approach is reflected in almost every reform measure taken by the 
government. For example, the state owned enterprise reform started in 1980 within 
Sichuan Province (Liu and Garino, 2001). The Sichuan experiment provided the 
managers of SOEs with both production autonomy and material incentives in order 
to increase business vitality and improve efficiency. After a trial of four years this 
experiment was considered successful. The central government then started a full- 
scale implementation of the methods experimented by Sichuan Province, offering all 
SOEs with production autonomy and material incentives. 
If there is one thing that has reshaped the post-Mao China since the 1970s, it must be 
the economic reforms and open-up policies, which has not only fuelled the massive 
economic expansion, but also brought about a series of fundamental changes to the 
whole country. From the standpoint of this thesis, these changes can be summarised 
into four major points. 
Firstly, among all the changes resulted from economic reforms and open-up policies, 
the most striking change would be that China has been transformed from a planned 
economy to a market economy. Although the government did not announce that the 
ultimate goal of the economic reforms is to establish the socialist market economy 
until 1992, the marketisation process has started since the early 1980s. To introduce a 
market mechanism into the whole economy, China started its price reform at the 
beginning of the 1980s with an experimental out-of-plan market for small 
commodities that proved successful in reducing supply shortages. This led to a full- 
scale market price experiment in the late 1980s, which created a mix-up of planned 
and market economy where almost every good had dual prices". The 'dual price 
system' became a playing field where Chinese people, who'had lived in a planned 
economy for almost 30 years, learned the power of market prices. The acquired 
knowledge and confidence in managing the market then led to the government 
decision in 1992 to finally free all plan prices and develop a full market economy. 
11 The 'dual prices system' is a unique phenomenon in China in the late 1980s and it refers to a 
situation where goods inside the planned economic system are traded at prices determined by state's 
plans and the above-plan goods are traded at the market prices. 
- 23 - 
Since then establishing market economy has become the central task of the economic 
reforms. Despite the fact that China is still an emerging economy, it has 
accomplished a significant achievement in establishing the market and making 
associated institutional arrangements. 
Secondly, the whole process of economic reforms and open-up policies can also be 
interpreted as privatisation. Prior to the reforms, the whole economy of the country 
was nearly entirely financed, owned and controlled by the state. Due to the 
ideological concerns deeply rooted in the policy markers, private sectors and foreign 
investments were completely eliminated from the whole state-controlled system. The 
government's decision to depart from the 'old path' has in effect opened a door to the 
non-state economy. Private companies were allowed to develop to fill in the gap left 
over by the state firms. Towns and villages were given a green light to run the town- 
owned and village-owned businesses. Foreign investments were attracted to China's 
market by a series of preferential policies e. g., tax cuts and government subsidies. As 
a result, the country's overall ownership structure has undergone a revolutionary 
change from the predominance of state economy to a widely diversified portfolio of 
business entities. It has to be mentioned that development of non-state economy has 
been truly phenomenal. Within a period of a quarter of a century, the scale of non- 
state economy has overtaken that of state economy, becoming the major engine to 
drive the economic expansion and the main stay of the national economy. According 
to Fung et al. (2006), non-state-owned and foreign-funded enterprises have 
contributed over 60 per cent of industrial production in the Chinese economy, while 
over 90 per cent of Chinese workers are now employed by non-state sectors. 
The change in status of non-state economy can also be reflected from the 
constitutional changes since the privatisation process began. To grant the non-state 
economy a legitimate status, in particular private sectors, China's Constitution has 
been revised four times since the early 1980s. In 1982, China made its first 
constitutional change to allow the establishment of individual enterprises employing 
fewer than eight employees. In 1988, the constitutional amendment recognised the 
importance of private enterprises and pointed out that non-state economy is an 
important supplement to the national economy. In 1999, the issue of protecting 
private properties was brought to the centre of the Constitution's revision. The latest 
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and most significant amendment occurred in 2004 with the law stating that both state 
and non-state economy are indispensable parts of the national economy and the state 
encourages, supports, and guides the development of non-state sectors. 
Thirdly, the SOE reform has been the core of economic reforms since 1984, when 
the government decided to shift the focus of reforms from rural areas to cities. SOEs 
built in the planned economy have always been the biggest headache to the 
government since they suffer a host of problems e. g. a lack of incentives and 
managerial autonomy, low efficiency, poor operating performance, and serious 
overstaffing etc. In response to these symptoms, the SOE reform at early stages 
placed an emphasis upon providing state firms with managerial autonomy and 
material incentives. A series of measures have been taken, including changing the 
means of financing from state appropriation to bank loans and the implementation of 
the Responsibility Contract System, however, these measures have not been 
satisfactorily effective in improving the profitability of SOEs. It was until 1992 when 
the government decided to develop the market economy that China started to seek for 
the underlying cause of the 'SOE syndrome'. The concept of property rights and 
establishing modem enterprises characterised by clarified property rights and 
separation of management from ownership have become the ma or theme of the SOE 
reform since 1992. As a result, the shareholding system was put on trial in large- and 
medium-sized state firms, which eventually gave rise to the listed companies and the 
stock market. Objectively speaking, it might be too early to make any comments on 
the success of the SOE reform because it is still ongoing and far from completion. 
However, the ever-deepening SOEs reform has profoundly altered the corporate 
landscape in China. The SOE reform in China will be discussed in details in Section 
3 of this chapter. 
Fourthly, internationalisation is another good depiction of what's happened in China 
over the last two decades. The government's policy to encourage the development of 
foreign investments and global trading have prompted the emergence of overseas 
economy, which has experienced an explosive expansion and now become the 
leading force of the entire economy. In fact, the open-up policies deserves the same 
level of attention as economic reforms. There is no doubt that China's entry into 
WTO in 2001 has accelerated the internationalisation process of China's economy. 
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With nearly USD 500 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) flooded into China 
during the past two decades, China has been extremely successful in attracting 
foreign investments, making it the largest FDI recipient country in the world since 
2002 (Sun and Tong, 2002). What is more, China's international trading (the total of 
imports and exports) hit the record level of USD 1,442 billion in 2005, accounting 
for over 65% of the total GDP. The rapid development of international trading has 
made China the third largest leading exporters and importers in the world 
merchandise trade, next only to the U. S. A and Germany 12 . 
In short, the rapid economic expansion over the past two decades is only the 
phenomenon appearing on the surface. Deep inside, the country has undergone a 
series of fundamental changes which in turn reshaped all aspects of the post-Mao 
China since the late 1970s. China is currently in a key stage where the whole country 
is being transformed from a planned economy to a market economy. The rapid rise of 
non-state sectors is in a striking contrast to the ailing state economy. SOEs reform 
has profoundly altered China's corporate landscape and eventually given birth to the 
stock market and listed companies. Foreign direct investments and international 
trading have made China an importantly part of the world economy. 
12 Source: Data citied in this paragraph are from the Yearly Book of China Statistics 2005 published 
on the website of Bureau of Statistics of China, wwNv. stats. izov. uk. 
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2.3 The Planned Economy and State-owned Enterprises 
Copying the former Soviet-Union's style, China has adopted the planned economy 
since 1949 when the P. R. China was founded by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CPP). The key feature of the planned economy, at the macro level, is that the 
government plan replaces the market in allocating economic resources through long- 
and short-term plans (Zhang, 2005). Under the planned economy, a special 
governmental body, the State Planning Committee (SPC), was established to plan the 
economic development and formulate targets for all industries. Within the planning 
system, factories manufacture products according to the plan; farmers plant 
agricultural products to fulfil the target; wholesalers and retailers purchase and buy 
goods subject to the plan. Quantities, prices, and varieties of goods are all determined 
by the SPC. In short, all economic activities and economic resources under the 
planned economy are driven by the plan, surrounding the plan and reined by the plan. 
Another striking feature of planned economy is that public ownership dominates the 
entire economy and other forms of ownership such as private ownership and foreign 
ownership are strictly prohibited. Under the planned economy, economic resources 
are owned by the government and the state represented by the government acts as a 
huge machine running all types of economic activities through plans and tight control 
over all economic units e. g., factories, plants, wholesalers, retailers, banks, farms, 
and mines etc. These economic units usually take two forms in terms of ownership: 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) and collectively-owned enterprises (COEs). State 
owned enterprises are entirely owned by the state, while owners of collectively- 
owned enterprises are a mix of governmental bodies and local non-govemmental 
organisations such as residence committees in cities. In general, state-owned 
enterprises are the main stay of the economy and collectively-owned ones are viewed 
as the supplementary part in the institutional arrangements. Although the former 
slightly differs from the latter in terms of ownership, they are largely the same in 
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tenns of ownership. Therefore these two types of ownership, put together, are called 
the public ownership 13 . 
What's more, SOEs under planned economy are by no means business entities from 
the perspective of the market economy. SOEs fundamentally differ from business 
entities in market economy in that the economic units are not geared towards profit- 
seeking . Rather, they are functioning like different components attached to the state 
machine. Financed, founded and managed by the government, SOEs under the 
planned economy simply take orders from the government and fulfil the targets 
formulated by the SPC. Furthermore, with the government both owning SOEs and 
running the businesses of SOEs, the management is not separated from ownership. 
The planned economy that China has adopted since 1949 has done a pretty good job 
in assisting the economy to recover from the chaos resulted from years of civil wars 
at the early stage, especially in 1950s (Zhang, 2005). He argued that centralised plans 
do work well on some special conditions e. g., the early stage of post-war era when 
the market is not functioning well. In the absence of the market, the utilisation of 
administrative forces is needed in that they can allocate economic resources into the 
most-needed area, thus ensuring the economic development to keep up with the state 
plan. However, when the order of the market is restored and the economic 
development back on track, drawbacks of planned economy begin to emerge and 
eventually outweigh the benefits. As a result, continuing to implement the planned 
economy will jeopardise the health of the economy. 
The fatal drawbacks of planned economy can be identified at two different levels. At 
the macro level, costs of allocating economic resources by the means of centralised 
plans are prohibitively high as oppose to the market. Under the planned economy, 
economic resources are allocated by the means of administrative forces, rather than 
the market. The nation-wide economy of the state is like a huge firm run by the 
government with all types of SOEs performing different tasks according to 
centralised plans. If one sees the whole state as a firm, then a fundamental question 
13 Just because of this and for simplicity, state owned enterprises and collectively-owned enterprises 
will be termed SOEs throughout the rest of this thesis. 
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needs to be addressed: what determines the firm's boundaries? Cabral (2000) argue 
that the size of the firm is largely determined by costs. If average cost is U-shaped 
and there is free entry into the industry, then firms tend to produce at the level where 
average cost is minimised. For example, if there is an optimal size for a cement plant 
that minimises costs. Plant of much smaller size or much larger size would probably 
incur a higher average cost and be unable to survive for very long. Following the 
above argument, one can clearly see that China's practice in implementing the 
planned economy comes with a huge cost to build up and manage a firm on such a 
national scale. As a result, the efficiency of allocating economy resources is lowered 
and ultimately the economy as a whole is harmed. 
At the micro level, property rights are not clarified in the state-run economic units 
and consequently there is no one to be held accountable for the state property. As a 
matter of fact, the issue of property rights stands at the heart of the problems 
encountered by China's SOEs. State firms are in theory owned by the state and the 
government is exercising property rights on behalf of the state. In practice, however, 
it is unlikely to create an effective mechanism in which the government is held 
accountable for state enterprises. Management in SOEs takes no responsibility for 
state properties in that they are acting like government agencies to ensure the SOEs 
14 they are in charge to fulfil the targets . The fact that property rights are not clarified 
in state-run enterprise has been the source of all problems with SOEs such as low 
efficiency, overstaffing and lack of incentive mechanism, etc. These problems are so 
widespread and serious that it comes as no surprise to see that one-third of SOEs are 
suffering losses, one-third of SOEs are breaking even and one-third of SOEs are 
making moderate profits (Sun and Tong, 2003). 
14 Under planned economy, SOEs managers are in fact pubic servants, rather than entrepreneurs. Most 
high-level managers in SOEs even carry the hierarchical titles as government officials. 
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2.4 The SOE Reform and Listed Companies 
As mentioned previously, the economic reforms consist of a series of reform 
schemes targeting different areas of the planned economy. Standing at the heart of 
the economic reforms, the SOE reform plays a vital role in determining the success 
of the entire economic reforms because the long-term prosperity of China will not be 
sustainable without the profit-making business entities (Jiang, 1997). As discussed 
previously, SOEs under the planned economy have suffered a host of serious 
problems, with the fundamental flaw being the lack of accountability for state 
enterprises due to un-clarified property rights. In order to revitalise the ailing state 
enterprises, the government has taken a series of measures since 1984 and this 
process is still continuing. According to Sun and Tong (2005), the whole process of 
SOE reform can be broken into four key stages. 
The first stage ran from 1984 to 1987. Inspired by the success in reforming the rural 
economic system by offering farmers with material incentives and production 
autonomy, the government started to bring enterprise autonomy and introduce 
incentive mechanism into SOEs. State enterprises were allowed to retain 3 per cent 
of their profits so that there were incentives to improve productivity and efficiency. 
Administration of SOEs was decentralised so the management could enjoy a certain 
level of autonomy. This in turn gave state firms a formal right to determine above- 
plan output quantity and retain profits after the fulfilment of planned targets. The rise 
in autonomy and incentives increased managerial efforts, but did not ensure the 
accountability of SOEs. As a consequence, SOEs are motivated to bargain with and 
even to hide profits from the government. This eventually led the government to take 
further measures which signifies the beginning of the second stage. 
The second stage ran from 1987 to 1990. Two significant measures were brought in 
by the goverment in this stage. First, SOEs were required to pay taxes instead of 
turning in profits so no more bargaining on profit sharing is necessary. Second, the 
funding for the state firm's capital investments, instead of being allocated directly 
from the government financial reserves, had to come through bank loans. This policy 
relieved the government's financial burden and made SOEs more cautious in their 
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use of capital. The intention of these two measures was clear: to encourage the 
production-unit-style state enterprises to become independent and profit-seeking 
business entities. However, this goal has not been achieved. Even worse, the shift 
from state allocation of capital to bank loans has given rise to a huge 'triangular debt' 
problem. This refers to the fact that a great number of SOEs are in debt to one 
another. According to Sun and Tong (2003), the average total debt ratio of SOEs was 
as high as 67.9 per cent in 1994 and 65.1 per cent in 1996. In 1994,27.6 per cent of 
the SOEs had total debts higher than their total asset values. Another 21.5 per cent of 
the SOEs had total debts equal to total equities. The recent study suggests that 
China's total liabilities for non-performing loans may be as high as $900 billion 
(McGregor, 2006b). The principal reason behind the widespread triangular debts is 
that no legal arrangements were set up to tackle the problem of unsettled debts 
among SOEs. When a default occurred there was not even a legal recourse by which 
a creditor can pursue its legal action against the debtor. In fact, a legal arrangement 
simply could not be established when property rights of state enterprises arc not 
completely clarified. 
Faced with the debt problem arising from state bank loans, the government initiated 
the Contractual Management System (CMS) in the late 1980s, which marked the 
third stage of the reform process. The focus of the CMS was to separate the 
government ownership from the control over SOE's operations. According to the 
CMS, a contract is signed between the government agents and management. The 
contract ensures that the government keeps its hands off the day-to-day operations 
and management runs businesses independently. In return, SOEs has to agree on 
committing a certain amount of tax to the government. Profits after tax are retained 
by state enterprises. The CMS seems to have worked on the issue of separation of 
government ownership from control. However, the SOE's obligation was on the 
profit side, not on the loss side. Profitable SOEs were required to pay taxes but loss- 
making firms were not fully responsible for their losses whatsoever. The impact of 
the CMS was investigated by Nolan and Yeung (2001) who point out that the 
contract system was a crude instrument for allocating the stream of business profits. 
In particular, it almost fails to achieve its goal of imposing a hard budget constraint 
on the firm, because of the enforcement problem resulting from uncertainty in the 
contract specification. 
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The failure of the SMC to solve accountability problem forced China to think of a 
more effective approach to reforming state enterprises by tackling the fundamental 
issue of property rights. The 14'h National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
in October 1992 announced the target of constructing a socialist market economy and 
establishing a modem corporate system, implying the beginning of the fourth stage 
of the SOE reform. Rather than pursuing the traditional approach of providing SOEs 
with managerial autonomy and incentives, the central task of this stage was to 
transform SOEs into 'modem enterprises' adapted to the market economy featured 
by clarified property rights and the separation of management from ownership. 
Having these thoughts in mind, the government formulated different remedies to 
SOEs with different sizes. In December 1994, the State Council proposed a pilot 
scheme for a few large SOEs. This led to the policy of 'taking a firm grip on the 
large and letting go of the small'. According to this policy, many weak and small- 
scale state enterprises were simply sold off to private hands or foreign investors, 
while some large- and medium-sized SOEs were transformed into shareholding 
companies, which ultimately evolved into publicly listed companies. By carrying out 
the experiment on share-holding system in SOEs, the government has shifted a 
considerable portion of state ownership to either private bodies or other legal persons 
(institutions), while retaining a state-dominated shareholding position in the stake. 
As a result, different owners were created and accordingly property rights were 
clarified to some extent. Corporate governance mechanisms were brought into the 
share-based company to mitigate the agency problems arising from the separation of 
management from ownership. Some good-performance companies have gone even 
further, going public by listing their shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. 
As can be seen from the above discussion, by comparison with Eastern European 
countries and the former Soviet Union who have gone from one extreme to another 
extreme, China has taken a distinctive approach in pushing ahead its SOEs reforms 
(Liu and Garino, 2001, Sun and Tong, 2003, Fung et al., 2006). From economic units 
attached to the state machine under the planned economy to 'modem enterprises' 
with diversified ownership and the separation of management from ownership, China 
did not take a straight-line route to get to the current position. The measures taken by 
the government at different stages are simply reflective of the fact that the 
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government was learning by doing. The unique institutional setting of China has 
made it extremely difficult to copy existing experiences from other market-oriented 
countries. Equally importantly, every measure taken by the government to lead the 
SOE reform further had to suit the overall economic and political conditions. For 
instance, the U. K. has been successful in privatising its state-owned utilities 
companies by issuing shares in the 1970s and the 1980s. However, it was utterly 
impossible for China to follow the same approach in the 1980s simply because, 
politically, privatisation is contradictory to the fundamental principle of the Chinese 
Communist Party and more importantly, stock markets and other related institutions 
did not come into existence at that time. It was only after the ideological debates 
were settled and market conditions matured that China started implementing the 
shareholding system and corporatising SOEs through the issuance of shares. 
As discussed earlier in this section, it was the experiment of stockholding system that 
eventually gave rise to the listed companies. A shareholding system was 
implemented in the large- and medium-sized state firms because it could, at least 
theoretically, fulfil a number of objectives. Firstly, with shares being sold to private 
sectors and other institutions, multiple shareholders are created. Although the state 
holds majority of the shares in most listed companies, the existence of diversified 
interest groups in state firms may help clarify property rights's. Secondly, SOEs 
could be transformed into independent, profit-seeking and market-oriented business 
entities as a result of management being separated from ownership. With an effective 
corporate governance mechanism in place, management is held accountable for the 
materialisation of the firm's targets and is monitored by a broad range of 
stakeholders. Thirdly, direct intervention of government is likely to be limited as 
share-based companies are no longer solely owned by the government. Other types 
of shareholders e. g. institutions may impose restrictions to the government's 
influence. Fourthly, private and foreign funds may be channelled into the SOEs who 
desperately need cash to get out of difficulties. Fifthly, management and staff can be 
provided with a material incentive by being compensated with shares. Unlike 
incentives introduced at early stages of SOE reforms which motivated firms to hide 
" The government on average holds two thirds of the shares of the listed companies in China. Details 
of shareholding by the government will be discussed in Section 5 of this chapter and Chapter 5. 
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profits from the government, the share-based incentive appears to be more effective 
in that share prices are determined by market and they are relatively hard to 
manipulate. . 
Fuelled by the benefits arising from the shareholding system, listed companies have 
emerged in China since the early 1990s with the establishment of the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock, exchanges in December 1990. Fifteen years on, the expansion in the 
number ofcompanies listed on the two exchanges has been absolutely phenomenal. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.2, there were merely 10 listed companies back in 1990, 
ho, vN, evcr, the number of companies going pubic went up to 1381 at the end of 2005. 
Note that the increase from 10 to 1381 has been explosive in that the rise happened 
within a period of as short as 16 years. In some years such as 1993, one year after the 
government announced its plan to shift the economic system from a planned 
economy to a market economy, China witnessed a three-fold increase in the total 
IlUmber of listed companies from 53) to 183. 
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Figure 2.2 Total number of listed companies in China from 1990 through 200-5 
Because the stockholding system is a rather recent development in China, the 
ownership structure of Chinese listed companies has some unique features not found 
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in the stock markets of most developed economies. Shares of listed companies are 
normally classified as A-shares designated for domestic investors and B-, H- and N- 
shares designated for overseas investors. A-shares are further divided into state 
shares, legal-person shares and tradable A-shares, and employee shares. State shares 
are those owned by the state, i. e., the central government and local governments. 
Legal-person shares are those held by domestic legal enterprises, and non-bank 
financial institutions. Both state shares and legal-person shares are not tradable on 
the stock exchanges, but the latter can be transferred to other legal persons upon the 
approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Tradable A-shares, 
which can be held by Chinese citizens and institutions, are the only class of share 
that can be traded among domestic investors. 
16 
B-, H- and N-shares are those that can only be held and traded by foreign investors 
The market for B-shares is separated from the A-share market. They are denominated 
in US dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in Hong Kong dollars on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. H- and N-shares are similar to B-shares in nature, except 
that they are listed and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York 
Stock Exchange, respectively. 
Employee shares are a unique feature of the Chinese stockholding system. They 
represent the accumulated profits retained by the pre-initial-public-offering entities 
under the Contract Responsibility System and are collectively owned by the 
employees of the company. They are not tradable at the time of listing and are 
managed by either an investment management committee or a staff union. 
At present, a typical listed firm has a mixed ownership structure. The state, legal 
persons and domestic individual investors are the dominant groups of stockholders, 
each accounting for 30% of total shares outstanding. Many listed firms do not have 
employee and foreign shares, and even if they do, these shares on average consist of 
16 These rules have recently been loosened up. Chinese investors have been allowed to invest in the 13- 
share market from January 2001 onwards. As of I' December 2000, foreign investors could be 
granted the permit to enter the A-share market under the scheme of Qualified Financial Institutional 
Investors (QFII). 
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less than 10% of total shares outstanding when combined (Qi et al., 2000). Although 
a company has a mix of multiple categories of shares, however, the holder of a share 
is entitled to the same cash flow and voting right regardless of the share type. The 
share composition of a typical listed company is illustrated by Figure 2.3. 
Share Composition of A Typical Listed Company 
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Source: Data arefi-om www. cst-c., gov. uk the website of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
Figure 2.3 Share composition of a typical listed company in China 
There is strong criticism over the current mix of' shares in the listed companies. 
Especially, the criticism is centred on the excessively high percentage of state shares 
and legal person shares which are not tradable on the open markets (Qi et al., 2000, 
Wang and Jiang, 2004, Wang, 2005, Tian, 2001, Easton, 1985, Hovey et al., 2003). 
Clearly, the government holds the majority of shares in listed companies with the 
intention that the state will not lose control over the listed companies after state firms 
go public. Behind this intention is the belief that being a controlling shareholder can 
prevent the loss of state property. While the government might be right on insisting 
the control is essential, the fact that state remains the controlling shareholder, in 
practice, leaves the government in a rather awkward situation. Materialisation of the 
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theoretical benefits listed previously has been seriously hampered. Even worse, more 
problems are likely to arise from the state and legal-person shareholding. 
Firstly, an effective corporate governance mechanism is unlikely to be established 
within a listed company that is tightly controlled by the government. It is a 
commonplace practice that every stock market in the world has non-tradable shares, 
such as cross-holdings, government-owned shares and private holding. Using an 
index called 'free float ratio' that is defined as the proportion of freely tradable 
shares available to investors, Gao (2002) provided a comparison between the 
liquidity of China's stock market and that of some leading stock markets in the world. 
He has found that, from 1993 to 2001, China's free float ratio of 29.3 per cent 
appears to be extremely low by comparison with 93.9 per cent in the U. S., 79.9 per 
cent in Europe, 87.8 per cent in Austria, 82.0 per cent in Canada and 79.6 per cent in 
Japan. Even compared with other emerging markets which record a ratio of 77.5 per 
cent, China's low free float ratio poses a striking contrast. In fact, the extremely low 
free float ratio is due to the widespread government ownership. As an existing SOE 
converts to a listed company, only one-third of its shares are typically issued to the 
public. The rest remain in the hands of either the government or the legal persons and 
are not allowed to trade on the open market 17 . 
Excessive government shareholding makes it extremely difficult for the government 
to impose an effective governance mechanism in listed companies. To float on the 
stock exchange, an SOE is usually to be transformed to a share-based company with 
diversified shareholders owning the firm. While the legal form of the company has 
been transformed, the fundamental issues deeply rooted in the firm have hardly been 
touched. For example, the board of directors is set up in all listed companies, 
however, Bai et al. (2004) found that more than one third of the CEOs are also either 
the chairmen or vice chairmen of the board of directors, which is likely to impede the 
board from playing an effective monitoring role. Independent directors do exist but 
17 It is widely argued that legal-person shareholding is by nature a type of government shareholding 
due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of legal persons are actually under the tight control of 
the government. For this reason, government shareholding is used to include both state shareholding 
and legal-person shareholding. 
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they are usually selected and appointed by the government body, the Bureau of State 
Property Management (BSPM). This actually raises a question as to how 
independent they can be. The supervisory board is created to ensure the board of 
directors and management of the company are under scrutiny, but its role is seriously 
restricted due to their weak enforcement power. As a result, the corporate 
governance practice in China's listed companies is widely considered poor (Bai et al., 
2004, Qi et al., 2000, Sun and Tong, 2003). The reason behind this is clear: excessive 
government shareholding enables the transformation to occur only at the surface and 
the corporate governance mechanism is hard to be established. 
Secondly, direct government intervention into the firm's day-to-day operation is 
inevitable. While holding a majority of shares may well ensure the state's control 
over a firm, it also poses a threat to the goal of SOEs reform: to separate 
management from the government's intervention. On one hand, the government has 
been working hard on providing firms with managerial autonomy and pushing state 
firms to run their businesses independently; on the other hand, the government's 
majority shareholding makes it perfectly possible for the government to step into the 
firm's operation. It is well accepted that government's objectives may differ greatly 
from those of the firms (Sun et al., 2002). While companies consider profit-seeking 
as the ultimate goal, the government will have to take political and social 
responsibilities into consideration. In a company with a majority of shares owned by 
the state, when the government's interest conflicts with that of the firm, it is likely 
that the government will have to force the firm to compromise using its control. For 
example, a common headache for Chinese state firms is overstaffing. In order to 
improve the efficiency, companies would have to lay off excessive employees. 
However, lay-off plans are frequently under the pressure from the government due to 
the concern that high level of unemployment could cause serious social and political 
problems. 
Thirdly, the fact that the government remains to be the principal stakeholder could 
also lead to two types of agency problems. Clessens et al. (2000) argue that there are 
two types of agency problems in modem firms. The Type I agency problem arises 
from the separation of management from ownership. The Type 11 agency problem 
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refers to the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
The separation of ownership and stewardship gives management substantial 
discretionary power to use the shareholder's resources for personal gains. Hence a set 
of effective mechanisms e. g. corporate governance is necessary to resolve or at least 
alleviate the conflicts between the firm's owners and its managers. However, as 
discussed previously, the function of corporate governance is severely limited by the 
state's majority shareholding, which could provide management with considerable 
loophole to abuse the managerial power. For this reason, and coupled with the 
lagged-behind legislation, lack of transparency and information asymmetry, The 
Type I agency problems in Chinese listed companies are likely be rather serious. 
Equally serious is the Type 11 agency problem. Concentrated equity ownership 
makes the largest shareholder in an unchallenged position to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Bai et al. (2004) found that listed companies in China usually have one 
major owner holding a significant percentage of the sharesI8. Hence, the transfer of 
resources out of listed companies into the parent companies or other related parties is 
perfectly feasible. 
It should be mentioned that the above problems related to the excessively high state 
ownership have been so serious that the regulators have already brought out plans to 
reduce the government shareholding in listed companies. On the 4 th September 2005, 
the CSRC promulgated the Administrative Measures on the Split Share Structure 
Reform of Listed Companies, providing detailed regulations on how to reduce the 
state and legal-person shareholding. According to the plan, the reduction of state and 
legal-person shareholding will be carried out on the trial base before it is 
implemented on the full scale. 
The unique ownership structure of Chinese listed companies has attracted a great 
deal of interest across the world. In the field of market valuation, the majority 
shareholding by the government and legal persons has also provided an excellent 
laboratory for investigating the impact of the government control on the market value. 
Researchers so far have carried out extensive studies on these issues and produced 
" According to Bai et al., on average, the largest shareholder in listed companies holds 44.8% of the 
total shares. 
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inconclusive results (Xu and Wang, 1999, Wang, 2005, Sun et al., 2002, Shi, 2003ý 
Qi et al., 2000, Delios and Wu, 2005, Bai et al., 2004). This thesis will have a close 
look at the empirical evidence in Chapter 6. 
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2.5 The Emerging Chinese Stock Market 
With no doubt, China's stock market is one of the fastest-growing markets in the 
entire world. The fact that the stock market is developing fast, however, focuses on 
only one side of the coin. The other side deserves the same attention: a host of 
serious problems such as an incomplete corporate governance structure, excessive 
government intervention into the market, inadequate regulatory capacity, intrinsic 
structural defects of the market, ferocious market manipulation and all kinds of traps. 
This section will have a look at both sides of the story by addressing three issues. In 
particular, it will shed the light on the ongoing problems with the stock market. More 
importantly, not only will these problems be identified, but also it will focus on 
analysing the underlying cause of the problems. 
2.5.1 Phenomenal growth vs. serious problems: what is the major theme of China's 
stock market? 
China's stock market has experienced tremendous growth in size since the inceptions 
of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange (SHSE). As illustrated in Figure 2.2 in 
the last section, the number of listed companies reached 1381 at the end of 2005 - up 
from only 10 companies in the early 1990s. As can be seen from Figure 2.4, market 
capitalisation in China in the last 14 years on the whole has been on the sharp rise, 
although the increase is not always steady. The MC went up from RMB 105 billion 
(USD 13 billion) in 1992 to RMB 4,809 billion (USD 580 billion) in 2000 then 
dropped to RMB 3,243 billion (USD 405 billion) in 2005 following a few ups and 
downs. By its peak, total MC accounted for more than 50 per cent of GDP in 2000. 
Within a period as short as 10 years, China's stock market has become the third 
largest one in Asia based on market capitalisation next to Japan and Hong Kong and 
this growth is still continuing (Chen, 2003). From 2000 through 2005, China's stock 
market has raised capital worth a total of RMB 905 billion (USD 113 billion). 
Trading activities have been extremely active despite the stock market downturn 
since 2000. Trading volume averaged at RMB 3,887 billion per year (USD 486 
billion) within a period between 2000 and 2005, accounting for 22 per cent of the 
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total GDP in 2005. In 2000, the year before the stock market began to tumble, 
trading volurne hit the record level of RMB 6083 billion (USD 760 billion), 60% per 
cent of GDP in that year. The phenomenal expansion of the market can also be 
reflected by the number of stock accounts which rose from 45,000 in 1990 to 73 
million at the end of 200519. 
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Figure 2.4 Total market capitalisation of Chinese stock market (1992-2005) 
Despite the fact that it has expanded rapidly in size, China's stock market is still an 
emerging market. The nature of the emerging market can be revealed by a number of 
significant problems inherent in China's unique institutional arrangements, legal 
framework and economic conditions. In other words, China's stock market is still in 
its early stage of development. From the perspective of market valuation, an in-depth 
understanding of the fundamental problems facing China's stock market is essential 
because market valuation is based upon the links between equity market information 
19 Statistics cited in this paragraph are all from w-ww. csrc. org,. uk, the website of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. 
- 42 - 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
and accounting information. Ignorance of these problems could lead one to jump into 
faulty conclusions. In particular, market information in China could be misleading 
and distorted due to the structural defect of the market, the government's excessive 
intervention and rampant illegal activities e. g., price manipulation, insider trading etc. 
For example, does the total number of stock accounts of 73 million represent that of 
investors in the stock market? The answer is obviously no as the number of investors 
is vastly different from that of stock accounts. First, the same investor has to have 
one account with the Shanghai Stock Exchange and one with the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, if he or she is to trade stocks listed on both exchanges. These two 
accounts of the same investor are counted as two. Second, investors often own 
multiple accounts to hide their identity by opening accounts using borrowed ID cards 
from others. This is a common practice especially among market manipulators, who 
have to hide their trade to evade regulators' attention. In fact, some researchers such 
as Chen (2003) believe that a realistic number of investors is around 10 million or 
less. Therefore, it would be helpful to provide an in-depth analysis on the principal 
problems facing the China's stock market. In particular, this section would highlight 
the issues that are closely associated with market valuation. 
2.5.2 Monitoring vs. capital raising: has the stock market been effective in the SOE 
reform? 
As discussed earlier, the emergence of the stock market in China is in fact the 
product of SOE reform and the process of marketisation. With SOEs being 
transformed into share-based companies, agency problems began to emerge above 
the water. Therefore, monitoring and control mechanisms must be created to solve or 
at least alleviate these problems. Capital markets are regarded by (Jenson, 1993) as 
one of only four control forces operating in corporations to solve the problems 
caused by a divergence between managers' decisions and those that are optimal from 
shareholders' standpoint. The other three are the legal or regulatory system, product 
and labour markets, and the internal control system such as the board of directors. 
The stock market, an important part of capital markets, is playing a significant role in 
linking the stock market and managerial actions, hence monitoring the managers of 
listed companies and limiting the agency problem. The monitoring function has been 
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discussed by Young and McGuinness (2001) who posited that the primary benefit of 
capital markets is their monitoring function and not the raising-capital function with 
which they are most often associated. 
Clearly the market regulators in China established the stock exchanges in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen in a belief that the stock market can, at least in theory, perform two 
important functions (Jiang, 1997). First, a well-ftinctioning stock market can provide 
a monitoring mechanism to the newly-established listed companies, hence 
minimising the agency problem arising from the separation of management from 
ownership. In fact, how to monitor managers of listed companies effectively was a 
huge challenge for the goverment when the shareholding system was first 
introduced and internal control system was not in place. Second, an active stock 
market can also assist SOEs raise much-needed capital. With the SOEs reform going 
further, the government gradually forced state firms to become independent business 
entities. Financing is no longer from the government's financial reserves, but from 
financial institutions such as banks. Lack of financing has always been the bottleneck 
hampering the development of state firms. Establishing stock exchanges in China 
obviously opened a door for listed companies to raise the much-needed cash. 
While there is nothing wrong with the market's functions identified by the 
government, the key issue is how well the market is functioning in terms of 
monitoring management of listed companies and raising capital. After over 10 years 
of expansion, the stock market has become a significant part of the capital markets in 
China and has done a great job in raising capital for listed companies. As cited earlier, 
listed companies have pocketed a total of RMB 905 billion (USD 113 billion) from 
the hands of individual and institutional investors, within a six-year period from 2000 
through 2005. However, the stock market has not been playing a significant role in 
monitoring managers of listed firms and protecting the interest of investors. This 
verdict is shared by a great number of researchers such as (Brooks and Ragunathan, 
2003, Chen, 2003, Young and McGuinness, 2001). Young and McGuiness (2001) 
made the comment on the performance of stock markets as follows: "Aside from 
injecting some much-needed capital into the system, the impact of these reforms (the 
shareholding system and the resultant stock markets) on company performance up to 
date has been somewhat disappointing". 
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This comment has raised two interesting questions: why has the stock market done a 
poor job in monitoring listed companies and what effect would it have on the SOE 
reform? To address these questions, one needs to take a deep look at the structural 
problems facing China's stock market. 
There are three ways in which the stock market monitors the managerial actions 
(Young and McGuinness, 2001). First, shares prices can be used as an aid in making 
resource allocation decisions. Second, agency problems can be alleviated by linking 
managers' compensation to the firm's shareholders. Third, an effective takeover 
market forms a strong external control for underperforming companies. Each of these 
ways will be discussed here with an explanation of why impediments exist in all 
three areas in the case of China's stock market. 
Firstly, share prices are widely seen as a guide for the performance of both firms and 
managers. In a developed market, market participants, in particular investors and 
mangers, often look to share prices as indicators of strategic effectiveness of a firm. 
China's investors also look to share prices when making investment decisions. 
However, share prices are less likely to function as an effective guide for Chinese 
managers for various reasons. Most importantly, China's stock market is still 
emerging, share prices are often determined by factors other than market forces alone. 
The government is frequently playing a dominant impact on share prices in China's 
stock market. It is not uncommon that China's market regulators, e. g. the CSRC, 
frequently intervened into the stock market. When the government sees a lukewarm 
market, it then encourages investments to the stock market through a series of 
measures e. g., cutting interest rates 20 ; when the state is concerned with particular 
market activities, it issues regulations to circumscribe those activities. 
20 For example, in order to direct investments to the stock market, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), 
the China's central bank, cut the interest rates twice in May and September 1996 and introduced 
interest taxes for the first time. These actions caused an overheated stock market in 1996, which 
witnessed the greatest increase in stock indices of both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
(Shanghai Composite Index and Shenzhen Composite Index) since the beginning of China's stock 
market. This significant event was investigated by Gao (2002), who labelled the huge increase in 1996 
"the 1996 oddity". 
- 45 - 
For example, in order to curb the increasing speculative activities that prevail in the 
China's stock market, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges introduced a 
ceiling scheme that limits the maximum change of stock price to 10 per cent above or 
below the closing price of the previous trading day since June 1996. Although it was 
meant to be a remedy to the rampant speculative activities on the China's stock 
markets, its effectiveness remained questionable. In fact, critics argue that the ceiling 
scheme is an inappropriate means to correct the distortion caused by the speculation 
in the long run because it has distorted the prices on the market much like the 
speculation itself (Peterson et al., 2003, Su, 2003, Gu, 2003). The 10 percent of the 
maximum set out by the stock exchanges would simply under-price the shares of a 
good-performance company when the actual price of the share could have gone up 
by more than 10% in a single trading day without the ceiling scheme in place and 
vice versa. Not only so, but the implementation of the ceiling scheme has actually 
put investors at greater risks because investors, restricted by the ceiling, would not be 
able to withdraw their funds quickly enough when a company's share, or the whole 
market, takes a tumble. 
While how effective the government's policies to direct the development of the 
market in the long run remains to be seen, excessive intervention and frequent 
change of policies can jeopardise the health of the stock market and the interest of 
investors. In particular, market prices are likely to be distorted by political forces, 
thus affecting the market participant's investment decision and ultimately hampering 
the stock market's function as a guide for resource allocation. 
Furthermore, shares prices can also be distorted by widespread speculation in the 
developing China's stock market. Unlike developed markets where institutional 
investors tend to dominate or at least represent a significant portion of the market, 
China's stock market is largely dominated by individual investors. According to Gao 
(2002), in the U. S. and Japan, institutional investors account for more than 40 per 
cent of the total market. In the U. K., insurance companies also hold about one-third 
of the total market. However, the holdings of institutions in China are estimated at 
less than 20 per cent of the market. By comparison with individual investors, 
institutional investors have both expertise and knowledge in analysing market and 
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financial information and making investment decisions. As a result, share prices in 
developed markets tend to be more rational and informative with the participation of 
institutional investors (Quiry et al., 2005). The function of the stock market as a 
guide for capabilities of management of running businesses can be better performed. 
By contrast, the striking feature of China's stock market is the dominance of 
individual investors which is closely related to widespread speculative activities. The 
degree of speculation can be measured by the average stock turnover which is 
calculated as the total annual trading value divided by the average market 
capitalisation. A higher turnover points to a higher frequency of trading, or a shorter 
holding period, which in turn implies a greater level of speculation. According to 
Gao (2002), the average stock turnover from 1994 through 2001 was more than 500 
per cent, suggesting that an individual stock changed hands five times a year on 
average, or the average holding period is merely a little over two months. This is 
roughly ten times the average turnover of most developed markets. The roots of 
speculative activities can be found in two fundamental defects in China's stock 
market. First, the overall investing environment of China's stock market simply does 
not encourage long-term investment strategies. This is partly due to the nature of a 
developing stock market. Second, the government's frequent intervention into the 
market has exacerbated speculation. As discussed earlier, actions taken by the 
government have significant impacts upon the stock market. Influenced by the 
government policies, investors tend to place a heavy value on news or rumours of 
state policies when making their investment decisions. 
Secondly, in a well-functioning stock market, agency problems can be alleviated by 
linking managers' compensation to the firm's value. Agency theory, though 
controversial, is still the predominant paradigm in corporate governance theory. 
Grounded in neoclassical economics, it naturally posits that managers are driven by 
self-interest. Aligning the interest of principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) 
is considered the central issue in improving company performance (Young and 
McGuinness, 2001). Linking managers' compensation to the firm's value is likely to 
drive managers to maximise corporate earnings and share prices. Managers' 
compensation usually consists of three parts: 1) fixed salaries and benefits, 2) bonus 
linked to the firm's operating performance, and 3) options and/or shares linked to the 
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firm's market performance. In developed countries, options and shares are 
increasingly used by companies and in some firms have become the major part of the 
managers' compensation. By awarding stock options to managers, managers' 
personal gains are closely linked to the market performance. Hence, managers' 
motivations are geared towards maximising the value of the company. Compared 
with bonus which depends on the company's operating performance, the advantage 
of options and shares lies in that share prices are not apt to be manipulated 21 . 
However, China is moving slowly in this direction. Due to the legal restraints, stock 
options have not been implemented by the market regulators. Management shares are 
only a negligible part of the total shares outstanding in the stock market. The stock- 
related compensation of Chinese managers has been investigated by Bai et al. (2004) 
who have found that top managers in China's listed companies typically own very 
little of their companies' shares, on average only 0.1 per cent. Instead, currently the 
compensation to Chinese managers is usually based upon the operating performance 
measured by accounting figures. To reach the profit targets stipulated in the contract, 
managers can easily manipulate the accounting figures. In fact, accounting fraud, 
such as false financial reporting and profit management etc., is so widespread that no 
one group should take the blame. The nature of the premature accounting regulatory 
system has provided management with plenty of opportunities to juggle accounting 
numbers. The weak internal control mechanism in China's listed companies and poor 
practice of auditing enabled Chinese mangers to conduct profit management nearly 
'worry free '. Without the market performance-linked compensation in place, 
compounded with Chinese managers' astonishing 'capability' of manipulating 
accounting figures, firm's performance in the stock market has drifted away from the 
fundamentals of the firm. In other words, managers are not bothered by share prices. 
As long as accounting figures meet the target, managers' personal gains are 
guaranteed. This is actually contrary to the government's purpose of establishing the 
stock market. Above all, the stock market could be used to align the interest of 
21 The fact that share prices and options are not apt to be manipulated by comparison with accounting 
figures does not necessarily mean that they cannot be manipulated. Even option itself can be 
manipulated somehow, e. g. backdating options when shares were low. 
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shareholders and management. If managers no longer look to stock prices for 
assessing perfon-nance, why is the stock market needed? 
Thirdly, a well-developed stock market can form a strong external control 
mechanism to listed companies. In an efficient market, a firm's performance can 
soon be incorporated by share prices. Hence, under-performed companies are likely 
to have lower share prices and become the targets of takeover. In order for the stock 
market to perforrn effective control over management of listed companies, two 
factors are vital: an efficient stock market and an active takeover market. In the case 
of China however, neither of these two factors are ripe enough for the stock market 
to perform its function. 
According to Quiry et al. (2005), the market efficiency theory classifies capital 
markets into three types: 1) a strongly efficient market in which the prices of 
financial securities at any time rapidly reflect all available relevant information; 2) a 
semi-strong efficient market which reflects all publicly available information, as 
found in annual reports, news paper and magazine articles, prospectuses, 
announcements of new contracts, of a merger, of an increase in the dividend, etc; and 
3) a weak-form efficient market in which existing prices already reflect all the 
information that can be gleaned from studying past prices and trading volumes. What 
type of market is Chinese stock market in terms of efficiency? The efficiency of 
Chinese stock market was investigated by Su (2003). He finds that domestic A-share 
investors, on average, do not correctly anticipate the EPS changes and do not adjust 
to the new earnings information very rapidly in the markets, indicating that China's 
stock market is neither strongly efficient nor semi-strong efficient. In fact, this 
finding does not come as a surprise because a number of reasons can be easily 
identified to contribute to the low efficiency of the market. First, it is not uncommon 
that government officials and managers of listed companies to be involved in insider 
trading of A-shares. Second, as discussed earlier, most A-shares investors are short- 
term investors who are more likely to speculate based on sentimental factors. Third, 
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Chinese stock market are segmented both in trading and financial reporting 
requirements 22 . 
What is more, there is not a takeover market existing in China. In the presence of 
takeover market, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can play a significant role in 
disciplining management of listed companies simply because firms with poor 
performance are apt to become the targets of takeover and managers risk losing their 
jobs (Allen, 1997). However, the market-oriented takeover activities in China's stock 
market are severely impeded by the unique ownership structure of listed companies. 
As discussed earlier, one of the most striking features of China's listed firms is that 
government (the state and legal persons) is the principal shareholder who on average 
owns nearly two-thirds of the total shares. To immunise state-controlled listed 
companies from any attacks, the government further regulates that these shares are 
not tradable on the open market. Even transfers between legal persons are subject to 
the approval of the CSRC and other related government authorities. All these in 
effect have built a fence by which China's listed companies are protected from 
private and foreign hands. While the effectiveness of this policy remains to be seen, 
the negative impact on the market has been fairly significant. With two-thirds of the 
shares in the hands of the state being non-tradable, market-driven takeover activities 
23 simply cannot take place in the stock market . When takeover occurs, 
it is usually 
because the government requests a healthy firm to take over an ailing one. Managers 
in China's listed companies hence face much less pressure in comparison with their 
Western counterparts. 
In summary, the stock market established by the government was meant to provide a 
monitoring mechanism to the listed companies transformed from SOEs as well as 
raising much-needed capital. While the stock market has done a terrific job in raising 
cash from private pockets, the function to effectively monitor the management of 
22 Companies issuing A-shares only are required to prepare for financial reporting based on Chinese 
GAAP. However, companies issuing both A- and B-shares should report financial accounts based on 
Chinese and international GAAP. 
23 According to Anderson (2000), merger and acquisition activities have been increasingly active since 
1990 in China. However, the vast majority of M&A undertakings are driven and/or participated by the 
government. Market-driven takeovers are fairly rare in China's stock market. 
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listed companies has been restricted by the inherent defects of the stock market. 
These problems can be summarised as follows. First, shares prices can be used as an 
aid in making resource allocation decisions. However in the context of China, 
political forces such as government intervention and change of regulations, other 
than market forces, have played a significant role in affecting share prices, hence 
distorting the information contained in share prices. The distortion is further 
exacerbated by the excessively speculative investing culture. Second, agency 
problems arising from the separation of management from ownership can be 
alleviated by the stock market. But the interest of managers is not well aligned with 
that of shareholders through stock options and/or shares due to the legal and 
institutional limitations. Linking managers' compensation to accounting profits can 
only fuel the rampant accounting fraudulence such as profit management and false 
financial reporting. Third, the stock market can be utilised as an external control 
mechanism as long as it is efficient and takeover activities can happen without the 
influence of non-market forces. However, by holding nearly two-thirds of the total 
shares, the government has built up a solid fence to 'protect' the state-controlled 
listed companies against any potential takeovers. Managers under this shelter tend to 
face less pressure. Based upon the above, it can be concluded that the stock market 
has been largely ineffective in assisting the SOE reform due to the problems 
identified in the above analysis. 
2.5.3 Law vs. order: has the stock market built upon a solid institutional foundation? 
As discussed earlier, despite the phenomenal growth in size, the stock market in 
China is still at its infancy and displays a series of typical features characterised by 
emerging market. One of the most distinctive features is the disorder of the market 
and lack of institutional infrastructure. A brief review of the recent history reveals 
that the development of stock market in China in a sense came from the desperate 
needs of cash and control over the share-based companies, rather than from a well- 
planned blueprint guiding the long-term future. Once again, the trial-and-effor 
strategy has been taken in developing China's stock market. In fact, when both of 
China's stock exchanges were established in December 1990, the legal system has 
not been put in place and the whole stock market was built upon a fairly poor 
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institutional infrastructure. According to Gao (2000), there were no laws to govern 
corporations until 1994, and there were no laws to regulate securities until 1999. 
Open-ended mutual funds were created as recently as 2000, and a draft of investment 
company law was not passed until 2003. Not surprisingly, China's stock market has 
been plagued by rampant fraud and even illegal activities. Behind these activities are 
the fundamental and structural problems deeply hidden in the seemingly success of 
the stock market. 
The current state of China's stock market is frequently described as a market full of 
traps. As a result, market order was damaged and investor confidence was hit. 
Fraudulent and illegal activities are so widespread that they are widely considered 
one of the most serious problems facing the Chinese stock markets (Anderson, 2000; 
Chen, 2003; Gao 2002). These activities in practice take a range of forms, but market 
manipulation and fraudulent financial reporting happen the most frequently. While 
the perpetrators should be held accountable for these wrongdoings, a close 
examination reveals that it is the stock market built upon the poor institutional 
infrastructure has provided the loophole for these activities to take place. 
Firstly, market manipulation has been a continuing problem on the Chinese stock 
market since the very beginning. The Securities Law, which was passed in December 
1998 and became effective on I" January 1999, addresses manipulation and prohibits 
anyone from carrying on combined or successive sales or purchases by building up 
an advantage in terms of funds or shareholdings or using one's advantage in terms of 
information, thereby manipulating securities trading prices, whether independently or 
in collusion. Manipulation carries both civil sanctions under the Securities Law and 
criminal penalties under the Criminal Law. Despite the threat of sanctions, 
manipulation has never shown any sign of decline. One question then comes to mind. 
Why is manipulation so rampant in China's stock market? Apart from the political 
and cultural reasons, one needs to seek for the answer from the inherent defects of 
the market. 
As revealed by Anderson (2000), the Chinese stock prices are easy to manipulate 
because of the relatively small number of shares and the growing demands for those 
shares. While it is understandable that there are not too many shares available on the 
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market when the development is at an early stage, the real reason for the small 
number of shares can be attributed to the market segmentation. It is well known that 
China's stock market has been segmented by two political forces since it was 
established. First, shares are classified into tradable shares and non-tradable shares. 
With nearly two-thirds of the total shares owned by the state being illiquid, the left- 
over tradable shares account for only one third. Second, the number of shares 
available for domestic investors is further restricted by the separation of the A-share 
market and the B-share market. There are two sub-markets, the A-share market and 
the B-share market, coexisting in China but these two markets are isolated from each 
other. Domestic investors are forbidden from entering the B-share market and 
foreign investors are not allowed to engage in transactions on the A-share market. 
Restrained by these policies, the scale of the emerging stock market has been greatly 
cut down, hence making manipulation relatively easier. Another question is worth 
thinking: who is manipulating the market? In fact, investors are aware that prices are 
usually affected by the trading of jigou', a term that literally means organisations 
with lots of capital available for stock speculation and powerful political background. 
In a country deeply plagued by corruption such as China, it is not uncommon for 
politicians to get involved in under-the-table businesses (Dyer, 2006). When 
appropriate legal arrangements have not been brought in place, the jigou' with the 
back-up of high-ranking politicians often have unrivalled advantages, such as 
exclusive access to insider information, powerful social networking and large sums 
of capital, etc. As a matter of fact, most of manipulative activities on China's stock 
market are controlled by these jigou'. 
Secondly, fraudulent financial reporting by listed companies is a commonplace 
phenomenon in the current global stock markets. Not only does it cause huge damage 
to investors, but also it undermines the stock market's function to allocate resources 
and puts the health of stock markets at substantial risks. In the context of China, 
listed companies issuing fraudulent financial reporting appears to be even more 
serious due to the nature of emerging markets and the transitional economy. In 
theory, there are various common reasons attributable to fraudulent financial 
reporting. For example, agency problems arise from the separation of management 
from ownership. According to Cabral (2000), a firm in essence is an aggregation of a 
series of contacts. The managers' profit-seeking nature, combined with incomplete 
- 53 - 
contracts based upon accounting figures, has determined that agents (high-level 
managers of listed company) may have motivations and opportunities to commit 
fraud to maximise their personal gains. In the meantime, information asymmetries 
commonly exist in all stock markets. As a result, managers may have more accurate 
information about the company they work for, compared with external investors or 
'outsiders' (Quiry et al., 2005). Asymmetrical information enables managers in listed 
companies to manage earnings if circumstances permit. While the above reasons can 
be used to explain fraudulent financial reporting across the world, there are some 
unique problems rooted in the institutional settings of China's stock market that 
should be blamed for the rampant fraud. 
Some of these problems can be traced back from the beginning of the stock market. 
One practice that was followed from 1990 to 2000 was that the market regulators 
adopted a quota system on the number of IPOs for each year. To keep up the IPO 
with the plan of the government, the CSRC formulated a yearly quota, and allocated 
it to provincial authorities and ministerial authorities at the central level. Provincial 
and ministerial authorities then chose and approved candidate issuers, whose 
application was then submitted to the CSRC for further approval. To meet the 
requirements set out by the CSRC, a firm seeking listing must go through a multi- 
step, tightly controlled selection process. To start off, SOEs have to be transformed 
into share-holding firms. A great deal of 'physical' and 'financial' packaging needs 
to be done and this job is frequently undertaken and/or facilitated by local 
governments. Unprofitable assets such as workshops and production lines are 
normally carved out to boost the overall profitability of the candidates. Small-scale 
companies might have to 'marry' the other local companies to meet the requirement 
for minimum size of assets. The CSRC set up a commission consisting of 
government officials, academics, accountants and lawyers etc to undertake the 
examination of application materials. The commission then votes on the application 
and issues a report stating the views reached by the examiners. Companies receiving 
the final approval can apply to Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for listing 
their shares. The quota system has been widely criticised for being political and 
resulting in approval of low-quality listings(Chen, 2003, Anderson, 2000, Aharony et 
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al., 2000)24. Most importantly, the implementation of the quota system has actually 
sown the seeds of widespread market fraud. 
First of all, the quota system was meant to ensure that the IPO goes to the centralised 
plan. However, it has not considered the growing market demands for shares. 
According to Chen (2003), the national quota was approximately equally divided 
among the 32 provinces and province-level cities. From 1991 to 2000, each province 
obtained a quota of about three IPOs. This undoubtedly limited the supply of IPO, 
made the value of IPO permits extremely high, hence creating a huge opportunity for 
rent-seeking and bribing activities. For provincial and lower-level governments, the 
number of local firms made publicly listed has become a major metric of political 
performance, on which future promotion of local government officials depends. As a 
result, these government officials are willing to help local companies manipulate 
financial numbers or commit unmasked fraud, all for the purpose of getting more 
local stocks traded nationally. Or, when local firms are caught by the media for 
committing fraudulent financial reporting, local governments or even higher-level 
authorities could cover up the fraud. 
Second, some of the excessively stringent requirements of the IPOs, coupled with the 
weak enforcement, even lead the listed companies to commit earnings management. 
For example, a major listing requirement for IPOs is at least two consecutive years of 
operating profit. Additionally, B-share and H-share firms must be able to generate 
foreign exchange income in the future to pay dividends in foreign currencies. While 
these requirements were meant to protect investors, the inflexible accounting-based 
objectives plus the weak enforcement frequently force firms to take the illegal 
approach. Driven by the huge windfall from listing, mangers have a strong 
motivation to get their companies listed and are willing to try virtually all means to 
financially 'package" the company in order to meet the targets set out by the CSRC. 
It has to be mentioned that the room left over for managers to commit the 'financial 
24 The quota system was abolished in 2000 after the Securities Law was enacted. Instead, the approval 
system was brought in to govern the IPO practices. Under the approval system, provisional and 
ministerial authorities are no longer involved in the IPO procedures, but the CSRC still have tight 
control over the number of IPO depending on the market conditions. 
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packaging' is increasingly restricted as a result of more and more legislation being 
issued and put into practice. However, the financial packaging has not shown any 
sign of decline, simply because the incentives are too great and enforcement is not 
powerful enough (Lu and Fu, 2003). 
Third, a listed company typically has to go through the 'physical packaging' to gain 
the approval from the CSRC, a procedure that usually involves carving out 
unprofitable units and merging with other profitable companies. Quite often, 
governments' involvement is behind these activities. As a result, lots of related 
parties have been created. This actually has given birth to the widespread insider 
trading. The 'physical packaging' has also been the source of 'tunnelling' problem 
(Chen, 2003, Bai et al., 2004, He, 2004). According to Bai et al. (2004), a large 
majority (79 per cent) of the publicly listed firms in China have a parent company. 
The controlling parent companies can engage in related-party transactions with the 
listed firms, usually with the latter buying worthless assets from the former at 
unreasonably high prices or with the latter lending to the former at favourable rates. 
The widespread financial fraud can also be attributed to the weak accounting 
regulatory regime. Traditional Chinese accounting regulatory system was built to suit 
the needs of the planned economy. While the economic reforms and open-up policies 
brought about a fundamental shift from planned economy to market economy, 
accounting as a business language has to keep up with the institutional changes. In 
practice however, accounting regulations and practice frequently lag behind the 
changes of circumstances. While the overall business environment in China's market 
is facing constant changes, the principle of 'crossing the river by touching stones' in 
the economic reforms has determined that accounting reform will have to follow the 
same approach. What's more, the promulgation of the Accounting Law and issuance 
of accounting standards normally have to take a long time and follow stringent 
procedures due to their legal nature. As a result, new accounting issues keeping 
emerging but the existing accounting regulations are not able to deal with them. The 
4grey' zones uncovered by the existing accounting rules have given rise to numerous 
loopholes for companies to commit all sorts of financial fraud. This probably 
provides an explanation why the quality of Chinese company disclosure is widely 
regarded as low. 
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Problems with the accounting system are not the only reason to question the accuracy 
of company disclosures. The government, following the lead of other countries, has 
attempted to protect investors by requiring listed companies to provide information 
users with more information. However, information disclosure is inconsistent with a 
general condition of less transparency in China. In fact, mandatory disclosure 
requirements have not successfully broken up the monopoly that managers enjoy 
over company information. Due to the severe information asymmetry and weak 
corporate governance, managers in China enjoy a great deal of autonomy in their 
positions and often operate outside the sight of central government. Accurate 
disclosure may reveal inefficiency and mismanagement, two problems that plague 
China's enterprises, and could result in managers losing their jobs. In addition, 
managers have almost unfettered access to the company coffer and can use company 
money to increase their own private wealth, as well as pay bribes to key government 
officials. 
Despite the power that managers have over company information, other persons or 
institutions have the responsibility to monitor the managers and ensure the 
truthfulness of company disclosures. Reports from accountants, lawyers, and 
intermediaries can act as gatekeepers and police the quality of financial information. 
In fact, all of these groups are subject to liability under the Securities Law for 
allowing fraud to occur. However, in most fraudulent activities taking place in China, 
those who profited from the fraudulent financial reporting include the gatekeepers. 
The claim that China's stock market was built upon a weak legal foundation may be 
right when the stock market started. However, this claim certainly underestimates the 
efforts that the government has put in promulgating laws and regulations to bring, the 
much-needed order in the market. In deed, China has been working extremely hard to 
construct the legal foundation for the healthy development of the stock market. The 
Company Law was promulgated in to 1993 and revised twice in 1999 and 2004. The 
Securities Law was passed in December 1998 and became effective from I" July 
1999. The Accounting Law was first enacted in 1984 and has been revised twice in 
1992 and 1999. The Auditing Law was issued in 1994. The market regulator, the 
CSRC, has issued more than 300 administrative regulations since its establishment 
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(Anderson, 2000). However, more laws and regulations may not necessarily bring 
the order to the market. Investors don't need more laws and regulations to protect 
themselves if the existing ones cannot be effectively enforced. To eliminate the ever- 
rising crime, China needs to strengthen its power to enforce the existing laws. 
It is worth noting that the above mentioned problems inherent in the Chinese equity 
market can to some extent be linked to the overall investment culture and even the 
traditional culture of China. Why does the Chinese equity market behave so 
differently from the markets in the rest of the world? Of course these differences can 
be explained by the nature of the Chinese developing markets, as presented above. 
However, to better understand the underlying course of the difference, one needs to 
think about this issue from the perspective of cultural differences because ultimately 
it is culture--in particular the investment culture--that is influencing the behaviour of 
investors. 
For example, the excessive speculative activities in the Chinese stock market can be 
attributed to the 'dream of getting rich quickly' embraced by generations of Chinese 
people. Unlike investors in the Western world who usually look to long-term returns 
on investments, most Chinese investors quite often place heavy weight on the short- 
term speculative returns when investing in the stock markets. China has not got a 
long history of stock markets therefore it is impossible for people to look at the 
benefits associated with long-term investments. On the contrary, China's booming 
stock market, partially caused by the government's quota system, has created ample 
opportunities for people to become millionaires overnight. Tempted by the widely 
spread news--or even rumours--that huge profits are made through the day-to-day 
selling and buying shares, tens of millions of individuals have plunged into the stock 
markets. 
The government frequent intervention into the market might not be fully appreciated 
by the Western world because they don't understand that, historically, China has 
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always been a country with a big government but a small societY15 . Historically, the 
government has been the almighty body embracing unchallenged power in the entire 
country ever since Qin Dynasty, the first dynasty that united China in about 200 B. C. 
This tradition has been further strengthened by the one-party ruling system and 
centralised planned economy after the Communist Party came to power in 1949. As 
discussed in previous sections, one can clearly see that the government has always 
been the ultimate driving force for the development of the stock markets. The 
government created the market to enable economic resources to flow into the most 
efficient enterprises and industrial sectors. The government has always shaped the 
market by issuing various regulations and rules. And of course, the government has 
the reason and power to intervene into the market when it thinks it is necessary to do 
SO. 
In summary, China's stock market has recorded a phenomenal expansion in size 
since the beginning of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 1990. 
However, the market figures such as market capitalization and shares prices can be 
misleading if one does not gain an in-depth understanding of the inherent problems 
facing the market. Some of the problems are caused by the unique institutional 
arrangements. An example would be the quota system adapted by the CSRC to 
approve the IPO, which has sown the seeds of widespread fraudulent financial 
reporting. Some of the problems may exist across the word but appears to be more 
serious in China due to the nature of emerging markets. For example, speculation is a 
common phenomenon existing in the entire world but it is far more serious in China 
because China's stock market is dominated by individual shareholders. Some of the 
problems happen only in China due to the country's unique political and economic 
conditions, e. g. the government frequently intervenes into the stock market and 
causes enonnous trouble to investors and other market participants. It is important to 
understand not only these problems but also the underlying cause of these problems. 
Doing so will give one a much clearer view on what has happened in China's stock 
market. 
25 'Big government and small society' is a famous saying in China mainly referring to the fact that the 
government enjoys unchallenged power in the state affairs but non-government institutions are 
severely underdeveloped. 
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Chapter 3. THE ACCOUNTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
IN CHINA 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, China has undergone profound changes in the last quarter 
of a century. These changes have posed serious challenges to the traditional 
accounting regulatory system that was built to suit the needs of the planned economy. 
In response to these challenges, accounting as a business language has undergone a 
series of historical changes. To bring the lagged-behind accounting regulatory system 
in conformity with the international norms and ever-changing economic conditions 
in China, the government has made huge efforts to reform the accounting system and 
construct an accounting regulatory framework. At the end of 2005, the Chinese 
government made a significant announcement that China has established its own 
accounting regulatory framework, the Accounting Standards System, based upon the 
International Accounting Standards (McGregor, 2006a). The accounting regulatory 
framework can be seen diagrammatically in Figure 3.1. 
As can be seen from Figure 3.1, the accounting regulatory framework in China 
encompasses three levels: the law, the standards and the system. The law refers to the 
Accounting Law and other laws related to accounting such as the Company Law, the 
Auditing Law, and the Securities Law. The standards can be broken into two sub- 
levels: the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises-Basic Standards (ASBE- 
BS) providing a conceptual framework of accounting, and 16 specific standards with 
the detailed prescriptions on accounting recognition, measurement and reporting for 
specific economic transactions and items. The accounting system is a set of 
regulations providing detailed code of practices at the operational level and can be 
seen from the Accounting System for Business Enterprises (ASBE). 
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Accounting Law 
Basic Standards 
Accounting Standards 
Specific Standards 
Accounting System 
Source: Adhikari, A. and Wang, S. Z. (1995) Accounting for China, Management Accounting, 22, pp. 
27-32 
Figure 3.1 The accounting regulatory framework in China 
The central task of this chapter is to review the accounting regulatory framework by 
looking at the accounting reform from three dimensions: the Accounting Law, the 
accounting standards and the accounting system. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 2 holds a brief discussion on the accounting regulatory 
system prior to the economic reform by highlighting characteristics of the traditional 
accounting practices. Section 3 summarises the process of accounting reform by 
discussing the development of accounting legal system, establishment of accounting 
standards and the change of accounting system. Section 4 discusses the achievement 
of the accounting reform and analyses the driving forces behind the accounting 
reforms by looking into the tensions between the ever-changing economic and social 
conditions and needs for reforming the accounting regulatory system. 
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3.2 Accounting prior to the Accounting Reform 
Prior to the economic reform initiated in the early 1980s, China's economy was 
exclusively operated by the government under the rigid regime of the centralised 
planning system (Adhikari and Wang, 1995). In the planned economy, companies 
usually take two forms of organisational modes: state-owned enterprises and 
collectively-owned enterprises. The former are directly financed and controlled by 
the government and the latter have a mixture of ownership between the government 
and local communities. Broadly speaking, however, they are both state-owned 
entities. Non-state sectors such as private companies and businesses with foreign 
involvement are strictly forbidden due to the ideological concerns and the belief that 
the state control is most effective way of organising production (Winkle et al., 1994, 
Tang, 2000). 
The traditional Chinese accounting practice has been influenced by the information 
needs of a planned economy and rest heavily upon stewardship objectives (Winkle et 
al., 1994). Financial reporting of SOEs was exclusively serving the administrative 
targets of the government. In practice, accounting performs the simple roles of 
bookkeeping production activities, allocating economic resources, and assisting the 
government to facilitate economic planning. From the perspective of accounting 
regulation, the accounting regulatory system is segmented and complicated by 
financial and accounting rules that differ among enterprises with different types of 
ownership, among those in different industrial sectors and among those with 
different business natures (Xinhua, 1992). To provide detailed guidelines on the 
routine accounting practices, various governmental bodies prescribe more than 40 
sets of industry-based accounting regulations (Skousen and Yang, 1988). The prime 
objective of laying out these regulations was to provide the code of practices at the 
operational level; however, they were far away from constituting an integral 
accounting regulatory framework. In short, the accounting regulatory system prior to 
reform was designed to reflect the goal of the enterprise and to meet the country's 
planning targets. 
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Despite the fact that enterprises in different sectors and/or in different ownership 
categories follow different rules, some of common features of traditional accounting 
in China can be identified. The distinctive characteristics of Chinese accounting prior 
to reform are well documented in the accounting literature and they are summarised 
in Table 3.1. 
As can be seen from Table 3.1, while major principles such as accrual accounting, 
historical costs, going concern and consistency etc., underlying the uniform 
accounting system prior to the accounting reform are the same as in the industrialised 
countries, the concept of fund is widely used by the Chinese accountants. 
For financial purposes, SOEs were normally required to provide what is called the 
fund balance sheet and the income statement on the regular basis. The cash flow 
statement is not required by the pre-reform accounting system. The concept and 
format of fund-based accounting is illustrated in Table 3.2. As can be seen from 
Table 3.2, unlike the balance sheet in the industrialised countries which provides an 
insight into the financial conditions of the company, the fund balance sheet is 
prepared by state-owned enterprises to record the application and source of the funds, 
which primarily come from the government's financial reserves and/or state banks. 
As illustrated by Table 3.2, the fund balance sheet prior to the accounting reform 
followed the formula 'Application of funds = Source of funds', rather than 'Assets = 
Liability + Owner's Equity'. The concepts of liabilities and equity appear in the fund 
balance sheet in the form of fixed funds, current funds and special funds. The 
western notions of liability and owner's equity could not be found at the Chinese 
fund balance sheet even though they are in essence the same as source of funds. 
Another interesting finding obtained from Table 3.2 is that the assets under the 
planned-economy accounting are classified into fixed assets, current assets and 
special-purpose assets. While the accounting terms in fixed asses and current assets 
are on the whole similar to those in the Western accounting, special-purpose assets 
might appear unfamiliar to most accountants in the Western world. In fact, special- 
purpose assets frequently appear in the financial statement of the Chinese state firms 
and are fairly important part of the assets. In general, the government under the 
planned economy provides state firms with two different types of financial resources. 
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The funds allocated to state firms within the short- and long-term plans are 
categorised as either fixed or current assets depending on the nature of the funds, and 
the funds beyond the state plans and with special or contingent purposes are 
classified as special-purpose assets. In the planned economy, the government 
frequently finds that planning is not the best solution to the constantly-changing 
balances between demands and supplies. Therefore, special-purpose funds need to be 
allocated to state firms to meet the special needs of the government. 
From Table 3.2, it also appears that the intangible assets such as goodwill, brands, 
intellectual property, and R&D etc., have not been mentioned in the planned- 
economy accounting. In fact, intangible assets are to some extent ignored in the 
planned economy because in an economy dominated by the government force, the 
market is in its absence. Therefore the notion of market value does not exist in the 
planned economy. However, to determine the value of goodwill, brands, and 
intellectual property etc., market value is necessary. If no market comes into 
existence, the issue of the value of intangible assets is ignored. 
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ORIENTATION 
Primary objective directed toward accountability and stewardship consistent with the needs 
of planned economy; 
Utilises a type of fund accounting; 
Emphasis on uniform accounting system for all enterprises to facilitate integrating 
information into the national economic plan; 
Accounting principles are formalised into national law. 
ASSETS 
Viewed as application of funds provided by the state or by other sources; 
Values based on historical costs. Long-term assets depreciated using straight-line method; 
Inventories valued at planned price in accordance with the central plan; 
Transactions cleared through the state bank on a cash basis resulting in very small amounts 
of receivables. 
LIABILITIES 
Viewed as fund sources by the enterprise. A fund source is matched with each asset group; 
Major liabilities consist of funds received from the state and bank loans. 
EQUITY 
" Strict distinction between liabilities and equity typically not maintained due to state 
ownership; 
" Profits allocated to state funds or enterprise's funds. 
REVENUE/EXPENSE/PROFIT 
Accrual basis used for revenue and expense determination; 
Standards prices utilised based on economic plan. 
FINANCIAL REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE 
0 Financial statements include a fund balance sheet reflecting fund applications and sources, an 
income statement and numerous detailed supporting schedules and cost analyses; 
0 Conventional footnote disclosure lacking due to detailed accounting regulations at the 
operational level and extensive reporting details; 
0 Financial reports required monthly, quarterly and/or annually. 
Sources: Accounting Standards in the People's Republic of China: Responding to Economic Reforms, 
Winkle et al. (1994), Accounting Horizons, Vol. 8 No. 3. 
Table 3.1 Characteristics of Chinese accounting prior to reform 
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Application of funds Resources of funds 
Fixed assets Fixed funds 
Historical cost of fixed assets State fixed fund 
Accumulative depreciation 
Net value of fixed assets 
Gain (loss) arising from disposal of fixed assets 
Current assets Current funds; 
Raw material State current fund 
Products in process Enterprise current fund 
Prepaid expense Current funds borrowing 
Finished products Accounts payable 
Other current assets Payment received in advance 
Products delivered Other payables 
Monetary funds Tax payable 
Accounts receivable Depreciation fund payable 
Amounts paid in advance Total profit payable to the state 
Special-purpose assets Special funds 
Special-purpose savings Special-purpose funds; 
Special-purpose materials Special-purpose appropriation; 
Total assets Total fund resources 
Source: Accountingfor industrial enterprises, 2' Edition, Shengqiang Wang, China Hunan Renmin 
Publishing House, 1983 
Table 3.2 An example of the fund balance sheet prior to the accounting reform 
The objective of reporting an income statement is also fundamentally different from 
that in the industrial countries. The differences can be seen from Table 3.3. As 
illustrated in Table 3.3, a state-owned company reports an income statement 
primarily in order to reflect the allocation of profits, rather than depicting the 
profitability of a company. 
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Revenue from sale of products 
of which: 
Revenue from sales of self-sold products 
Less: 
Sales tax 
Factory cost of product sold 
Selling expenses 
Technical know-how transfer charge 
Profit from sales of finished products 
of which: 
Profit from sale of self-sold products 
Add 
Other sales products 
Non-operating income 
Less 
Non-operating expenses 
Tax on natural resources 
Total net income 
Add 
Profit transferred from other units 
Deficit to be covered by budget 
Deficit to be covered by profit of later years 
Less 
Profit for repayment of capital construction loan 
Profit for repayment of specific loan 
Net profit of 'three wastes' products left to enterprise 
Processing and assembling with supplied materials from abroad 
Employee welfare and employee incentive funds sources drawn from profit and repaying loans 
Profit allotted to other units 
Profit for covering prior year deficits 
Subtotal 
Less 
Income tax payable 
Income adjustment tax payable 
Contract fee payable 
Profit to be turned over the state 
Profit retained by enterprise 
Un-retained profit. 
Source: International Financial Accounting: a comparative approach, 2nd Edition, Clare Roberts; 
Pauline Weetman; Paul Gordon, Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 2002 
Table 3.3 An example of the income statement prior to reform 
- 67 - 
A close examination of the Table 3.3 could actually produce an interesting finding: 
profitability levels of SOEs derived from the Chinese income statement under the 
pre-reform approach is likely to be overstated by comparison with from the IAS 
method. 
First of all, the principle of prudence is not implemented in the traditional accounting 
practice and this is likely to overstate the profitability level of Chinese SOEs. The 
most typical example is that assets are not reviewed for impairment losses purposes 
and impairment losses are not recognised. In fact, under the traditional approach, 
assets are recorded at historical costs and Chinese SOEs are not required to review 
the value of assets even if there is evidence that assets are impaired. Therefore 
impairment losses resulted from the impaired assets were not recognised under the 
traditional accounting practice. However, according to the IAS 38 Impairment of 
Assets, an entity shall carry out the impairment review at each reporting date to 
check whether there is any indication that an asset may be impaired. If an asset is 
impaired an impairment loss shall be recognised and immediately charged into 
income statement. By contrast, reviewing the value of assets and recognising 
impairment losses for Chinese SOEs have never been put into practice under the 
traditional accounting regulations. As a result, the value of an asset in the fund 
balance sheet prior to reform may well be overstated when its carrying amount 
exceeds its recoverable amount. In addition, profitability levels of an SOE are also 
likely to be overstated because impairment losses are not recognised and charged 
against profits. This actually reveals a fundamental deficiency of the traditional 
accounting regulations in China -a lack of principle of prudence. The profit without 
being charged the impairment loss of the asset, if the asset is indeed impaired, is 
overstated and therefore can not represent the true profitability of the company. 
Secondly, the cost of capital has been seriously understated under the traditional 
Chinese accounting practices. In fact, the concept of capital did not even exist in the 
pre-reform accounting due to ideological concerns 26 . Instead, capital has 
been 
26 Under the planned economy, capital was a sensitive issue because it was regarded as the means of 
exploiting people. Therefore, capital and cost of capital could never be mentioned in the pre-reform 
accounting regulations. 
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replaced by state funds in reality. In the market economy, companies raise capital 
from capital market through bank loans and the issuance of debt and equity securities 
etc. Interest charges are a major component of capital costs which should be 
deducted in computing the net income for an enterprise. However, the capital 
structure of Chinese SOEs prior to economic reform has determined that China could 
not adopt the international approach in calculating the net income. It is well known 
that most SOEs were purely financed by the government through financial 
appropriations and state bank loans. Capital, usually in the form of fixed and current 
funds, was appropriated by the government to SOEs as if it were free. The notion of 
capital charge is not mentioned in the Chinese accounting prior to reform and 
therefore capital charges have never appeared in the income statement. Ignoring the 
cost of capital appropriated by the government through state appropriation would 
undoubtedly lead to the overstated net income. 
However, it can be argued that the cost of capital was recognised and accounted for 
by enterprises borrowing money from state banks because they had to pay interest to 
the bank and repay the capital within the term stipulated by the contract. This 
argument was strengthened by the policy 'to switch from state appropriations to bank 
loans' initiated by the government at an attempt to build up the internal self- 
constrained mechanism as the enterprise reform continues in the mid 1980s (see 
Chapter 2 for details). With the financing pipeline shifted from state financial 
appropriations to bank loans, SOEs had to consider the cost of borrowing and 
therefore cost of capital emerged. However, bank loans are in essence the same as 
the state appropriation in that the loans provided by state banks are ultimately from 
the state. The profitable SOEs are required to make the interest and principal 
payments but the loss-making SOEs could easily dodge the charges because state 
banks have neither legal means nor motivations to force the SOEs to make the 
payment. Financing SOEs from through state appropriation to through bank loans is, 
in effect, nothing more than giving money to SOEs from one pocket to another. With 
the concept of cost of capital applying to only those profits earning SOEs, the figures 
on the income statement of an SOE therefore cannot provide a true and fair 
indication of the profitability. 
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Based on the above, one can conclude that computation of profit under the pre- 
reform Chinese accounting regulations is seriously flawed and the net income 
appearing on the income statement was overstated. Consequently, the real 
profitability of SOEs prior to reform could not be truly presented by the income 
statement. 
In fact, from the perspective of the market economy, the net income figures 
appearing on the income statement simply could not provide the reliable indication 
of an enterprise's profitability; instead they serve the government as the 
administrative tool. The fact that SOEs are not independent economic entities but 
production units attached to the state machinery further suggests that the profit on the 
income statement is no more than statistical figures. With the government 
determining prices for almost all products, SOEs under the planned economy had 
neither choice nor bargain power to purchase the materials needed. Finished products 
were sold to the designated customers at government-set prices within the macro 
planning system (Ge, 2000). It seems that the only possibility that an SOE can 
improve profit is to reduce the costs in manufacturing products and/or delivering 
services. With fairly limited room left over for an enterprise to manage profit earning, 
one can clearly see that the profit is actually subject more to the government's 
administrative objectives and macro planning than to the market and the management 
of the enterprise. 
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3.3 The Construction of Accounting Regulatory Framework in China 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the accounting regulatory framework 
encompasses three parts: the laws, the standards and the system. Therefore the whole 
process of the accounting reform can be better seen from these three dimensions: 1) 
the development of legislation on accounting; 2) the adoption of accounting 
standards; and 3) the introduction of the accounting system. This section is 
attempting to have a historical view on what has happened in China's accounting by 
looking into these aspects. 
3.3.1 The Accounting Law 
The Accounting Law was promulgated by the Chinese National People's Congress 
(CNPC), the supreme legislative body of China, on the 21" January 1985 and became 
effective on the I't May. This is the first accounting law in China since 1949. 
The ever-deepening economic reforms, coupled with the promulgation of ASBE-BS 
at the end of 1992, have created disparity between the Accounting Law and the 
accounting standards. Especially, the economic reforms in China have reached a new 
stage in 1992 following the government's announcement to switch the economic 
system from a planned economy to a market economy. Significant disparity between 
the Accounting Law and the economic conditions started to emerge. In response to 
these, the Accounting Law was amended in December 1993 for the first time. Note 
the amendment was primarily targeted upon the significant disparity between 
Accounting Law and the changing economic conditions. Most of the prescriptions in 
the Accounting Law remained unchanged due to the uncertainty in the early stage of 
plan-to-market transition. Nevertheless, compared with the previous law, the revised 
Accounting Law has made some progress, e. g. the application scope of the 
Accounting Law has been enlarged from state-owned businesses and non-profit 
entities to all businesses and non-profit entities, hence strengthening the Accounting 
Law's protection to the public. In addition, the revised Accounting Law states that 
the role of accounting is to keep the order in the socialist market economy. This 
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statement is significant in that it reinforces the idea that accounting in the transitional 
period must satisfy the needs of a market economy. 
The Accounting Law was amended for the third time in October 1999. This 
amendment has brought about an array of noticeable changes. Firstly, it specifies that 
the objectives of accounting law are to standardise accounting practices and to ensure 
the quality of accounting information. Secondly, it requires the legal-person 
representative of an entity, i. e. the chair person of the board or managing director, to 
take full responsibilities for the truthfulness and completeness of accounting 
information. Thirdly, it formulates detailed prescriptions on accounting entries and 
requires all business and non-profit entities to look into the economic substance of 
business transactions when recognising and measuring assets, liabilities, equity, 
revenue, expense and profits. In addition, factors which might lead to manipulation 
of accounting figures are also identified in the Accounting Law and detailed rules are 
formulated to prohibit them happening. Fourthly, the revised Accounting Law has 
shed the light on the importance of a supervisory system encompassing internal 
monitor, external monitor and government supervision. 
3.3.2 The accounting standards 
Accounting standards are the main part of the accounting regulatory framework in 
most market economies. In countries such as U. K. and U. S., accounting standards are 
usually laid out by the accounting profession. Although there are widely accepted 
principles and are even mandatory in dealing with accounting issues, they by nature 
are not legislation. 
At the early stage of accounting reform, the financial and accounting theories and 
accounting standards prevailing in the Western countries caught the interest of the 
Chinese government. Influenced by these theories and standards, coupled with the 
increasing demands for bringing the Chinese accounting in conformity with the 
international convention, introducing accounting standards based on the International 
Accounting Standards with the consideration of unique Chinese economic conditions 
was brought to the top of the agenda. The Chinese Institution of Accounting (CIA) in 
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1987 set up a research panel to carry out a series of studies on accounting standards 
and relevant theories. In 1988, the Accounting Section of Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
established a special force encompassing researchers, accountants, lawyers, 
government officials from both China and overseas to draft the Chinese accounting 
standards. The effort to promulgate the Chinese accounting standards was also 
supported by a USD 2.6 million World Bank loan. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu was 
working with the MoF to provide consultation (Xinhua, 1992). The primary task is to 
develop a set of national accounting standards in line with international accepted 
norms. 
In November 1992, the MoF promulgated the Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises-Basic Standards (ASBE-BS), which became effective on I't July 1993. 
The purpose of these new standards, as described by Zhongli Liu, the then Chinese 
Finance Minister, is to 'standardise the financial practice of Chinese enterprise and 
bring China's accounting system in line with international convention' (Xinhua, 
1992). This is the first time for the Chinese government to formulate accounting 
standards and the birth of ASBE-BS was widely regarded as 'a landmark move to 
accelerate the process of switching to the market economy' (Xinhua, 1992). The 
promulgation of the ASBE-BS symbolised that China has made a key step forward in 
bringing the Chinese accounting in harmony with the international practices. 
The ASBE-BS consists of 10 chapters covering general rules, accounting principles, 
assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, expenses, profits, financial statements and 
supplementary articles. The ASBE-BS is also widely conceived to provide a 
conceptual framework that guided the setting of future accounting standards 
(Adhikari and Wang, 1995; Chen et al., 1997; Chen et al., 1998; Xiao 1999) in that it 
addresses the most fundamental issues in the field of accounting such as the 
objectives of ASBE-BS, the users and objectives of financial accounting and 
reporting, accounting postulates, general accounting principles and qualitative 
characteristics, elements of financial statements, recognition, measurement, and 
financial statements. It is also recognised that the promulgation of the ASBE-BS 
represents a revolutionary progress in the Chinese accounting it that it has brought 
about remarkable changes to the existing accounting theories and practices. A series 
of basic accounting concepts and principles were officially codified in the ASBE-BS. 
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These are entity, going-concern, accounting period, historical cost, accrual 
accounting, realisation, conservatism, matching principle, distinction between capital 
and revenue expenditure, consistency, timeliness, etc. The main feature of the ASBE- 
BS is surnmarised in Table 3.4. 
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ORIENTATION: 
"A uniform accounting system conforming to the International Accounting Standards 
designed to meet the needs of China's socialist market economy; 
" These standards are incorporated into law; 
" The accrual basis, the concept of consistency, the matching of revenue and expenses and the 
quality of objectivity are all required by the ASBE-BS. 
ASSETS: 
" The use of historical cost for assets is specified and a clear distinction between revenue 
expenditures and capital expenditures must be made; 
" Assets should be classified into the usual categories consistent with the International 
Accounting Standards; 
" Inventories may be valued using the conventional methods, including LIFO; 
" Fixed assets may be depreciated using the straight-line or the activity method. Accelerated 
depreciation may be used upon approval; 
" Intangible assets, including goodwill, are recognised and are to be amortised over the period 
benefited. 
LIABILITIES: 
Liabilities may be classified as current or long-term and liability accounting generally 
follows the IASs. 
EQUITY: 
Equity is classified into invested capital, capital reserve, surplus reserve and undistributed 
profit. Invested capital represents the face value of stock issued and government investment. 
Capital reserve represents stock premium, asset revaluation increments, donated capital, etc. 
Surplus Reserve is analogous to appropriated retained earnings and undistributed profit is 
analogous to retained earnings. 
REVENUEIEXPENSEIPROFIT: 
" Revenues are determined using the accrual basis consistent with the IASs including the 
completed contract and percentage-of-completion methods for long-term projects; 
" Expenses are determined using the accrual basis and actual costs incurred. Enterprises using 
standard or estimated costs must adjust variances to actual at the end of the current month; 
" The plan for distribution of profits must be shown in the income statement or the notes of the 
financial statements. 
FINANCIAL REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE: 
Required reports consist of a balance sheet, an income statement, a statement of changes in 
financial position (or cash flow statement), supporting schedules, notes and explanatory 
statements; 
Comparative financial statement are required; 
Consolidated financial statements are required in cases of 50% or more ownership except for 
enterprises not suitable for consolidation; 
Notes to financial statements must disclose accounting methods adopted, changes in 
accounting methods, descriptions of unusual items and other details and explanations. 
Sources: Accounting Standards in the People's Republic of China: Responding to Economic Reforms, 
Winkle et al. (1994), Accounting Horizons, Vol. 8 No. 3. 
Table 3.4 Characteristics of the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 
-Basic Standard 
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Following the promulgation of the ASBE-BS, the MoF issued 30 exposure drafts for 
specific accounting standards between 1995 and 1996. In May 1997, the first specific 
accounting standard-Disclosure of Related Party Relations and Transactions-came 
into existence. Until now, the MoF promulgated 16 specific accounting standards. 
Details of these specific accounting standards are summarised in Table 3.5. 
No. The Specific Accounting Standards Effective Date 
I Disclosure of Related-Party Relations and Transactions 01/01/1997 
2 Events After the Balance Sheet Date 01/01/1998 
3 Construction Contracts 01/01/1999 
4 Revenue 01/01/1999 
5 
Changes in Accounting Policy, Accounting Estimates, and Correction 
of Accounting Errors 
01/01/1999 
6 Correction of Accounting Errors 01/01/1999 
7 Contingencies 01/07/2000 
8 Non-monetary Transactions 01/01/2001 
9 Cash Flow Statements 01/01/2001 
10 Debt Restructuring 01/01/2001 
11 Investments 01/01/2001 
12 Intangible Assets 01/01/2001 
13 Leases 01/01/2001 
14 Interim Financial Reporting 01/01/2002 
15 Fixed Assets 01/01/2002 
16 Inventories 01/01/2002 
Source: wKiv. csre. gov. uk the website ofthe China Securities Regulatory Commission 
Table 3.5 Specific accounting standards promulgated by the MoF 
Note that the order of the above specific accounting standards was basically 
determined by the extent to which the development of capital markets demanded the 
specific standards. 
Clearly the framework of accounting standards has already taken its form. There are 
two different levels of accounting standards: the basic standard and the specific 
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standards. The basic standard stands at the upper tier and is widely regarded as the 
conceptual framework to lay a foundation for setting up the specific standards. It 
stipulates the general prescriptions on the fundamental accounting principles and 
accounting postulates. It also outlines the basic rules on the recognition and 
measurement of accounting items and the preparation of financial reports. The 
specific standards deal with specific economic transactions and items, and provide 
detailed regulations on the recognition, measurement and reporting. 
3.3.3 The accounting system 
The Uniform Accounting System (UAS) is a set of accounting regulations governing 
accounting practice in China prior to the promulgation of the Accounting Law and 
accounting standards. Copying the accounting model of former Soviet-Union, China 
established the UAS to adapt to the needs of centralised planned economy in the 
early 1950s. In the 20 years after the 1950s, China has been in a disastrous status 
under the influence of continuous political chaos such as the Great Leap Forward and 
the Great Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and the 1970s. The whole country was 
severely hit and accounting is no exception. As a consequence, the UAS was 
completely ruined. The accounting practices in China have been isolated from the 
outside world (Zhuan, 2001). 
The government was determined to restore the UAS following the commencement of 
the economic reforms and open-up policies. The whole process of construction of the 
UAS can be broken into two stages. 
Stage one can be traced back from the 1980s to 1992. In this stage, the emphasis of 
the effort was placed upon restoring the ruined UAS. The ob ective of bringing the 
UAS in line with the international conventions has not been put forth because of the 
government's indecisive attitude towards establishing market economy in China. 
One of the striking characteristics in this stage is that the establishment of accounting 
system was primarily targeted at state-owned businesses and very much industry 
oriented. Various government bodies formulated different accounting regulations 
according to the specific nature of the industry. For example, the MoF in 1980 
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promulgated the Accounting System for State-owned Industrial Enterprises- 
Accounting Items and Financial Reports. In 1981, two sets of similar regulations 
came out but they were applied to different industries: the trading and construction 
sectors. These regulations are the Accounting System for State-owned Trading 
Enterprises-Accounting Items and Financial Reports and Accounting System for 
State-owned Trading Enterprises-Accounting Items and Financial Reports. In the 
years after 198 1, more government bodies, e. g. the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Railways, the Ministry of 
Transport, the Ministry of Foods and the People's Bank of China-the central bank 
etc., have produced their own accounting regulatory systems. 
What is ironic about the work in this stage is that the so-called Uniform Accounting 
System was actually a mixture of separate codes of practices issued by various 
government bodies according to the specific nature of the industry. As a consequence, 
enterprises in different sectors should apply different regulations when preparing 
their financial reports. What is more interesting is that all these regulations were 
applicable to state-owned enterprises only. Accounting regulations for private 
businesses and foreign investments were largely lacking due to the fact that SOEs 
were the mainstay of the national economy at the early stage of the economic reform. 
However, despite the government's failure to put an accounting system universally 
applicable to all types of enterprises in place, accounting reform is moving in a right 
direction. 
One noticeable move is the introduction of the Provisional Accounting System for 
Joint-venture Enterprises (PASJE) in March 1985. Although the scope of the PASJE 
is limited to joint-venture companies only-a negligible part of China's economy in 
the mid-1980s, historically, it has far-reaching implications for setting up a Chinese 
accounting regulatory framework. It is also widely accepted that the promulgation of 
the PASJE has sent out a strong indication of the government's intention to depart 
from the traditional accounting system and to bring the Chinese accounting in 
conformity with the international conventions (Xiao, 1999, Chen et al., 1999, Xiang, 
1998, Winkle et al., 1994, Zhuan, 2001). A selection of accounting methods, 
concepts, principles and formats for the first time have been introduced into China 
from international accounting practice. For the first time, China has included the cash 
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flow statement as a part of the financial reporting system; for the first time, the 
conception of paid-in capital has been codified in the mandatory regulations; for the 
first time, patents and technologies have been recognised as a part of intangible 
assets. Clearly, importing international conventions into the Chinese accounting 
practice on such a massive scale has posed a fresh challenge to the traditional 
accounting system established in the past decades. The promulgation of the PASJE is 
considered of particular importance because it provides a window for the government 
to carry out the experiment to bringing the Chinese accounting in line with the 
international conventions. 
Stage two started from 1992, when the government was determined to develop the 
market economy in China. A series of measures were taken by the government to 
ensure that market economy will be established with success. Among them the most 
significant is to deepen the SOE reform by carrying out the experiment of 
transforming traditional SOEs into shareholding companies with diversified 
ownership, which resulted in the emergence of listed companies and the stock 
markets. One of the greatest challenges encountered by the policy makers when 
allowing diversified investors to be shareholders of listed companies is to protect the 
interest of individual investors. Once again, the demands for standardised accounting 
practices and transparent financial reporting arose. In response to the fresh 
challenges, the MoF enacted the Accounting System for Shareholding Limited 
Companies (ASSLC) in January 1998. The introduction of the ASSLC signified 
another significant step forward in the Chinese accounting history in that it has 
achieved substantial break-through in many aspects. Especially the principle of 
prudence was introduced and required to put into practice. For example, under the 
ASSLC, a company is required to implement the principle of prudence when 
choosing accounting policies. It was further specified that four classes of assets, 
namely accounts receivable, short-term investments, long-term investments and 
inventory, should be reviewed periodically, or at least at the end of accounting year. 
When these assets are found to be impaired, impairment losses should be recognised 
and charged into the income statement. Accordingly, the impaired assets should also 
be written down to reflect the current value of the assets. It is worth noting that 
introducing the principle of prudence by requiring shareholding companies to 
recognise impairment losses has had a significant impact on the overall 'culture' of 
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financial reporting and the stock market in China (Lin and Chen, 1999). Although 
management of listed companies continues to enjoy substantial managerial discretion 
in preparing financial reports, the room for shareholding companies to overstate 
accounting profits and value of assets has been severely restricted as a result of 
impairment losses being recognised 27 . 
As discussed earlier, despite the government's efforts to bring Chinese accounting 
practices in line with international conventions, the existence of multiple accounting 
systems promulgated by various government bodies to suit the needs of different 
industries and applicable to companies with different ownership has caused serious 
problems and gradually become a stumbling stone hampering the further 
development of accounting reform. Until the end of 1992, the MoF had issued 
thirteen sets of accounting systems to cover eight important industrial sectors (Zhuan, 
2001). The core problem with these systems lies in the lack of comparability in the 
accounting information provided by companies owned by different investors and/or 
in different industrial sectors. To tackle this problem, the MoF promulgated the 
Accounting System for Business Enterprises (ASBE) on the 291h December 2000. In 
the mean time, all other accounting systems prior to the ASBE including the ASSLC 
were abolished. Furthermore, it stipulates that the ASBE will be applied in the 
shareholding companies first. Other types of companies are also encouraged to 
implement the ASBE. According to the plan of the MoF, the ASBE will be become 
mandatory to all companies in the foreseeable future. 
It is conceived that the promulgation of the ASBE was based upon the ASSLC and 
the existing accounting standards with consideration of the unique accounting 
environment and accounting practices in China. By comparison with the ASSLC and 
other accounting systems segmented by industries and types of ownership, the merits 
of the ASBE are remarkable and can be summarised as follows: 
27 It can also be argued that the introducing impairment losses provides management more 
opportunities to commit earnings management as reviewing the value of assets and making provisions 
for impairment losses involve substantial managerial judgement. Therefore, requiring companies to 
recognise impairment losses is a double-edge sword. 
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Firstly, the ASBE has a wider scope of application. As discussed earlier, the ASBE is 
applicable to all types of companies across all sectors and all types of ownership. As 
specified in Article 2 of the ASBE, with the exception of small-scale companies 
without external capital and financial & insurance companies, all business enterprises 
formed in the People's Republic of China should apply the ASBE when preparing 
financial reports. Clearly, the lines which used to segment accounting practices 
according to industries and types of ownership have been eliminated as a result of the 
ASBE being put into practice. 
Secondly, the implementation of the principle of prudence has been further 
strengthened. The principle of prudence is reflected in many aspects of the ASBE. 
For example, in addition to the four classes of assets which were required by the 
ASSLC to recognise impairment losses, four more classes of assets have been added 
into the list: fixed assets, intangible assets, projects under construction and third- 
party loans. 
Thirdly, more room for professional and managerial judgement has been given to 
accountants and management. For example, accountants are given the right to 
determine depreciation periods and choose depreciation methods when dealing with 
deprecation. The proportion of provision for bad debts is also subject to the 
management's judgement. 
Fourthly, more accounting information is required to disclose under the ASBE. 
Compared with the previous accounting systems, the ASBE has placed more 
emphasis upon reliability and truthfulness of the accounting information disclosed by 
the company. In addition to the balance sheet, income statement and cash flow 
statement, companies are required by the ASBE to report statement of impairment 
losses, statement of changes in equity, and segmented statement by industries and 
regions. 
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3.4 A Further Look at the Accounting Regulatory Framework and the 
Accounting Reform 
Having discussed the changes in Chinese accounting in the previous sections, it is 
worth surnmarising the accounting reform that China has carried out during the last 
decades and the accounting regulatory framework established as a result of the 
reform. Comments can be made from two perspectives: firstly, what has the 
accounting reform achieved? Secondly, what are the driving forces behind the 
accounting reforms? This section will make comments on the current accounting 
regulatory framework and accounting reform by addressing these two issues. 
3.4.1 What has the accounting reform achieved? 
As can be seen from the preceding sections, an accounting regulatory framework has 
taken its form as a result of continuous reform in the past decades. With the 
Accounting Law and other related statues laying the legal foundation, the accounting 
standards constructing a conceptual framework and the accounting system providing 
detailed instructions at the operation level, the three levels of regulations together 
constitute an integral regulatory framework. 
Standing at the top level of the accounting framework are the Accounting Law and 
other related statues including the Company Law, the Auditing Law and the 
Securities Law. They are enacted by the Chinese National People's Congress 
(CNPC), the supreme legislative body in China, and therefore they provide a legal 
foundation for promulgating other regulations. 
The accounting standards and accounting system are promulgated by the MoF, the 
governmental body embracing the power to formulate administrative rules and 
regulations governing accounting practices. It is noted that the issue of relationship 
between accounting standards and accounting system has been a widely debated 
topic in recent years. The common thought is that with accounting standards 
providing guidance to the formulation of accounting system, accounting standards 
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stand at the higher level than does the accounting system (Chen et al., 1997, Tang, 
2000, Xiao, 1999, Chen et al., 1999). In the whole regulatory framework, the 
Accounting System for Business Enterprises plays its grass-root role by dealing with 
detailed instructions at the operational level in implementing the Accounting Law 
and accounting standards. 
There are, however, two competing schools of thoughts as to whether accounting 
standards can replace the Accounting System for Business Enterprises. Some 
researchers argue that like the industrialised countries such as the U. K. and U. S. 
where there are only accounting standards, China does not have to keep the 
accounting system in place following the promulgation of accounting standards, 
because accounting standards would be sufficient to regulate the accounting practices. 
The dual-regulation system would lead to complication and confusion. The 
opponents insist that the accountants in China are used to the accounting system with 
detailed instructions on the use of the accounting items, while accounting standards 
are not easy to be accepted by the accountants in that they give only guidance and 
principles. Therefore, it is necessary to continue to apply the accounting system even 
after all accounting standards are issued and implemented. The debate is still going 
on, however, it does not alter the fact that accounting standards and accounting 
system will co-exist to govern the accounting practices in the foreseeable future 
(McGregor, 2006a). 
Although the important contents in accounting standards have been incorporated into 
the Accounting System for Business Enterprises when the MoF considers 
formulating the ASBE, accounting standards differ significantly from ASBE in terms 
of the roles they play in the accounting regulatory framework. Accounting standards 
are utilised to regulate the recognition, measurement and the reporting of transactions 
based on the substance of businesses, while the ASBE places an emphasis on 
applying the spirit of accounting standards into specific accounting practices in 
dealing with accounting items. It is widely conceived that the co-existence of 
accounting standards and the ASBE in China reflects a combination of the demand 
for bringing Chinese accounting in line with international conventions and the 
government's desire to keep the unique accounting tradition in place to adapt to the 
under-developed accounting professions (Tang, 1999). 
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As discussed before, the enterprise system reform, as a core part of the economic 
reforms, has provided momentum for establishing the current accounting regulatory 
framework. The construction of the accounting regulatory framework as a result of 
accounting reforms has in turn played a significant role in strengthening the 
enterprise system in China. One of the core characteristics of the modem enterprise 
system is the separation of ownership and management, which relies upon the 
development of the capital market. In a well-developed market, an enterprise can 
raise capital from the capital market by its performance and investors are able to 
make investment decisions by obtaining the true and fair accounting information 
(Allen, 1997). In a listed company with ownership separating from management, 
investors, especially individual investors, can rely on only the publicly reported 
information to make investment decisions. Clearly the reliability, fairness and 
timeliness of accounting information are of particular importance. 
To ensure the listed companies do report high-quality accounting information, the 
accounting standards and accounting system provide a wide range of technical 
standards for recognising, measuring, recording and disclosing accounting items. The 
Accounting Law further clarifies the legal responsibilities of directors, accountants 
and auditors etc, thus offering a set of statutory rules to regulate the accounting 
practices. As far as the accounting standards and accounting system which have 
come to existence are concerned, most of the regulations are formulated to tackle the 
problems facing the enterprises under reform, especially listed companies. For 
example, among all the specific accounting standards issued so far, the Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises-The Disclosure of Relationship of Related 
Parties and Transactions was the first specific standard enacted to deal with the 
widespread problem of insider trading and earnings management through related- 
party transactions. The introduction of impairment losses in the ASBE was also 
designed to reduce the possibility for management to manipulate accounting figures. 
The construction of the accounting regulatory framework has also helped to shape 
the capital markets in China. Capital markets seek for efficiency and fairness (Allen, 
1997). Capital tends to flow into the companies with higher rates of return in seeking 
for profits. Investors need relevant information about the performance of the 
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company to make investment decisions and this information is usually contained in 
financial reports. Therefore truthful and reliable accounting information is playing a 
vital role in ensuring the capital market is functioning towards achieving its goals: 
efficiency and fairness. 
The listed companies and the equity market in China emerged as a result of the 
government's experiment to transform SOEs into shareholding companies. Not 
surprisingly, all the accounting standards and accounting system were also put forth 
after 1992. Most of the regulations are required to be applied to listed companies or 
shareholding companies before they are implemented to all types of enterprises. This 
to some extent reflects the needs of the capital markets for improving the quality of 
accounting information. Despite all the problems facing the Chinese accounting 
regulators, it is an undeniable fact that the quality of accounting information 
provided by Chinese listed companies is in deed improving (Xiao, 1999). The 
development of Chinese capital markets would not have been sustainable without the 
improvement in the quality of accounting information. 
Especially, the accounting regulatory system is playing, and will continue to play, an 
irreplaceable role in protecting the interest of individual shareholders and 
maintaining order in the capital markets. It is worth noting that the protection of 
individual investors is of particular importance in the context of China due to the 
lack of legal protection and information asymmetry. The accounting standards and 
accounting system promulgated since 1992 have to some extent provided a control 
mechanism to restrict the management's possibility to report false accounting 
information. More importantly, the new regulations have increased the comparability 
among different companies and within the company over different periods. 
3.4.2. What are the driving forces behind the accounting reforyn? 
It is well recognised that the accounting environment, among the other factors, plays 
a substantial role in shaping the accounting regulatory framework (Xiang, 1998). 
Profound changes in the economic system and massive alteration of the corporate 
landscape in China have brought increased attention to the importance of the role of 
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accounting and financial reporting. The sharp increase in foreign direct investments 
flooding in China, coupled with the establishment of stock exchanges and listed 
companies, have heightened the needs for a national accounting regulatory 
framework which is in line with the international norms. On a close examination, one 
can discover that it is the ever-changing accounting environment that has been 
shaping the accounting regulatory framework. In China, this accounting environment 
can be specified as the transition from planned economy to market economy, the 
enterprise system reform and the integration of China's economy into the globe. 
Their influences on the accounting regulatory framework will be discussed as 
follows: 
3.4.2.1. The economic transition 
The economic reform is in essence a revolutionary transition from the planned 
economy to the market economy (Zhuan 1999). With new economic phenomena and 
diversified business forms emerging, fresh demands have been created for reforming 
the lagged-behind accounting regulatory framework. For instance, the fast-expanding 
scale of businesses has given rise to the emergence of group companies. 
Consequentially, the demand has been generated for the promulgation of according 
regulations to deal with accounting treatments on transactions between the parent 
company and its subsidiaries and transactions among subsidiaries. In the meantime, 
regulations are also needed to govern the consolidated financial reporting for group 
companies. The issuance of the Regulations on Consolidated Financial Statements 
(RCFS) in 1995 has responded to and reflected this demand. What is more, the fast 
growing economy has also enabled many companies to have become conglomerates 
with business operations across several sectors. These companies frequently find it 
extremely difficult to prepare for financial accounts because accounting for 
businesses in different industries would have to follow different rules. The Uniform 
Accounting System that was designed to deal with accounting practices according to 
the industrial sector will have to be substituted with an accounting system that 
provides a universal code of practices to companies in all sectors. The promulgation 
of the Accounting System for Business Enterprises (ASBE) and accounting standards 
has broken the line by stipulating that the regulations are applicable to all companies 
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across industries. Based upon the above, one can clearly see that every single step 
that the accounting reform has made was actually pushed by the demands generated 
by the market-oriented economic reform. 
The market-oriented economic reform can be reflected in many aspects, e. g. the 
increased diversification of ownership structure. As discussed in Chapter 2, One of 
the most noticeable changes taking place in China since the early 1980s is that the 
ownership structure has been profoundly altered (Tang, 1999). The dominance of 
state owned enterprises in the national economy has been challenged by the rising 
power of non-state ownership of companies, e. g. share-based companies, family 
businesses, joint-ventures enterprises, foreign-investing firms, etc. Although the 
newly-emerged enterprises take various forms in terms of ownership, there is one 
common characteristic among them: property right is clarified. On the other hand, 
the SOE reform has also made it possible to clarify property rights within SOEs by 
separating management from ownership and by encouraging diversified investors to 
own shares of SOEs. To respond to these changes in the ownership structure, new 
accounting regulations must be put forth to reflect the clear-cut property rights of all 
stake holders in a company. An accounting regulatory framework that breaks 
ownership and industry boundaries and provides a fair treatment to all types of 
owners in a company is therefore necessary. 
The market-oriented economic reform has given rise to the growth of financial 
markets. Companies increasingly rely on financial markets to raise capital. The 
development of the capital market, especially the equity market, posed fresh 
challenges to the accounting regulatory framework. It is well recognised that the 
modem financial markets are built on the efficient information disclosure (Allen, 
1997). The core of the information disclosure is the financial information. Timely 
and reliable financial information is the prerequisite for the health and order of 
capital markets. As far as the accounting reform is concerned, the rapid development 
of capital markets has provided a powerful driving force in constructing the 
accounting regulatory framework. For example, the existing 16 specific accounting 
standards are promulgated in order to regulate the accounting treatments and 
information disclosure for listed companies. These standards are applicable to 
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companies that raise capital from capital markets, e. g. listed companies, before other 
forms of companies begin to put these standards into practice. 
3.4.2.2. The SOE reform 
The accounting regulatory system, as an important part of whole economic and social 
system, is highly dependent upon the other institutional arrangements, especially the 
enterprise system (Zhuan, 2001). The soaring number of listed companies and the 
fast development of share-based firms have provided tremendous momentum for the 
construction of an accounting regulatory system. To push ahead the SOE reform, 
large and medium-size SOEs were transformed into shareholding enterprises with 
diversified investors and clarified property rights before they can issue shares and 
float on the stock market. Foreign and private investors are allowed to hold shares of 
shareholding companies on the conditions that the state owns the majority of the 
shares and the enterprises are not in the industries threatening the national security 
and monopoly (Jiang, 1997). As discussed earlier, despite the majority of state shares 
in these companies, they resemble the Western enterprises for the following reasons. 
Firstly, property rights of the stock-based companies to some extent have been 
clarified after the transformation that involved diversified investments. Secondly, 
management in the stock-holding companies is separated from ownership. Although 
the government as the major shareholder still plays a significant role in the company, 
direct interference from the government can be replaced with professional 
management. Thirdly, SOEs that act as production units under the planned economy 
are turned into the profit and investment centres on the ground that they are forced to 
face the market competition and the state holds limited responsibilities. In short, the 
share-based companies, especially those listed on the stock exchanges, have been 
transformed into market-oriented enterprises although they more or less contain 
some of the attributes of the traditional SOEs. 
One of the most common headaches rooted in all modem public companies lies in 
the agency problem. Cabral (2000) points out that, in general, the managers' 
objectives differ from those of the shareholders due to the separation of ownership 
from management. It is therefore inevitable that managers do not always act in the 
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interests of shareholders and shareholders cannot exercise effective control over 
managers. Even if shareholders are able to control managers, there is still a problem 
that managers normally know better than shareholders what is best for the firm, a 
problem of asymmetric information. The fact that managers possess more 
information than shareholders makes the agency problem even more irresolvable. It 
is argued that agency problem can be at least attenuated by internal discipline such as 
setting up efficient corporate governance and a compensation contract combining 
fixed wage and profit-contingent compensation and by external disciplines including 
labour market, product market and capital market. These disciplines, working 
together, may ensure that the deviations from profit maximisation can not be too 
large. 
The agency problem prevails in all companies where management and ownership are 
separated. By no means are Chinese listed companies immune from it. In fact, the 
agency problem of Chinese listed companies is likely to be even more severe than 
that of their western counterparts, if one takes corporate governance and external 
discipline mechanism into consideration. 
Firstly, corporate governance in most Chinese listed companies suffers a series of 
inherent problems, one of which is the, imbalance of power between the government 
and individual investors. As discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese listed companies are 
transformed from SOEs with the dominance of state shares. The government still 
performs substantial control over the listed companies, whereas individual investors 
have very little influence. As a result, Bai et al. (2004) argue that effective monitor is 
not likely to take place within the listed companies where the corporate governance 
is established based on the former management of SOEs who possess very little 
know-how and experiences in managing businesses. 
Secondly, the market is unlikely to be able to perform an effective external discipline 
on Chinese listed companies on the ground that the development of the market 
economy is still at its infancy. The labour market simply can not give pressure onto 
the managers in poor-performing companies because many high-ranking managers of 
Chinese listed companies are subject to the appointment of the government who 
normally assesses the manager's performance from the perspective of the political 
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and administrative needs (Bai et al., 2004). The information conveyed in the product 
market is frequently distorted by the government's monopoly. It is well known that 
some state-controlled listed companies possess unchallenged monopoly advantages 
in industries such as telecom, automobile manufacturing, banking, utilities, railway 
and motor transport, petroleum and related products, etc. Therefore it is likely that 
there is no direct link between the performance of a company and the competency of 
management. A poor-managed company may perform extremely well simply 
because it is in a government-monopolised industry. Furthermore, the control 
mechanism of takeover markets is severely restricted by the shareholding structure of 
listed companies (Xu and Wang, 1999). in fact, an active takeover market does not 
exist in China because state shares and legal person shares are not allowed to trade at 
the stock exchanges. Even though state and legal-person shares are transferable, 
parties involved must go through a tedious procedure and have their deals approved 
by the market regulators. As a result, being fired by the board of directors seems to 
be a far more serious threat to the Chinese managers than an outsider takeover. 
The emerging agency problem stemming from the separation of management from 
ownership, accompanied with severe information asymmetry and weak corporate 
governance mechanism, has provided management in China's listed companies with 
ample opportunities to commit fraud in preparing for financial reports. According to 
Lu and Fu (2003), who have carried out research on the financial fraudulent activities 
in the China's listed companies, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) has 
investigated 346 corporate fraudulent incidents in the SSE between 1994 and 2000, 
nearly 20% of them are related to the illegal manipulation of accounting information. 
Activities such as earnings management are considered widespread in China's listed 
companies. The increasingly rampant financial fraudulent activities have caused 
tremendous damage to the health and development of stock markets in China. A 
'trust crisis' seemed to be inevitable if no measures were to be taken (Lu and Fu, 
2003). All these have generated a fresh demand for establishing an accounting 
regulatory system geared towards protecting a wide range of stakeholders such as 
investors, creditors, customers and suppliers, etc. An accounting regulatory system 
that is adapted to the market-oriented economy must be put in place to ensure the 
provision of high-quality accounting information which can reflect the true and fair 
view of the financial conditions and profitability of the company. In addition, 
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accounting information must be complete and comparable and accounting practices 
must be as uniform and transparent as possible. 
3.4.2.3 Intemationalisation 
With international trading and foreign investments being rare prior to the 1980s, the 
accounting regulatory system was built upon the isolated and highly centralised 
planned economy. The success of open-up policies led to a sharp increase in the 
international trading and foreign investments flowing into China. This posed another 
challenge to the traditional accounting practices. 
Most foreign investors enter the China's market by choosing to set up joint-venture 
companies with Chinese partners in the early years (Fung et al., 2006). One of the 
prerequisites under which Chinese enterprises and their foreign partners bond 
together is that each side ought to have a complete understanding of the financial 
conditions of their future partners. Financial reports produced by Chinese enterprises 
under the Chinese accounting regulations, however, always make it impossible for 
their foreign future partners to understand. The huge accounting gulf between China 
and the outside world has become a significant hindrance for China to attract more 
foreign investment. Even after a joint venture was established, the debate on what 
accounting regulations should be followed remains intense as the Chinese side 
continues their practice while the foreign partners struggle to persuade their Chinese 
partners to take the international approach. 
The difficulty in communication of accounting information takes place not only 
when foreign investors form joint ventures, but also when Chinese company seek to 
list shares overseas or to sell shares to foreign investors. The traditional Chinese 
accounting practice and the resultant financial reports are so distant from those of the 
international conventions that the likelihood of success for firms attempting to go 
public depends on how well the Western accounting firms manage to reconcile two 
business cultures that are 'worlds apart' (Winkle et al., 1994). In addition, foreign 
investors in the emerging Chinese stock market frequently have difficulty in 
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assessing the financial health of companies listed on the stock exchanges due to the 
lack of specific disclosure requirements (McGrath, 1993). 
With China's economic integration into the world accelerating, the insulated 
traditional accounting practices have increasingly become the stumbling stone for the 
further development of China's economy. To bring Chinese accounting in 
conformity with the international norms has become a must-do, rather than an option. 
To construct an accounting regulatory system that is adapted to China's global 
economy, China has taken a series of bold steps in introducing the international 
accounting conventions. As discussed earlier, the first step is the introduction of 
Accounting Regulations for Joint Ventures in March 1985. Although applied to 
merely joint-venture companies, this set of regulations was widely regarded as a 
significant step forward in that it marked a radical departure from the traditional 
accounting in China and provided guidelines for j oint-venture operations by referring 
to international accounting practices (Ho, 2002). The most significant move is the 
promulgation of the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises-Basic Standards 
and following 16 specific accounting standards. Although differences between the 
Chinese accounting standards and international accounting standards (IASs) exist in 
the contents, interpretation and implementation of the standards, China has largely 
adopted the major principles and concepts from the IASs. 
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Chapter 4. A FURTHER LOOK AT THE CHINESE 
ACCOUNTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction 
After more than two decades of efforts to reform the system of accounting, China has 
constructed its own accounting regulatory framework consisting of accounting laws, 
accounting standards and accounting system. One of the central focuses of the 
accounting reform is to bring China's accounting regulations in line with 
internationally acceptable standards. In practice, the MoF did refer to, and is still 
referring to, the international conventions contained in the IASs when issuing 
Chinese accounting standards. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, the project of 
promulgating accounting standards was also backed up by the international 
assistance such as the World Bank loan and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. However, it 
will be wrong to assume that Chinese accounting regulations are identical to the rules 
in the IASs. Rather, there are substantial differences between the Chinese accounting 
standards and the IASs. 
The differences between the two can be attributed to the unique circumstances of 
China. Firstly, China is in a transitional period in which the influence of the planned 
economy still remains and the market-based institutions are under construction. The 
overall economic, cultural and political environment in which accounting is 
functioning is fundamentally different from that in the developed markets. Chinese 
accounting regulations must be built on and be reflective of these unique institutional 
settings. Secondly, the Chinese accounting profession, e. g. Chinese accountants, has 
been used to the traditional accounting practice and is still learning how to work in a 
market economy. Sometimes it is difficult to translate the Western-style accounting 
concepts and terms into Chinese. Regulations can be issued within a short period of 
time. However, training the accounting profession towards international practice is a 
daunting challenge and takes a much longer time. Therefore, to minimise the shock 
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triggered by the new accounting standards, the MoF often have to make the new 
standards not only less sophisticated but also more prescriptive than the IASs. 
The central task of this chapter is to identify the major differences between the 
Chinese accounting standards and the IASs. The remainder of this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 2 takes a brief look at the differences between the 
existing standards and the equivalent IASs. Section 3 focuses on identifying the 
unique accounting items by looking into the consolidated financial reports by a 
Chinese company, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (CPCC). 
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4.2 Where Does the Chinese Accounting Stand in the Four Spectrums? 
The comparative approach taken by Roberts et al. (2002) in studying the 
international financial accounting attempts to pinpoint the position of a country's 
accounting regulatory system by looking at four dimensions: 1) professionalism 
versus statutory control; 2) uniformity versus flexibility; 3) conservatism versus 
optimism; 4) secrecy versus transparency 28 .A question was immediately raised: 
Where does China stand in these four spectrums? Clearly, a brief discussion on 
China's current position is helpful for one to gain an understanding of China's 
accounting regulations in the global context. 
4.2.1 Professionalism vs. statutory control 
Unlike the U. K. where the entire history of accounting practice is strongly dependant 
on professional expertise, China's regulatory system of accounting is obviously one 
which relies exclusively upon statutory control (Roberts et al., 2002). While 
accounting standards are issued, they are issued by the MoF independently of the 
accounting profession. In fact, the whole process of accounting reform was initiated, 
pushed ahead and controlled by the government. There are a number of reasons 
attributable to the China's extreme position on this profession vs. statutory control 
continuum. First, this government-dominated approach is consistent with the overall 
culture of 'big government and small society'. Historically, the government has 
always been a central force in all aspects of the country. The socialist planned 
economy, together with the one-party political system, enables the government to go 
even further towards the centralised administration. Second, the government's 
unchallenged power and authority in governing the accounting practice is in a 
marked contrast to the new, small and powerless accounting profession. The Chinese 
28 Roberts's approach was actually taken from Gray's (1998) accounting values, which were based on 
Hofstede's (1984) framework. Details of their work can be found from Gray, S. J. (1988), 'Towards a 
theory of cultural influence on the development of accounting systems internationally', Abacus, 24 (1): 
1- 15 and Hofstede, G. (1984) Cultural differences: International Differences in Work-related Values. 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
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Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA), which was established in 
November 1988, is limited to setting auditing standards and acting as a trade 
organisation for exams and CPA registration. Therefore, the government is unlikely 
to give up this power to a professional body unless there is a very good reason to do 
SO. 
4.2.2 Uniformity vs. flexibility 
Roberts et al. (2002) found it very difficult to locate Chinese accounting in the 
uniformity/flexibility continuum. The reason for this is the coexistence of accounting 
standards and accounting system. While the Accounting System for Business 
Enterprises gives little discretion on how to account for particular transactions or 
events, some of the rules contained in the accounting standards are very flexible. 
This does not necessarily mean that the rules in the accounting system contradict 
with those in the accounting standards. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a debate as 
to whether China should keep both these two in the future. It seems that the MoF will 
carry on the dual-regulation system for quite a long time (McGregor, 2006). The 
justification for the MoF to use both accounting standards and accounting system lies 
in that these two are performing different functions in the whole regulatory 
framework. While the accounting standards provide the basic guidance as to how to 
treat, recognise and measure transactions or events, the accounting system offers the 
detailed code of practice at the operational level. Both of these functions are 
important in the context of China, especially when accounting regulations are just 
established. 
In fact, it is a great challenge for the MoF to reach a balance between uniformity and 
flexibility. On one hand, regulations contained in the accounting standards cannot be 
as sophisticated as those in the IASs because doing so will only cause confusion to 
the newly-emerged market. In other words, the IASs can be used but they have to be 
simplified to suit the needs of the emerging market. This approach actually makes 
the MoF to go from one extreme to another in promulgating the Chinese standards. 
As a result, the MoF either chooses one of the methods available in the IASs or gives 
accountants complete discretion over the methods. On the other hand, as discussed in 
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Chapter 3, accountants in China are used to the traditional practice to follow detailed 
and stringent rules and are not ready for the maTket-based accounting. Too much 
room for judgement given to those planned-economy-style accountants will lead to 
chaos. This is why the MoF issued the accounting system to fill in the gap between 
the principles of the accounting standards and operations in practice. Of course, 
when it comes to accounting practice, little discretion is left over to the accountants. 
Despite the above, it is still worthwhile to explore the 'from extreme to extreme' 
situation where the rules are extremely flexible in some areas and extremely tight in 
some other areas. 
4.2.2.1 Intangible assets: an example of uniform extreme 
For example, the Chinese regulations appear to stand at the side of uniformity 
extreme when it comes to the accounting treatments for intangible assets. This 
uniform extreme can be seen from three aspects. First, research and development 
(R&D). According to the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises - Intangible 
Assets (ASBE - IA), all expenditures on R&D are recognised as period expenses 
when incurred regardless of whether the expenditure happens on the research phase 
or the development phase. However, the IAS 38 classifies R&D into two phases: the 
research phase and the development phase and prescribes different recognition rules. 
Under the IAS 38, expenditures on research and/or the research phase of an internal 
project shall be recognised as expenses when incurred, while an intangible asset 
arising from development or from the development phase of an internal project shall 
be recognised under certain conditions (Article 51-64, IAS 38). In recognising 
expenditures on development or development phase of an internal project, 
management and accountants have been given substantial scope for professional 
judgement under the IAS 38. However, the ASBE-IA has taken a simple approach to 
uniformity, leaving management no room to exercise subject judgement whatsoever. 
Second, measurement of intangible assets after recognition. The ASBE-IA differs 
from the IAS 38 in measuring an intangible asset after it is first recognised. The IAS 
38 gives an entity a choice between cost model under which an intangible asset shall 
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be carried at its cost less any accumulated amortisation and any accumulated 
impairment losses after initial recognition, and revaluation model under which an 
intangible asset shall be carried at a re-valued amount less any accumulated 
amortisation and any accumulated impairment losses after initial recognition (Article 
72-75, IAS 38). Detailed standards as to how an intangible asset is re-valued are 
prescribed in the IAS 38. However, the ASBE-IA adopts only the cost model and 
requires an entity to review the carrying amounts of its intangible assets periodically, 
at least at the end of each year (Article 16, ASBE-IA). Revaluation model mentioned 
in the IAS 38 has not even been addressed in ASBE-IA, let alone putting the 
revaluation model into practice. 
Third, amortisation. The ASBE-IA departs from the IAS 38 considerably in 
prescribing issues such as amortisation period, amortisation method and residual 
value. Firstly, when determining the amortisation period of an intangible asset, the 
ASBE-IA again takes a much simpler approach than does the IAS 38. The ASBE-IA 
requires that the amortisation period of an intangible asset be determined by the 
relevant contract or law. If the contract does not stipulate the beneficial period and 
the law does not stipulate the effective period, the amortisation period should not 
exceed 10 years (Article 15, ASBE-IA). The IAS 38, however, does not give a 
maximum amortisation period to an intangible asset. Instead, it requires an entity to 
assess whether the useful life of an intangible asset is finite or indefinite. An 
intangible asset with a finite useful life is amortised and an intangible asset with an 
indefinite useful life is not (Article 89, IAS 38). Secondly, when choosing 
amortisation method, the ASBE-IA stipulates that the cost of an intangible asset 
should be amortised evenly over its expected useful life (Article 15, ASBE-IA), thus 
taking the straight-line method as the only permitted amortisation method. On the 
contrary, the IAS 38 allows a variety of amortisation methods, including the straight- 
line method, the diminishing balance method and unit of production method, to be 
selected by an entity on the basis of the expected pattern of consumption of the 
expected future economic benefits embodied in the asset and is applied consistently 
from period to period (Article 98, IAS 38). Under the IAS 38, management and 
accountants are given an opportunity to exercise judgement to choose the 
amortisation method that best reflects the nature of the application of an asset. 
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4.2.2.2 Inventory valuation: an example of flexibility extreme 
According to Roberts et al. (2002), this is perhaps the most surprising instance of 
extremely flexibility. While it would have been easy to impose a uniform system 
mandating one particular method, the ASBE - Inventory allows enterprises 
considerable freedom in how they account for inventory. As stated in Article 17, 
ASBE, an enterprise should determine the actual cost of inventories transferred out in 
accordance with the actual circumstances for various types of inventories using 
methods such as specific identification method, the first-in-first-out method, the 
weighted average cost method, the moving average cost method, or the last-in-first- 
out method. The cost of inventories of items that are not ordinarily interchangeable 
and goods or services produced and segregated for specific projects should generally 
be assigned by using the specific identification method. Therefore, under the ASBE - 
Inventory, Chinese companies are allowed to use FIFO, LIFO, weighted or moving 
average, or specific methods of valuation, thus all the alternatives permitted by the 
IAS 2, both preferred and allowed alternatives, are allowed. 
4.2.3 Conservatism vs. optimism 
While the traditional Chinese accounting ignored the concept of conservatism or 
prudence, the principle of prudence was first introduced in the ASBE - Basic 
Standard. As stated in Article 18 ASBE - Basic Standard, the principle of prudence 
should be followed in reasonably determining the possible loss and expense. 
However this principle was not put into practice until 1998, when the Tentative 
Accounting Regulations for Shareholding Companies was issued. According to it, an 
enterprise should carry out impairment review on its assets periodically or at least at 
the end of each year, and make provisions for impairment losses on assets that may 
be impaired in accordance with the prudence principle. 
The question as to where the Chinese accounting stands at the 
conservatism/optimism continuum compared with the IASs was empirically 
investigated by Chen et al. (1999). They examined the reconciliation statements of 
between 34 and 50 companies with B shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
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for each of the years (1994 - 1997). They found, on average, the reported earnings 
determined under the Chinese standards are 20-30 per cent higher than earnings 
reported under the IASs. After restatement, 15 per cent of the B-share companies 
changed from a reported profit to a reported loss. Their finding suggests that Chinese 
accounting standards tend to be significantly less conservative, resulting in earnings 
that are significantly higher than those based on the IASs. They further identified 
five items that accounted for the largest differences in the two sets of earnings 
figures: 1) foreign currency translation; 2) bad debts; 3) fixed assets valuation, 
revaluation and depreciation; 4) accrued expenses; and 5) long-term investments. 
Chen et al. (1999) further suggest that these five items accounted for approximately 
40 per cent of the differences in reported earnings. 
4.2.4 Secrecy vs. transparency 
The issue of secrecy versus transparency refers to the disclosure requirements 
contained by the accounting regulations. To reach any conclusion, it is worthwhile to 
have a brief look at the disclosure requirements contained in the Chinese accounting 
regulations. The disclosure requirements can be broken into four categories: initial 
disclosure, periodic disclosure, non-periodic disclosure and other disclosure. This 
section will concentrate on those requirements for periodic reporting, in particular, 
the annual report. 
It should be noted that the Accounting System for Business Enterprises has made 
fairly detailed regulations on disclosure requirement. Not only does the ASBE 
specify statements to be published, but also it goes on to specify the detailed contents 
of the notes to the accounting statements. Furthermore, the ASBE prescribes 
stringent rules regarding the time limits of different periodical reporting. 
Firstly, what statements should be produced? According to the ASBE Article 154, 
Chinese enterprises should produce the following eight statements for the annual 
reporting. Note that while most of them can be normally found in the Western annual 
reports, some of them such as the statement of provision for impairment of assets are 
not. 
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"a balance sheet 
" an income statement 
"a cash flow statement 
"a statement of provision for impairment of assets 
"a profit appropriation statement 
"a statement of changes in owners' equity 
"a statement of segmental information 
" other relevant supplementary statements 
Second, what should be explained in the notes to accounting statements? Article 155 
stipulates that the notes to the accounting statements should at least comprise the 
following: 
" an explanation of any non-compliance with basic accounting presumptions; 
" details of significant accounting policies and accounting estimates; 
" an explanation of changes in significant accounting policies and estimates; 
" details of contingencies and events occurring after the balance sheet date; 
" disclosures of related party relationships and transactions; 
" details of the transfer or disposal of significant assets; 
" details of business combinations and de-mergers; 
" detailed information about significant items in the accounting statements; 
" other disclosures that are necessary to enable users to understand and 
analyze the accounting statements. 
Third, when should the Chinese enterprises publish financial reports? Article 158 
stipulates that: 
Monthly interim financial and accounting reports should be published within 6 
days after the end of the month (deadlines will be extended to take into 
account of public holidays); 
Quarterly interim financial and accounting reports should be published within 
15 days after the end of the quarter; 
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Half-year interim financial and accounting reports should be published within 
60 days (that is, 2 consecutive months) after the end of the interim period 
Annual financial and accounting reports should be published within 4 months 
after the end of the fiscal year. 
Based on the above, one can see that China has made enormous efforts in increasing 
the disclosure transparency by requiring companies, especially listed companies, to 
disclose more information. However, as argued by Anderson (2000), more 
information disclosed by the company doe not necessarily guarantee the improved 
transparency and quality of information. In other words, the amount of information 
alone simply does not work. To improve the transparency of the information 
disclosure, detailed explanation is needed and voluntary disclosure should be 
encouraged. A company can disclose more information in accordance with the 
disclosure requirement. However, if the information is not explained in details, or the 
company hides the information which is not required by the accounting regulations 
but has significant impacts on the businesses of the company, the information 
disclosed is simply not able to bring the improved transparency to'information users. 
This is consistent with the argument of Roberts et al. (2002) who pointed out that 
although the Chinese disclosure requirements do not differ significantly from the 
IASs, they are generally far less detailed and lack sufficient explanation to be easily 
and consistently implemented. 
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4.3 The 'Puzzles' in the Chinese Income Statement and the Balance Sheet 
It has to be mentioned that there is not too much literature discussing the differences 
between the Chinese accounting standards and the IASs. Taking the face-to-face 
approach, Chen et al. (1999) compared the reported earnings under Chinese 
standards and the IASs and investigated the differences between the two. They listed 
the factors that are responsible for the differences between earnings under the 
Chinese standards and those under the international counterparts. These factors 
include foreign currency translation, inventory, allowance for bad debts, long-term 
investment valuation and consolidation, deferred tax and other tax-related items, 
fixed assets, intangible assets amortisation, equity and cost method, accrued expenses, 
accrued revenues, and equity adjustments. 
While some distinctive differences have been identified in their study, their study 
suffers two problems with the findings and the method. First, some of their findings 
are soon out of date due to the fast-changing nature of the accounting reform in 
China. For example, Chen et al. (1999) pointed out that one of the major differences 
between the Chinese Accounting standards and the IASs lies in the lack of principle 
of prudence in the Chinese regulations. Assets such as inventories, accounts 
receivables, investments, fixed assets and intangible assets etc are valued at historical 
costs under the Chinese standards, but at the lower of cost and market under the IAS. 
While it was true that the principle of prudence was not in place when the paper was 
published in 1999, the MoF soon adopted this principle following the promulgation 
of the ASBE. Chinese companies have been required to carry out the impairment 
review on assets and to recognise impairment losses should impairment occurs. 
Second, the face-to-face approach taken by them seemed to be not powerful enough 
to carry out an in-depth analysis. Although some of the differences have been 
identified by comparing the articles specified in both standards, some puzzling 
accounting items unique to the financial reports by Chinese companies have not been 
even touched. This is because China's accounting regulatory framework is under 
construction and some of the accounting treatments are not covered by the existing 
16 accounting standards. As a matter of fact, many accounting issues are dealt with 
by the administrative documents issued by the government bodies such as MoF and 
- 103 - 
the CSRC. For example, the accounting standards for consolidated accounts have not 
been issued yet, but merger and acquisition activities have been booming since the 
1990S29 . To guide the accounting treatments on consolidated accounts, the MoF 
issued the Tentative Regulations on Consolidated Accounts (TRCA) in 1995. These 
regulations cannot be found in the existing accounting standards and system. 
Based on the above, this thesis is attempting to take a completely different approach 
to studying the differences by looking into a live example - the details of the income 
statement and the balance sheet from a Chinese company. In particular, this thesis 
will discover and explain some of the 'puzzling items' universally existing in the 
Chinese financial reports. By doing so, I believe a better picture on the uniqueness of 
Chinese accounting will be presented. It has to be stressed that this section will not 
cover every single difference existing between the financial reports under the 
Chinese regulations and the IASs. Instead, it will focus on the accounts and 
regulations that display striking Chinese characteristics. 
According to the CSRC disclosure regulations, Chinese companies issuing both A- 
shares and B-shares (H-shares) are required to publish financial statements that are 
based on Chinese GAAP, defined by the existing accounting standards and 
accounting system, and the IASs. And the reported accounting earnings based on 
current Chinese GAAP are significantly different from those based on the IASs 
(Chen et al., 1999). This provides a unique opportunity to examine the differences 
between the Chinese GAAP and the IAS and identify the items contributing the most 
to the differences. 
The 2004 annual reports of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (CPCC) were 
utilised as an example to provide an in-depth examination on the differences between 
the Chinese GAAP and the IASs. The reasons for choosing the CPCC's 2004 annual 
report are twofold. Firstly, as the largest listed company in China by its turnover and 
market capitalisation in 2004, CPCC is the first Chinese company issuing shares in 
Hong Kong, New York, London and Shanghai (CPCC, 2004). Its annual report 
29 As discussed earlier, the market-oriented takeovers are still rare in China and usually the 
government is heavily involved in most of the M&A activities. 
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contains financial statements such as the income statement, the balance sheet and the 
cash flow statement etc based on both Chinese GAAP and the IAS. This makes 
comparison more straightforward. Secondly, the Chinese accounting regulation- 
setters frequently change accounting rules. Therefore the recent accounting reports 
are more likely to incorporate the up-to-date rules. 
In this section, I will focus on the unique features of Chinese financial statements and 
identify the major differences between and Chinese GAAP and the IASs by 
examining the income statement and the balance sheet prepared by the CPCC in its 
2004 annual report. 
I begin my task first by looking at the income statement of CPCC. Appendix A, B, C, 
and D present the income statements and the balance sheets prepared by CPCC under 
the Chinese standards and the IASs respectively. 
4.3.1 Formats of the income statement 
As shown in Appendix A and B, the income statement under the Chinese regulations 
follows a significantly different format from that on the IASs. The Chinese income 
statement reports earnings at four different levels: profit on main businesses, 
operating profit, total profit and net profit, whereas the IASs income statement 
presents earnings following the order of operating profit, profit on ordinary activities 
before taxation, profit on ordinary activities after taxation, profit for the financial 
year. 
4.3.2 Profit from operations 
This is perhaps the most surprising difference between the Chinese practice and the 
practice permitted by the IASs. Although both income statements report the profit 
from operations, they in fact are determined by different formulas and therefore 
contain substantially different economic substance. The income statement based on 
Chinese regulations determines the operating profit as follows: 
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Profitftom operation = Profit on main businesses (Turnoverftom main businesses - 
Cost on main businesses - Business taxes and surcharges on main businesses) + 
Profit on other businesses - Operating Expenses - Administrative Expenses - 
Financial Expenses 
While the profit from operation in the incomes statement based on the IASs is 
determined as follows: 
Profit ftom operation = Revenue - Cost of Sales - Operating Expenses - 
Administrative Expenses 
The finance expenses under the Chinese regulations mainly refer to interest expenses 
incurred during the period (Zhang, 2002). The difference between the profit from 
operation under the Chinese regulations and the IASs lies in when the interest 
expense is deducted. The former is derived after the deduction of financial expenses 
(mainly interest charges); whereas the latter arrives before interest charges are 
deducted. This significant difference needs to be noticed because although they are 
the same by the name but actually contain quite different economic substance. 
Ignoring the difference may lead to mistakes. 
4.3.3 Taxes and surcharges on main businesses 
In addition to VAT and the corporate tax, Chinese companies are required to pay 
various taxes and surcharges to the central and local governments. In general, these 
comprise consumable tax, operating tax, urban maintenance & construction tax, 
education surcharges etc. Some of the taxes, for example consumable tax, are levied 
on the companies depending on the industrial sectors, while the other taxes such as 
operating tax, urban maintenance & construction tax and education surcharge are 
levied on all companies regardless of their types of businesses. As indicated in 
Appendix A, CPCC paid up to 16.2 billion yuan (16.3 billion yuan by IASs) taxes on 
main businesses to the government on top of the corporate tax which amounted up to 
16.1 billion yuan (17.8 billion yuan by IASs). The effect of these taxes on the profit 
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level of is significant as evidenced by the fact that CPCC's extra taxes are roughly as 
much as the corporate tax. It therefore may be argued that excessively taxation in 
China might make Chinese companies in a disadvantaged position in terms of 
profitability. A brief introduction to some of the taxation regulations and rules, 
mainly promulgated by the State Council, can provide an insight into the Chinese 
companies' extra tax burden. 
4.3.3.1 Operation tax 
According to The Contemporary Regulations on Operation Tax (CROT) of P. R. 
China issued by the State Council in 1993, all companies and individuals providing 
services such as transportation, construction, finance and insurance, postal and 
communication, culture and sport, entertainment, hotels and restaurants, etc, 
transferring intangible assets and selling real estates have to pay the operation tax. A 
formula to obtaining the total amount of tax is given as follows: Total amount = 
Total revenue x Tax rate. The operating tax rate is within a range between 3% and 
5% for most above-mentioned industries and transactions; however, companies or 
individuals in some industries such as entertainment may pay the operation tax as 
high as 20%. 
4.3.3.2 Consumable tax 
The State Council issued The Contemporary Regulations on Consumable Tax 
(CRCT) of P. R. China in 1993. According to it, the consumable tax is levied on 
companies and individuals producing, importing and exporting some specific 
products such as tobacco, alcohol, cosmetics, jewelleries, fireworks, petrol, diesel 
and automobile etc. Like the operation tax, the amount of tax is determined by the 
total revenue and tax rate. However, the consumable tax rate varies significantly 
from 3% on small-engine minibuses to 45% on tobacco products. 
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4.3.3.3 Urban maintenance and construction tax 
Aiming at funding the construction and maintenance of the infrastructure and public 
facilities in cities and towns, the State Council issued the Contemporary Regulations 
on Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax (CRUMCT) of P. R. China in 1985. 
According to it, all companies and individuals paying VAT and operation tax must 
pay this tax. The CRUNICT prescribes that urban maintenance and construction tax 
rates vary from 1% to 7% depending upon whether the major location of the 
company is in the city, town or country. However, it does not provide detailed 
regulations on the determination of the total amount a company should pay. Local 
governments are given the power to make detailed regulations and rules based on the 
CRUMC. 
4.3.3.4 Education surcharge 
Chinese companies started paying education surcharge following the State Council 
issuing The Contemporary Regulations on Education Surcharge (CRES) of P. R. 
China in 1990. According to the CRES, this particular taxation goes directly into the 
local education funds. All companies paying VAT and operation tax have to pay 
education surcharge to the local governments. The tax rate for all companies is 2 per 
cent with an exception of tobacco companies paying 10 per cent. Again, the CRES 
did not provide detailed rules on how much education surcharge a company should 
be paying. Instead, the local governments are given the power to enforce this 
mandate and are responsible for determining the amount of taxation. 
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Table 4.1 sums up the basic features of the taxes apart from VAT and corporate tax 
that Chinese companies have to pay to the government. 
Taxation Applicable to Tax rate 
companies and individuals producing, importing and exporting Consumable tax 3-45% 
some specific products 
Companies and individuals providing some services, Operation tax 3-20% 
transferring intangible assets and selling real estates 
Urban maintenance 
All companies paying VAT and operation tax 1-7% 
and construction tax 
Education surcharge All companies paying VAT and operation tax 2% 
Table 4.1 Summary of extra taxes and surcharges 
Although some of the taxation such as consumable tax and operation tax are 
applicable to companies and individuals in some specific industries, the above- 
mentioned extra tax commitments (in contrast with the UK companies who have no 
such extra liabilities) could have significant effect on the profitability of Chinese 
companies. 
4.3.4 Profit distribution 
As shown in the Appendix A, CPCC distributed RMB 6.4 billion (20% of the net 
profit for the financial year) to the statutory surplus reserve and the statutory benefit 
reserve before paying off dividends to shareholders. In fact, required by the 
Company Law, all Chinese companies must retain a certain proportion of net profit 
for the statutory surplus and statutory benefit reserve. Figure 4.1 provides an 
illustration on how a Chinese listed company distributes the net profit. As indicated 
in Figure 4.1, a company should distribute its net profit following these steps: 
Step 1: The net profit for the financial year must be used to offset against losses 
during the previous years. A company is not allowed to distribute profits until the 
previous losses are fully recovered; 
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Step 2: A company must retain a proportion of net profit for the statutory surplus 
reserve account and statutory benefit reserve account; 
Step 3: Dividends to preferred shareholders to be paid off; 
Step 4: An extra amount of profit goes to surplus reserve account as the 
discretionary surplus reserve; 
Step 5: Dividends to ordinary shareholders to be paid off. 
Net Retained 
profit 
prof it from last 
year 
e 
Distributable 
profit 
Statutory 
surplus reserve 
Statutory 
benefit reserve 
Profit 
availabl 
for 
shareholders 
Dividends paid off 
<D 
Retained profit for 
the financial vear 
Source: H, Ge (2000), How does a company distribute net profit 911 in : Financial Accounts in China, 
Is'Edition, Ch. 8, Z Lin, China Finance and Economics Publishing House, Beying 
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Figure 4.1 How does a Chinese listed company distribute net profit? 
From the above, one can see that Chinese listed companies distribute the net profit 
following a quite different pattern from the U. K. companies. The major difference 
lies in that the net profit has to go through three filters, namely statutory surplus 
reserve, statutory benefit reserve and discretionary surplus reserve, before reaching 
to the ordinary shareholders as dividends. However, U. K. companies usually 
distribute the net profit by paying off the dividends to the preferred and ordinary 
shareholders straightaway. 
4.3.5 Statutory surplus reserve, statutory benefit reserve and discretionary surplus 
reserve 
As mentioned before, there are three accounts in Figure 4.1 which are rarely seen in 
the income statement based on the IAS: statutory surplus reserve, statutory benefit 
reserve and discretionary surplus reserve. These accounts are set up in the income 
statement in accordance with The Company Law. Table 4.2 sums up the main 
features of these accounts. 
Nameof 
Purpose of the Account Rates Belongs to 
accounts 
Statutory 0 To offset against the previous 10% of the net Shareholders 
surplus 
losses; 
profit 0 To pay off dividends in case 
reserve there is no profit for the financial 
year; 
0 To increase the share capital by 
transferring from the surplus 
reserve to the share capital 
account 
Statutory 0 To be spent on staff benefit 5-10% of the net The reserve belongs to 
benefit facilities such as staff profit shareholders, however accommodation, child care and 
reserve health care etc. management of the 
company owns the usage 
right 
Discretionary To recover the previous losses; At the discretion Shareholders 
surplus To pay off dividends in case of the board of there is no profit for the financial 
reserve year; directors 
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To increase the share capital by 
transferring from the surplus 
reserve to the share capital 
account 
Source: H, Ge (2000), How does a company distribute net profit?, in : Financial Accounts in China, 
T" Edition, Ch. 8, Z Lin, China Finance and Economics Publishing House, Beying 
Table 4.2 Summary of statutory surplus reserve, statutory benefit reserve and 
discretionary surplus reserve 
4.3.6 Unrecognised investment losses 
The most unusual item in the Chinese standard-based income statement is the 
unrecognised investment loss because there is no an such account in the IAS-based 
financial reporting and it is unfamiliar for most Western accountants. Therefore it is 
necessary to have some discussion about the nature and effect of this unique Chinese 
accounting item. 
What is the unrecognised investment loss and where does it come from? To answer 
these questions, one needs to search for the answer from Accounting Standards for 
Business Enterprises - Investment (ASBE - Investment). According to Article 18 of 
the ASBE - Investment, a company should account for long-term equity investments 
adopting the equity method when an investor can control or has significant influence 
over the investee enterprise. Under the equity method, an investing company adjusts 
the carrying amount of the investment according to its attributable share of the 
investee enterprise's net profit (loss) and recognises the same amount as investment 
gain (loss) for the current period accordingly. Thus, when a subsidiary makes a profit 
for the financial year the parent company's long-term equity investment account 
increases by the amount of it attributable share of profits, and vice versa. 
An important question arises when a subsidiary makes a loss and the amount of 
adjustment of long-term equity investment resulting from the subsidiary's loss 
exceeds the carrying amount of the long-term equity investment in the parent 
company's balance sheet. In this case, to what extent should the parent company 
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adjust the long-term equity investment and recognise the subsidiary's loss? The 
ASBE - Investment answers this question by stating that an investing enterprise 
recognises net losses incurred by the investee enterprise to the extent that the 
carrying amount of the investment is zero. If the investee enterprise makes net profits 
in subsequent periods, the investing enterprise should increase the carrying amount 
of the investment above zero at the amount in excess of its attributable share of 
profits over the share of the unrecognised loss. 
The term 'unrecognised losses' was introduced by the ASBE - Investment. However, 
it was not properly defined by the ASBE - Investment and no guidance as to how to 
account for it was given either. Failure to provide detailed guidance on this 'grey 
area' has caused confusion and difficulty at the operational level. In March 1999, in a 
formal letter to Guangdong Zhongzheng Accounting Firm who made an enquiry 
about the unrecognised loss, the MoF proposed to set up an account, namely 
unrecognised investment loss, in the consolidated balance sheet above the account 
'retained profit for the financial year'; and the same account appears on the income 
statement below the account 'minority interests'. This proposal has in effect become 
the guidance in dealing with this issue in practical terms. 
Under this method, the holding company's share of loss of the subsidiary company in 
excess of the carrying amount of long-term equity investment is recorded as the 
unrecognised investment loss. The according amount is then put in the income 
statement as a 'plus' account. The accumulated unrecognised investment loss in the 
meantime appears on the balance sheet as a 'less' account to decrease the owner's 
equity. The aim of creating the unrecognised investment loss by the MoF is to 
balance the accounts in the balance sheet. As the increase in the net profit by the 
amount of unrecognised investment loss will be brought into the balance sheet as the 
retained profit for the financial year. The increase in the retained profit for the 
financial year is then offset by the decrease in the owner's equity brought by the 
unrecognised investment loss. The result is that there is neither increase nor decrease 
in the group owner's equity and the consolidated balance sheet is unaffected by the 
loss produced by the subsidiary. 
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To exemplify the above method, let's assume that Finn A bought 60 per cent of the 
ordinary shares of Firm B for RMB 80 million by cash at the beginning of the year 
and Finn A takes the equity method to account for the investment. Table 4.3 
illustrates the accounting method in accordance with the regulations proposed by the 
MoF. 
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Simplified consolidated balance sheet 
Accounting treatment under the Chinese for the group 
it th d equ y me o 
Cash + Investments Capital + Liabilities 
Firm A bought 60% of the ordinary shares of 
Firm B for RMB 80 million by cash at the -80 +80 00 
beginning of the year 
Firm B announced a net profit of RMB 60 
+36 +36 
million for Year I 
Firm B announced a cash dividend of RMB 
+12 -12 20 million for Year I 
At the end of Year 1 -68 +104 +36 0 
Firm B announced a loss of RMB 200 
-120 -120 
million for Year 2 
At the end of Year 2 before adjustment -68 -16 -84 0 
+ 16a + 16b 
Adjustment: the unrecognised investment 
(16 ' is shown in the owner's equity as a 'less' loss is created to bring the carrying amount 
of investments back to zero account and 16 
b is shown in the income statement as a 
4plus' account) 
At the end of Year 2 after adjustment -68 0 -68 0 
Firm B announces a profit of RMB 100 
+60 +60 
million for Year 3 
At the end of Year 3 before adjustment -68 +60 -8 0 
Adjustment reversed -16 -16 
At the end of Year 3 after adjustment -68 +44 -24 0 
Table 4.3 The way in which the unrecognised investment loss works 
As illustrated in Table 4.3, when Firm B, the associated company of the group, made 
an extraordinary loss of RMB 200 million in Year 2, the attributable share of the loss 
of the group, which amounts to RMB 120 million, is even greater than the carrying 
amount of the investment of RMB 104 million. The MoF, however, does not allow 
the parent company to record the carrying amount of investment as RMB -16 million. 
Instead, the unrecognised investment loss account, RMB 16' million, is created as an 
adjustment amount to bring the carrying amount of investment back to zero. To keep 
two sides of the equation balanced, capital account on the other side has to increase 
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by the same amount, RMB 16 b million. As indicated in Table 4.3, the adjustment 
account 16' is shown in the owner's equity in the consolidated balance sheet as a 
'less' account and 16 b is shown in the consolidated income statement as a 'plus' 
account. The increase in the capital account of the group actually comes from the 
income statement as the retained profit for the year. It has to be noted that the 
adjustment account - unrecognised investment losses - is created by the parent 
company to keep the both sides of the balance sheets balanced, but appears in the 
consolidated accounts only. 
It is worth noting that the method proposed by the MoF is in fact in accordance with 
the principle of the Company Law which states that a parent company should be held 
limited responsibilities for its subsidiaries only. The loss produced by the subsidiary 
therefore should not be fully borne by the parent company and the full amount of loss 
does not need to appear on the consolidated financial statements. 
Although it is in accordance with the principle in the Company Law, the introduction 
of the unrecognised investment loss presents a significant flaw and therefore 
provokes widespread criticism. As can be seen on Appendix A, the net profit of 
CPCC for year 2004 has increased by RMB 470 million due to the unrecognised 
investment loss recorded by the subsidiaries for the financial year. This has 
obviously created a great loophole for management to window dress profits because 
the net profit of a group is increased as a result of the extraordinary loss produced by 
the subsidiary. When the loss is great enough, the whole group's loss can even be 
turned into profit. The consequence is that management has been given an extra 
vehicle to manipulate the earning figures. There are plenty of examples in the 
Chinese listed companies where the loophole provided by this accounting treatment 
has been made the best use. For example, ST Shengtai, a de-listed company, reported 
a net profit of RMB 12-48 million for the year 2002. However, its net profit was 
mainly contributed by the unrecognised investment loss amounting up to RMB 67.80 
million. Without the unrecognised investment loss, it would have reported a net loss 
of RMB 55.32 million3o. 
30 The data presented here are from the financial reports of ST Shengtai 2002. 
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4.3.7 Accounting for Subsidiaries, Joint ventures and Associated Companies 
The definitions of subsidiaries, joint ventures and associated companies are given in 
the ASBE - Disclosure of Related Party Relationships and Transactions (ASBE- 
DRPRT), which was issued by the MoF in 1996. According to the ASBE-DRPRT, a 
subsidiary is an enterprise which is controlled by a parent company; a joint venture is 
an enterprise whose business activities are, as contractually agreed, jointly controlled 
by two or more investing parties; and an associated enterprise is an enterprise over 
which an investor has significant influence and which is neither a subsidiary nor a 
joint venture of that investor. 
Under the Contemporary Regulations for Consolidation of Financial Reports 
(CRCFR) issued by the MoF in 1995, the parent company should include all its 
subsidiaries into the scope of consolidation in preparing for the financial reports. The 
CRCFR states that companies which should be included into the scope of 
consolidation are the ones whose majority (more than 50 per cent) of equity capital is 
owned by the parent company, and those who are controlled by the investing 
company. In some cases, the parent company does not own over half of the equity 
capital of the investee company, however as long as any of the following criteria is 
met, the investee company is still considered the subsidiary: 1) the investing 
company holds more than half of the voting power through certain agreement with 
the investee company ; 2) the investing company obtains the power to control the 
operating and financial policies; 3) the investing company can appoint and remove 
majority of the members of board of directors; 4) the investing company owns more 
than half of the voting power in the board of directors. 
The CRCFR has not provided regulations in dealing with the accounting for joint 
ventures. However, the Accounting System for Business Enterprises (ASBE) 
requires the parent company to consolidate the accounts of joint ventures when 
producing group financial statements. The proportion consolidation approach should 
be adopted when the consolidating the assets, liabilities, revenue, expenses and 
profits of joint ventures. 
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As for the accounting for associated companies, accounts of associated companies 
should not enter the group financial statements, In accordance with the ASBE- 
Investment, the equity method should be adopted to account for the parent 
company's investment in associated companies. Unlike UK companies which usually 
disclose share of operating profits in joint ventures and associated undertakings in 
the group P&L account, Chinese companies are not required to put the same 
information into the consolidated income statement. However, information about the 
share of investment gains from associated companies can be found in the notes on 
investment gains. 
In Table 4.4, the extract from the notes on investment gains in the CPCC's financial 
statements, CPCC breaks down the investment gains into two categories: investment 
gains accounted for under the cost method and investment gains accounted for under 
the equity method. Moreover, CPCC further discloses the investment gains for the 
group and the parent company respectively. As can be seen from Table 4.4, the 
parent company made an investment gain under the equity method totalling RMB 
39,292 million in 2004. The group's total investment gain under the equity method is 
RMB 968 million. Since the investment in associated companies should be 
accounted for under the equity method, one can see that the group's investment gain 
amounting to RMB 968 million accounted for under the equity method is therefore 
the share of profits of associated companies. Furthermore, most of the parent 
company's investment gains from subsidiaries and joint ventures are eliminated as 
internal profits or gains when preparing for the group accounts, which explains why 
there is such a great disparity between the company's investment gain of RMB 
39,292 million and the group's investment RMB gain of 968 million. 
The group The company 
2004 2003 2004 2003 
RMB million RMB million RMB million RMB million 
Investment gains accounted for 
120 71 82 36 
under the cost method 
Investment gains accounted for 
968 477 39,292 22,808 
under the equity method 
Total 1,088 548 39,374 22,844 71 
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Sources: CPCCsfinancial reportfor the period ended 31 December 2004 
Table 4.4 The notes on investment gains in the CPCC's financial statements 
4.3.8 Investments and investment gains 
As stated in the ASBE - Investments, company's investing activities in China take 
the forms of long-term and short-term investments. Long-term investments are 
further broken down into long-term debt investments and long-term equity 
investments. It seems that the Chinese companies have relatively limited means of 
investments in comparison with the Western companies. This is not surprising 
because the financial market in China is still at its early stage and the means of 
investment available for Chinese companies is far from developed. As indicated in 
Appendix C, the long-term equity investment is CPCC's sole means of investment. 
CPCC recorded its total investment gains as the aggregate of investment gains 
accounted for under both the cost and the equity methods. 
It is notable that the concepts of fair value and unrealised profits (losses), which 
prevail in the IASs accounting, have not been mentioned in the ASBE - Investment. 
According to the ASBE - Investment, an investment, regardless of the types of 
investments, is recorded at its initial cost on acquisition. However, when it comes to 
recognising investment profits (losses) and adjusting the carrying amount of 
investments, different classes of investments should be adjusted by taking different 
methods. By taking a close look at short-term investments and long-term equity 
investments accounted for under the cost method, one can examine the major 
difference between the Chinese standard and its international counterpart. 
The ASBE - Investment defines the short-term investment as an investment that is 
readily realisable and is intended to be held for not more than one year. As far as the 
short-term investment is concerned, Article 9 of the ASBE-Investments dictates that 
the cash dividends or interest received from the short-term investment, other than 
those recorded as receivable items, should be offset against the carrying amount of 
the investment upon receipt. This is to say that under normal circumstances no 
investment gains arising from a short-term investment should be recognised. Assume 
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that Company A receives RMB I million as the dividend for its short-term 
investment in Company B, it should make the accounting entry as follows: 
Dr: cash - dividend from company B: I million 
Cr: short-term equity investment - company B: I million 
In this case, RMB I million does not run thought the income statement; instead, the 
cash received is debited to the cash account and credited to the short-term investment 
account. The result of it is that the short-term investment is decreased by RMB I 
million. Therefore, for a short-term investment, the carrying amount is normally 
reduced by the amount of dividends or interests received. 
Moreover, short-term investments should be carried at the lower of cost and market 
value at the end of each period or at least at the end of each year. The difference 
between cost and market value should be recognised as an investment loss in the 
current period. In other words, when the market value of a short-term investment 
falls below the carrying amount at the end of the period, the carrying amount will 
have to be marked down and an investment loss is recorded accordingly, no matter 
whether the loss is realised or not. However, in the case where the market value gets 
above the carrying amount of the investment, mark-up to the market value is not 
allowed and the short-term investment is carried at the historical cost. 
The cost method should be used to account for a long-term investment when an 
investor does not have control, joint control or significant influence over the investee 
enterprise. Under the cost method, profits or cash dividends declared to be 
distributed by the investee enterprise should be recognised as investment gains in the 
current period. However, the amount of income recognised is limited to the amount 
received from the accumulated net profits which arise after the investee enterprise 
has accepted the investment from the investor. The amount of profits of cash 
dividends declared to be distributed by the investee enterprise in excess of this 
threshold should be treated as a recovery of investment cost to reduce the carrying 
amount of investment. The carrying amount of a long-term equity investment 
accounted for under the cost method should generally remain unchanged, unless 
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there are additional investments or repayment of investments. In other words, the 
carrying amount of cost-method long-term equity investment is not subject to 
adjustment under the normal circumstances. In addition, to implement the principle 
of prudence, like the short-term investment, the cost-method long-term equity 
investment is subject to periodical impairment review, at least at the end of the year. 
If the recoverable amount falls below the carrying amount due to the continuous drop 
in the market price or the change of circumstances of the investee company, the 
difference should be recognised as the period loss and the carrying amount must be 
marked down to the market value. 
4.3.9 Long-term equity investments, equity investment differences and goodwill 
As shown in Appendix C, the long-term equity investment, as an asset account, is 
disclosed in the consolidated balance sheet. In addition, a company should report the 
amount of equity investment difference, as a component of the long-term equity 
investment, in the consolidated balance sheet. Other significant information such as 
increases (decreases) in the long-term equity investment, disposal of investment, 
provisions for impaired investments, amortisation of equity investment difference is 
disclosed in the notes for the financial statements as shown in Table 4.5. 
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Investments in 
Investments non-listed Equity Provisions for Total 
in listed companies and investment value decline amount 
companies other equity difference in investments 
investments 
RMB RMB RMB RMB RMB 
million million million million million 
Balance up to 1" 
January 2004 736 10,285 400 (271) 
11,150 
Increase in 
investments in the 2,083 169 2,252 
year 
Adjustments under 
equity method 
54 887 941 
Dividends 
(237) (237) 
receivable/received - 
Disposal of 
investments in the (429) (429) 
year 
Amortisation for the (186) 
- 
(186) 
year 
Adjustments of (82) (82) 
provisions for the year 
Balance up to 31 790 12,589 383 (353) 13,4 December 2004 
Resource: CPCCs Annual Reportsfor the period ended 3 1"' December 2004 
Table 4.5 The notes on the group's long-term equity investments in the CPCC's 
financial statements 
What is equity investment difference? Is it good will? If it is so, why is it reported in 
the long-term equity investments instead of intangible assets? According to the 
ASBE - Investment, the equity investment difference is used to measure the 
difference between the initial investment cost and the investor's share of the net asset 
of the investee. When an investor makes an investment to another company and 
owns control, joint control or significant influence over the investee company, the 
equity method should be adopted to account for the long-term equity investment. 
When the initial investment cost exceeds the investor's share of the net asset of the 
investee, the difference between the two is recorded as the equity investment 
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difference. The investor then records its long-term investment as the sum of the 
investor's share of the net asset of the investee company and the equity investment 
difference. The investor's share of the net asset of the investee company is adjusted 
for the net profit (loss) of the investee company proportionate to the investor's share 
of the net asset of the investee. The equity investment difference should be amortised 
over a period not exceeding 10 years and the amount of amortisation enters the 
income statement as the period expense. 
However, there are possibilities that the initial investment cost falls below the 
investor's share of the net asset of the investee company. In this case, the ASBE- 
Investment requires that companies recognise the negative equity investment 
difference. The long-term equity investment is therefore the result of the investor's 
share of net asset of the investee company minus the equity investment difference. 
The equity investment difference has to be amortised within a period more than 10 
years and the amount of amortisation then enters the income statement as the 
investment gain. 
It is worth noting that the above accounting treatment for negative equity investment 
difference was amended by the MoF and a new approach was proposed in the 'Q&A 
No. 2 on Implementing the Accounting System for Business Enterprises and Related 
Accounting Standards' issued by the MoF on 17th March 2003. Adopting the new 
approach, a company, for example, who purchases a total of RMB 12 million worth 
of net asset of its investee company for RMB 10 million cash, should make its 
accounting entry as follows: 
Dr: Long-term equity investment - XX company 12 million 
Cr: Cash 10 million 
Capital reserve - equity investment provisions 2 million 
From the above accounting entry, one can see that the excess of the investor's share 
of the net assets of the investee company over the initial investment cost is not 
allowed to record as the negative equity investment difference and appear on the 
balance sheet. Instead, the difference enters straight into the capital reserve of the 
owner's equity. By doing so, the MoF has taken a more prudent approach to 
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accounting for the difference. Although the Q&A No. 2 did not provide the reason 
for the change of the policy, one can clearly see that the result of the new approach 
has narrowed the possibilities for earnings management activities. The accounting 
treatment for the negative equity investment difference stipulated by the ASBE - 
Investment in effect provides a loophole for management to manipulate the earnings 
because the amortisation of the negative equity investment difference runs through 
the income statement as investment gains. Companies can increase its net income by 
under-paying for the investment and/or over-pricing the investee's asset. In a stock 
market where majority of the shares of the listed companies are non-tradable, 
valuation of the assets is largely subject to the judgement of management. 
Consequently, there are an abundance of opportunities for earnings management. 
The reason for the MoF to change the method to account for the negative equity 
investment difference is therefore obvious. 
It should be pointed out that the equity investment difference in the CPCC's financial 
statements can be understood as goodwill, but they are not exactly the same. 
Goodwill, as the non-identifiable intangible asset, is briefly mentioned in the ASBE- 
Intangible Assets and the Accounting System for Business Enterprises, however, 
they fail to provide the definition of goodwill and the detailed rules on how to 
recognise and measure good will. In addition, the ASBE-Intangible assets explicitly 
points out that regulations in the standard do not deal with goodwill arising from a 
business combination. As indicated in the note 14 for intangible assets in the CPCC's 
consolidated balance sheet, goodwill is not reported in the intangible assets. It 
therefore appears that although goodwill is recognised as part of intangible assets, it 
does not appear on the account of intangible assets. Instead, it is disclosed as part of 
long-term equity investment. 
It is worth noting that the equity investment difference reported in the CPCC's 
annual report is not completely the same as goodwill defined in the MRS 3- 
Business Combinations. As defined in the ASBE - Investment, the equity investment 
difference measures the difference between the investor's initial investment cost and 
the investor's share of net asset in the investee company. However, the ASBE - 
Investment does not allow parent companies to record the assets and liabilities of 
investee companies at fair value. Therefore, the investor's share of net asset in the 
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investee is recognised as the book value for the purpose of consolidated accounts. 
The equity investment difference actually is the difference between the investor's 
initial investment cost and the book value of the investor's share of net asset of the 
investee. However, under the IFRS 3- Business Combinations, the fair value of the 
parent company's investment in subsidiary is set against its share of the fair value of 
the identifiable net assets in the subsidiary at the date acquisition. If the investment is 
greater than the share of net assets then the difference is regarded as the purchased 
goodwill (Elliot and Elliot, 2005). It appears that under the MRS 3 the group's share 
of the assets and liabilities of the subsidiary should be re-valued to the fair value 
prior to consolidation. Goodwill is therefore the difference between the group's 
initial investment cost and the group's share of fair value of the net assets in the 
subsidiary. When fair value deviates from book value, which occurs most of the time, 
the equity investment difference in the Chinese regulations then departs from 
goodwill under the IASs. 
4.3.10 Impairment Losses 
The concept of impairment loss was introduced to Chinese companies for the first 
time in 1998 following the promulgation of The Accounting System for Share- 
holding Companies. In accordance with the rules set out by the policy, share-holding 
companies ought to review the value of assets periodically or at least at the end of the 
year, make reasonable estimates of possible impairment losses (when the assets are 
impaired) and recognise provisions for impaired assets. Four classes of assets were 
required by the new regulations to review. They are short-term investments, long- 
term investment, inventories and accounts receivable. In 2000, the MoF promulgated 
the Accounting System for Business Enterprises. Four more classes of assets were 
added into the list: fixed assets, intangible assets, projects under construction and 
third-party loans. 
The ASBE prescribes detailed methods by which the value of the assets should be 
reviewed and rules on how to measure the provisions for impaired asset and when to 
reverse the impairment losses. These methods and rules are summed up in Table 4.6. 
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Provisions for asset Impairment loss Assets Measurement of assets 
impairment goesto 
Difference between the cost Short-term Carried at the lower of cost Investment gains 
of short-term investment investments or market price (losses) 
and the market price 
Carried at the lower of Difference between the Third-party Investment gains 
amount of the loan or principle of the loan and the loans (losses) 
recoverable amount recoverable amount 
Carried at the lower of Difference between the Long-term Investment gains 
carrying amount or the carrying amount and the investment (losses) 
recoverable amount recoverable amount 
Carried at the carrying Accounts Administration 
amount less the estimated Estimated bad debt losses 
receivable expenses bad debt loss 
Carried at the lower of cost Difference between the cost Administration Inv entory 
. or 
the recoverable amount and the recoverable amount expenses 
Carried at the lower of Difference between the Non-operating 
Fixed assets carrying amount or the carrying amount and the 
expenses 
recoverable amount recoverable amount 
Carried at the lower of Difference between the Non-operating 
Intangible assets carrying amount or the carrying amount and the 
recoverable amount recoverable amount 
expenses 
Carried at the lower of Difference between the Projects under Non-operating 
carrying amount or the carrying amount and the 
construction expenses 
recoverable amount recoverable amount 
Table 4.6 Summary of impairment losses and provisions for impaired assets 
The ASBE also sets out stringent rules on the disclosure of provisions for impaired 
assets and impairment losses. In accordance with the ASBE, the provision for 
impaired fixed assets must be disclosed in the statement of provisions for impairment 
of assets, separately from the balance sheet. 
It should be pointed out that introducing the concept of impairment losses is to 
implement the principle of prudence. As a result of impaired assets being written off 
the balance sheet and impairment losses charged against the income statement, the 
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value of the assets and profitability of a company are likely to be depicted in a more 
conservative way. The impact of the introduction of these provisions on listed 
companies was examined by Duan (2002), who found that altogether RMB 21 billion 
(nearly 0.5% of the total market capitalisation) was written off as the impairment 
losses by nearly 1,000 listed companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges in 2001. 
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Chapter 5. VALUE-RELEVANCE OF CHINESE ACCOUNTING 
INFORMATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter follows the tradition of* empirical work in valuation theory by 
examining the market value of the firm in the form of regression analysis. Two 
generic accounting variables are explored: book value and earnings. As pointed out 
by Arce and Mora (2002), this study focuses on both book value and earnings for 
two reasons. First, a central feature of the accounting systems in the world is that the 
financial statements of companies are comprised of at least two components, namely 
the balance sheet and the income statement. Second, book value and earnings are the 
key variables in the theoretical accounting valuation model developed by OhIson 
(1995). 
The empirical study will be conducted at two stages. Chapter 5 will focus on the 
study at stage one and Chapter 6 at stage two. The emphasis of stage one is placed 
upon gaining an overall picture of the value-relevance of accounting information in 
the emerging Chinese capital markets. In fact, exploring the market valuation in the 
context of China is of particular interest. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, China's 
stock market is an emerging market. Despite its phenomenal expansion in size, the 
market displays a host of distinctive features which cannot be found in other markets. 
Putting China in a global perspective, Gao (2002) summarised the characteristics of 
the stock market into 14 points. These points are abnormal performance, tremendous 
volatility, insulated market, substantial government ownership, irregular expansion, 
influence of IPOs, typical emerging market, pyramid structure, unstable core, out 
performance of micro stocks, incredible speculation, manufacturing orientation, and 
disappointing earnings of companies. Secondly, China's accounting regulatory 
system is in a transition from serving the planned economy to suiting the needs of the 
market economy. As discussed in Chapter 4, while the new regulations have been 
mostly brought in conformity with international conventions, significant differences 
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between the Chinese rules and those in the IASs still exist. The striking features 
appearing on both the market side and accounting side of the market valuation theory 
seem to raise an intriguing question: although the market valuation theory proves to 
be true in most developed markets, does it hold in the unique context of China? In 
fact, to address this issue by exploring the association between market information 
and accounting information in China has both theoretical and practical implications - 
- if the accounting information disclosed by Chinese listed firms is found to be 
significantly associated with market values, it certainly provides evidence that the 
market valuation theory holds not only in developed markets but in emerging 
markets such as China. 
Based upon the above, this chapter will elaborate the following two questions: 
1. Is accounting information provided by Chinese listed firms value relevant? If 
the answer is yes, are there significant differences in terms of value-relevance 
of Chinese accounting information existing during the studied period and 
across industrial sectors? 
2. Is there other accounting information playing a significant role in explaining 
the market value of listed firms? If yes, what is it? 
Based upon the findings of stage one, the study at stage two will keep a sharp focus 
on the unique ownership structure in the Chinese listed companies. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, nearly all listed companies in China are transformed from the former 
SOEs. To ensure the control over the listed firms, the government holds two-thirds of 
the total shares in the forms of state shares and legal-person shares. What is more, the 
shares held by the government are not tradable on the open markets. China's 
corporate ownership structure featured by the exceptionally high level of government 
shareholding is distinctively different in comparison with the rest of the world. This 
actually provides an excellent laboratory for researchers to explore the market 
valuation from the perspective of ownership structure. As pointed out in Chapter 2, 
the excessive government shareholding has been the source of all sorts of problems 
prevailing in the Chinese stock market e. g. weak corporate governance, worsening 
agency problems, distortion of market prices and ferocious speculation etc. All these 
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problems have been explored and acknowledged by a wide range of people such as 
policy markers, market regulators, researchers, managers and investors. However, 
how does the market as a whole view the government shareholding? Does the 
government shareholding increase or decrease the market value of the firms in China? 
Does the state shareholding differentiate from the legal-person shareholding in 
explaining the market value? These questions are of particular importance because 
the research finding will enable us to understand a series of fundamental issues in the 
context of China and there issues are: 
1. Is the government shareholding as a whole (state and legal-person 
shareholding) playing a significant role in explaining the market values of 
listed firms? If yes, what exactly is the association between the government 
shareholding and market values? 
2. If the state ownership is taken alone, does it influence the market value of 
listed firms? Again, if the answer is yes, how doe it associate with the market 
values? 
3. Do the legal persons play a significant role in explaining the market values of 
listed firms in China? If yes, does the role of legal persons differentiate from 
that of the state? 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 holds a discussion 
on the methodology by searching for a model used in this study. Section 3 is going to 
review the arguments surrounding the above three questions in the existing literature. 
Section 4 describes the data and definitions of the variables used in the regressions. 
Findings and discussion will be presented in Section 5. 
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5.2 The Search for the Market Valuation Model: Methodology 
5.2.1 The discounted dividends model (DDM Model) 
Finance theory has long accepted the discounted dividends model (DDM) as 
reflecting the correct equity value of a firm (King and Langli, 1998), The discounted 
dividends model suggests that the value of any financial claim is simply the present 
value of the cash payoffs that its claimholders receive. Since shareholders receive 
cash payoffs from a company in the form of dividends, from a theoretical perspective, 
the value of their equity is the present value of future dividends. The DDM model 
can be expressed as follows: 
co 
vo DIV, 
Where: 
V0= the present value of the equity value of the firm 
DIV I= the dividend at time t 
r, = cost of equity capital (assumed constant) 
The above equation can also be written as follows: 
(5.1) 
= 
DIV, DIV2 DIV3 vo 
(I + r, ) 
+ 
(I + r, )2 
+ 
(I + r, )3 
+ (5.2) 
The DDM model implies that a firm's equity value is a function of two factors: 
dividends in different periods and cost of equity capital. Note that the DDM views a 
firm as having an indefinite life. But in reality firms can go bankrupt or get taken 
over. In these situations shareholders effectively receive a terminating dividend on 
their stock. 
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Substituting accounting variables into the DDM, OhIson (1991) developed the 
following expressions relating firm value and accounting variables. Under the 
assumption of clean surplus accounting, book value of equity changes only with 
income or loss, net capital investments and withdrawals (dividends) by owners, and 
all equity effects (other than capital transactions) should flow through the income 
statement. Thus, assuming no new capital, the expected book value of equity for 
existing shareholders at the end of year (BVE, ) is simply the book value at the 
beginning of the year (BVE 0) plus expected net income (NI less expected 
dividends (DIV I). This relation can be written as follows: 
BVEI=BVEO +NII -DIV, 
The above equation can be rearranged as follows: 
DIV, =NII +BVEO-BVE, 
By substituting this identity for dividends into the dividends discount formula and 
rearranging the terms, equation (5.2) can be rewritten as follows: 
V0= 
NI, + BVEO - BVE, + 
N12+ BVE, - BVE2 + (5.3) 
(I+ r, ) (I + re )2 
This can be rewritten as follows: 
V 
NI, - rBVEO + BVEO (I + r, ) - BVE, 
(I + r, ) 
+ 
N12- rBVE, + BVE, (I + r, ) - BVE2 
(1 + r. )2 
BVEO+ NII - r, B VEO + 
N12- r, BVE, +... 
B VE, 
(I + r, ) (I + r, )2 (1 + r, )' 
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The above equation can be written as follows: 
co NI -r BVE B VE, Vo = BVEO+ Ie 1-1 (5.4) 
t-I (1 + r, )' (i + 
Note that the term NI ,- reBVE 1-1 
in Equation (5.4) is defined as the abnormal 
earnings. Abnormal earnings are net income adjusted for a capital charge computed 
as the discount rate multiplied by the beginning book value of equity. From the 
definition, it can be seen that abnormal earnings therefore make an adjustment to 
reflect the fact that accountants do not recognise any opportunity cost for equity 
funds used. The final term 
B VE, 
represents the present value of liquidating book (1 + re)' 
value. As the forecast horizon expands, it becomes inconsequential. The value of 
equity is therefore the current book value plus the present value of future abnormal 
earnings. 
V0= Book value of equity + PV of expected future abnormal earnings 
Thus, the discounted abnormal earnings valuation model is 
NII -rBVEO_ N12- r, BVE, N, 3-rBVE2 Vo =BVEO + (I ++ (1 )2 
ýL- + 
(I r, )' 
*** 
Alternatively, Equation (5.4) can be written as follows, 
Vo = BVEO+ 
NI, -r,, BVE, -, 
t-I (I+r, )' 
(5.5) 
Note that Equation (5.5) is an approximation because BVE, -, approaches zero as 
t 
increases. 
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5.2.2 The discounted abnormal earnings model (DAE Model) 
Equation (5.5) was also called Discounted Abnormal Earnings model (DAE) by 
Palepu et al. (2004) and was termed the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson Model (EBO) by 
Bernard (1995). By comparison with the DDM model, the DAE Model has following 
attractive attributes: 
First, estimating the DDM model requires an analyst to forecast the complete future 
stream of the firm's net dividends. Rather than reflecting wealth creation, however, 
dividends reflect wealth distributions (Penman, 1992). Further, the timing of 
dividends is largely discretionary with growing firms often paying little or no 
dividends. Hence, estimation of the DDM model requires estimation of a terminal 
value that may be a large portion of total estimated value (King and Langli, 1998). In 
contrast, relying on known book values and estimated future accounting earnings, the 
DAE model establishes a bridge between the market value and accounting numbers. 
Because estimating future earnings is easier than estimating future dividends, the 
DAE model is an easier and more practical approach than the DDM model. 
Second, since both models are defined over an infinite horizon, truncation to finite 
periods will require estimates of terminal value. However, the future values in the 
DAE model are abnormal earnings. Normal earnings (earnings that return the equity 
cost of capital) do not add value to value and may be ignored. Hence, the portion of 
total value represented by the terminal value is typically much smaller for the DAE 
model than for the DDM model. This is due to the inclusion in the DAE model of the 
opening book value, a measure of normal return on the firm's resources. 
Third, the DAE model has another intuitive appeal. It implies that if a firm can earn 
only a normal rate of return on its book value, then investors should be willing to pay 
no more than book value for the stock. Investors should pay more or less than book 
value if earnings are above or below this normal level. Thus the deviation of a firm's 
market value from book value depends on its ability to generate 'abnormal earnings. ' 
The DAE model also implies that a firm's stock value reflects the cost of its existing 
net assets (that is, its book equity) plus the net present value of future growth options 
(represented by cumulative abnormal earnings). 
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It is important to point out that the DAE model expresses firm value as a function of 
book value and expected future abnormal earnings over an infinite horizon. It can be 
simplified by making assumptions about the relation between a firm's current and 
future abnormal earnings. If abnormal earnings are assumed to follow a random walk, 
implying that the best guess about future expected abnormal earnings are current 
abnormal earnings. The random walk model can be written as follows: 
Forecasted AE I= AE 01 
Forecasted AE, is the forecast of next year's abnormal earnings and AEO is current 
period abnormal earnings. Under the model, forecasted abnormal earnings for two 
years ahead are simply abnormal earnings in year one, or once again current 
abnormal earnings. In other words, the best guess of abnormal earnings in any future 
year is just current abnormal earnings. Based on the above, all future forecasts of 
abnormal earnings are simply current abnormal earnings. It is then possible to rewrite 
value as a perpetuity: 
I 
AEO 
V, =BEVO + 
r. 
(5.6) 
Equation (5.6) implies that under the random walk assumption equity value is the 
function of three factors: book value of equity at the beginning, the abnomal 
earnings at the beginning and the cost of equity capital. 
Despite the attractive attributes the DAE model displays in comparison with the 
DDM model, the application of DAE model into the market valuation in the context 
of China is severely restricted by one factor -r the cost of equity capital. The cost 
of equity capital is not an observable factor and needs to be estimated. 
As indicated by Equation (5.5), the market value of a firm is expressed by the sum of 
the book value of equity plus the present value of expected future abnormal earnings. 
However, abnormal earnings are not directly observable variables. To obtain 
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abnormal earnings, three factors need to be known: the net income for the current 
year, the book value of equity for the previous year, and cost of equity capital. While 
the first two variables can be obtained from the financial statements, the cost of 
equity capital needs to be estimated. According to (Quiry et al., 2005), there are a 
variety of methods in which the cost of equity capital can be estimated. Among all 
the models the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM model) is currently universally 
applied in practice. The CAPM model suggests that if all investors hold the market 
portfolio, the risk premium they will demand is proportional to market beta and it can 
be expressed as follows: 
re =rF +ß *(k -r. ) (5.7) 
Whereby r, is the required rate of return on a financial asset, rF the risk-free rate, 
km the required rate of return for the market and 8 the sensitivity coefficient 
Despite its theoretical soundness and increasing popularity, the CAPM model 
presents some problems in practice, especially when it comes to determining the risk 
free rate, the required rate of return of the market and beta. Usually, to obtain these 
figures, historical figures from the capital market are needed. In many developed 
markets, there has been a long history of development of the capital markets. 
Therefore historical data and macroeconomic data are available. However, the capital 
market in China, in particular the stock market, is a rather recent development. The 
database for this study covers a period from 1994 to 2001 only. Without sufficient 
historical information, the task of estimating the cost of equity capital will become 
4mission impossible'. This worry is actually shared by Quiry (2005) who pointed out 
that the 'anticipated' data cannot be observed directly in the market, and so forecasts 
must be done on the basis of historical data and macroeconomic data. For some 
countries, such as emerging nations, this is not easy! 
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5.2.3 The modified OhIson model 
Based upon three assumptions, OhIson (1995) developed a valuation model that built 
a direct link between the market value and accounting information contained in the 
balance sheet and income statement - book value and earnings 
31 
. This modified 
model can be expressed as follows: 
MVjt = a. + a, B Vjt + a2Ej, +6 (5.8) 
Where E., is the accounting earnings for firmj at time t. 
In the field of market valuation, the modified OhIson Model has been universally 
applied. By comparison with the DAE model and DDM model, this model exhibits a 
series of desirable features. Firstly, the modified Ohlson Model is theoretically 
consistent with the DAE model and DDM model because it is directly derived from 
the previous models. As pointed out by Ohlson (1955), the valuation model was built 
upon three straightforward assumptions. The first assumption is that the present 
value of expected dividends determines the market value. This assumption is actually 
in the spirit of the DDM model. The second assumption is that accounting data and 
dividends satisfy a clean surplus relation and dividends reduce book value without 
affecting current earnings. This clean surplus assumption is actually the one on 
which the development of the DAE model depends. Secondly, one can see that 
abnormal earnings which are not directly observable are replaced by accounting 
earnings which are available from the income statement. In other words, the 
modified OhIson model has used the accounting earnings as a proxy for abnormal 
earnings. This replacement is rather desirable due to the great difficulties in 
estimating abnormal earnings. Therefore, this study is to use the modified OhIson 
model as the foundation model. 
31 These three assumptions are: 1) the present value of expected dividends determines the market 
value; 2) accounting data and dividends satisfy the clean surplus relation and dividends reduce book 
value without affecting current earnings; and 3) a linear model frames the stochastic time-series 
behaviour of abnormal earnings. 
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5.3 Arguments Surrounding Value-relevance of Accounting Information in 
Chinese Equity Market 
5.3.1 Question 1: Is accounting information value relevant in China? 
To explore this question, I start off my investigation on the relationship between 
market value and accounting data, including net profits and book value of equity. 
This is an issue of relative information content as discussed by (Biddle et al., 1997). 
As mentioned earlier, this study is to adopt the modified OhIson model framework 
(1995) which suggests that market value is a simple linear function of earnings and 
book value, and conduct association tests between the market value and earnings & 
book value reported by the Chinese listed companies. 
The modified OhIson model is expressed as follows: 
MVjt = ao + a, BV,, + a2Ej, +e 
Where MV,, is the market value of firm Y) at balance sheet date (t), BV,, the book 
value, E, the eamings, and c is a mean zero error term. 
Adopting the above model, accounting researchers have carried out numerous studies 
(e. g. Landman 1986; Barth 1991; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Burstaher & 
Dichev 1997, Stark and Thomas, 1998; Arce and Mora, 2002) to explore the relative 
accounting information content in various countries. On the whole, they have found 
the evidence of value-relevance of both the balance sheet and income statement 
information in developed markets including the U. S., Canada, Australia, the U. K. 
France, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Italy etc. 
This study extends this line of inquiry into the emerging Chinese stock market. As 
discussed earlier, because of the unique institutional settings of the Chinese market 
and significant differences between and the Chinese accounting regulations and the 
IASs, the result of this study have far-reaching implications for both theory and 
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practice in China and beyond. After all, accounting and financial reporting play a 
vital role in an efficient market. Major accounting standard-setting bodies such as the 
Financial Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) have adopted this investor-oriented information usefulness 
perspective and specially stated that the primary purpose of accounting is to meet the 
needs of capital markets. Consequently, it is not surprising that an important 
objective of the Chinese accounting reform is to improve the usefulness of financial 
reporting in the stock market (Winkle et al., 1994, Xiang, 1998, Chen et al., 1999, 
Chen and Su, 2001). 
Among the existing literature on market valuation in China's stock market, there are 
currently two competing schools of thoughts as to whether the Chinese accounting 
information is value relevant. While the dominant view appears to be that Chinese 
accounting information is not value relevant or at least not significantly value 
relevant, there is a belief that the market value can be explained by accounting 
figures contained in the financial reports published by listed companies in China. 
To investigate whether the accounting information is value relevant in Chinese 
market, one needs to take an in-depth look at the capital market and the accounting 
system. The unique characteristics inherent in the Chinese capital market and the 
accounting system have provided ample reasons for researchers to be sceptical about 
the information content provided by the Chinese listed companies. As discussed by 
Chen et al. (2001), accounting information in the emerging Chinese market is not as 
value-relevant as in the developed market for a number of reasons. 
First, despite the efforts of the accounting regulation setters to bring the Chinese 
accounting in line with international conventions, the Chinese accounting system is 
far from fully-constructed. As discussed previously, in a transitional period in which 
the old system has been abolished but the new system is still under construction, 
there are numerous unresolved issues in producing and disclosing accounting 
information, thus providing companies opportunities to manipulate accounting 
numbers for various purposes. The quality of accounting infon-nation disclosed by 
the listed companies has therefore been questioned in a large volume of literature 
(Xiao, 1999, Chen et al., 1997, Anderson, 2000). The quality of accounting 
- 139 - 
information poses an even bigger question when one takes into consideration the 
issue of investor protection. The mechanism to protect the interests of equity 
investors has yet to take its form given the relatively premature stock markets in 
China. The fact that the Chinese capital market is dominated by the government 
suggests that the accounting system is far from market oriented. Therefore protecting 
the interests of equity investors frequently has to give way to various government 
objectives despite of the slogan of CRSC: investor protection is our top priority. In a 
market with a severe lack of protection for equity investors, the incentives for listed 
companies to cheat far outweigh the risks. Therefore, as pointed out by Anderson 
(2000), company managers and directors might utilise company disclosure to 
perpetrate fraud so they might gain a listing or boost the stock's price. Investors may 
not be properly informed through company disclosures and could be at greater risk if 
they rely on this information. 
Second, the accounting and auditing professions in China are not well developed 
given the relatively short history of the development of stock markets. While it is 
true that the establishment of the so-called 'Chinese Accounting Standards System' 
at the beginning of 2006 has symbolised that Chinese national accounting standards 
have been brought in line with international rules (McGregor, 2006a), the system 
will not work without enough competent accounting and auditing professionals. 
Independent auditing is a new phenomenon in China. Although it is required that 
financial statements of listed companies must be audited by CPAs, the quality of 
audits in China has been generally perceived to be low (Aharony et al., 2000). A 
relatively weak monitoring role by outside auditors may contribute to a lack of 
confidence in and less use of financial statements. 
Third, compared to the mature market such as the U. S. and the U. K. market, the 
Chinese market lacks a sufficient level of corporate governance such as independent 
outside directors, audit committee, and competition in the managerial labour market, 
which weakens investor's confidence in their use of accounting information. 
Fourth, unlike the U. S. and U. K. market where most transactions are executed by 
institutional shareholders who have the know-how to analyse and therefore depend 
on the accounting information, Chinese stock markets are mainly participated in by 
- 140 - 
individual investors motivated by short-term returns and with limited access to 
information. The so-called insider information or even rumours, rather than public 
accounting information released by the listed companies, play an important role in 
determining share prices. This weakens the investor's reliability upon the financial 
statements. 
However, there are also reasons to believe that accounting information is useful and 
thus incorporated in stock valuation in the Chinese market. As a new market, it lacks 
alternative information sources other than published accounting reports such as 
earnings forecasts and company research by financial analysts, and management's 
conference calls. While individual investors are active in the market, the investment 
profession in China is not well established and comprises only a small number of 
financial analysts and institutional investors. Most transactions are undertaken by 
individual investors. As a result, price may be less informative and accounting 
information may contain more surprises in the Chinese market, both of which lead to 
an increased reliance upon accounting numbers by investors. Second, the 
government has made considerable efforts since the start of the Chinese stock market 
to improve accounting and financial reporting. As mentioned before, it has been 
announced by the government that the Chinese Accounting Standards System has 
been established and will take effect from I't January 2007. These efforts may have 
had a positive impact on the efficiency of the market and the confidence of Chinese 
investors in accounting numbers. 
Since there are reasons both to believe and to be sceptical about the value-relevance 
of Chinese accounting information, it is more an empirical question of whether 
accounting information is useful to domestic investors in China as measured by the 
contemporaneous associations between accounting numbers and stock valuation. 
Hence, this issue will be explored by providing empirical evidence. 
Two existing studies examine the value-relevance of accounting information in 
China. Focusing on the financial reports prepared under both Chinese GAAP and 
IASs by B-share companies, Bao and Chow (1999) examine the relative value 
relevance of two sets of accounting information of Chinese listed companies which 
issued B shares to foreign investors on the Chinese stock exchanges. Overall, they 
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find that earnings and book value reported based on both Chinese GAAP and IAS are 
value relevant, with the latter having greater information content than the former. 
However, this study suffers from two potential problems. First, this study utilises B- 
share prices to proxy for the market value of the firms. This obviously creates a 
serious drawback in that B-share prices have long been under-priced due to the 
relatively low trading volume in the B-share market (Gao, 2002). Therefore, 
including B-share prices and A-share earnings and book value simultaneously in one 
model may imply an association which is not consistent with actual practices in the 
market. Second, this study focuses on the B-share market only, but the B-share 
market has always been dominated by the A-share market. The B-share market is 
known for its lack of liquidity. As a result, the small trading volume may not allow 
stocks prices to fully reflect new information in the market. For example, a 
substantial number of B shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are priced under 
US$ 0.10. An increase or a decrease in the stock price amounting to one cent (the 
minimum change) would effectively lead to a suspension of trading due to the 
trading rule on maximum daily price variation (10 per cent) set by Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. . Furthermore, B shares are supposed to be traded 
by 
investors outside China. These investors may not have access to Chinese GAAP- 
based financial reports, which are published domestically in Chinese. The 
reconciliation of GAAP discrepancy is required to be disclosed only with the A-share 
reports. Consequently, the value relevance of accounting information with respect to 
foreign investors in the B-share market does not necessarily imply that domestic 
investors will respond to accounting information in the same way in the A-share 
market. It is important to point out that the A- and B- share markets Chinese market 
are actually segmented by the government policy. Foreign investors are not allowed 
to enter the A-share market and Chinese investors to B-share market. It is likely that 
these two markets behave substantially differently in terms of incorporating the 
accounting information. Therefore, focusing on the B-share market which is isolated 
from A-share market does not provide a full picture of the value-relevance of the 
Chinese market. 
Utilising both the return and price model and using a sample of all listed firms in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1991 to 1998, Chen et al. (2001) 
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empirically investigate whether investors in the Chinese stock market perceive 
accounting information based on Chinese GAAP to be value-relevant. Specifically, 
they address three research questions: 1) Is the accounting information based on 
Chinese GAAP value relevant in the Chinese stock market? 2) Does value relevance 
in China change in a predictable manner? 3) Do investors place more weight on 
accounting information in companies issuing A shares only relative to companies 
issuing both A and B shares? They find that, collectively, accounting information is 
value relevant to investors in the Chinese market. 
While it is appropriate that Chen et al. (2001) choose the A-share listed companies as 
the sample of the research, their study is subject to some restrictions on data. First, 
the data obtained in the study covers a period from 1990 to 1998. The data from 1990 
to 1994 cannot be used for the study because of the relatively small sample size 
during the early years. Therefore the period studied contains only 4 years, namely 
1995,1996,1997 and 1998. This short period of time might not pose a problem in 
the mature and developed market; however, in an emerging Chinese market which is 
growing at the explosive pace, the study needs to be updated quickly. Second, the 
study chooses net income per share as the proxy for earnings. However, net income 
as the measure of earnings suffers from a potential problem in that it incorporates 
transitory components that could be misleading (Collins et al., 1997). Another 
measure of earnings, earnings before non-recurring items, is perceived to better 
capture the permanent component of earnings. However, Chen et al. (2000) have not 
tried to capture the effect of the earnings before non-recurring items in explaining the 
value relevance of the accounting information. 
This study extends current research in that: 1) it will explore the issue of value 
relevance by focusing on the A-share market, the dominant stock market in China, by 
using data exclusively prepared by A-share companies; 2) it will capture the latest 
change of the market and the accounting system by expanding the data period to 9 
years spanning from 1994 to 2001; 3) it will compare the effects of choice of proxies 
for earnings by using both measures of earnings (earnings before non-recurring items 
and net income) to test the valuation model. It is important to point out that the 
value-relevance of accounting information in China is a fundamental issue because 
accounting information is primary source of public information in the Chinese 
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market (Chen et al. 2001). After all, the purpose of various measures taken by the 
Chinese government to improve accounting and financial reporting is to increase the 
usefulness of accounting information. 
To address the above questions empirically, I will estimate the modified OhIson 
model by regressing the market value on book value and net income. The 
investigation will be carried out by taking the following steps: 
Step 1: To capture the overall picture of value-relevance of accounting information 
in the Chinese market, I will run the regression of market values on book values and 
net income based on the pooled and cross-sectional data. Coefficient of the variables, 
a, and a 2,, and determination coefficient , the adjusted R2 should be able to provide 
the preliminary evidence to address the question. 
Step 2: To identify the changes over the years, the modified OhIson model will be 
estimated by using the yearly data. Changes of the adjusted R' will be investigated. 
Step 3: To examine the value-relevance differences across sectors, the modified 
OhIson model will be estimated by partitioning data into 12 sectors. According to the 
Mandate on Sectors of Listed Companies (MSLC) issued by the CSRC in 2001, 
listed companies in China are classified into 13 sectors: farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry & fishing, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, transportation & 
warehouse, information technology, wholesale & retailing, finance & insurance, real 
estates, public services, communication & cultural, and conglomerate. Firms in the 
finance and insurance sector are excluded from this study due to their unique asset 
make-up and special requirements on financial reporting. I am therefore going to 
investigate the differences in value-relevance of the accounting information across 
the remaining 12 sectors. 
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5.3.2 Question 2: Is other accounting information value relevant? 
So far the model I am using to investigate the value-relevance of earnings and book 
values in the Chinese market is the modified Ohlson model. However some other 
accounting information, which might contribute to explaining the market value, 
needs to be examined in order to gain a further insight into the value-relevance of 
accounting information in the Chinese capital market. It is important to point out that 
there are limitations in using the modified Ohlson model to examine the value 
relevance of accounting information in that the modified OhIson model focuses on 
only two accounting variables: earnings and book value. Other accounting numbers 
are not included in the model. However, research work can be conducted by adding 
some more accounting variables into the modified Ohlson model. The primary 
objective of this section is to further investigate the effect of adding more accounting 
variables on the overall explanatory power of the model. If the overall R's increase 
as a result of adding more accounting variables and the coefficient on the added 
variables is statistically significant, I shall have a reason to believe that adding the 
accounting variables might help explain the market value of the firm. 
5.3.2.1 Ball and Brown model 
Following Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver et al., (1979) who examine the 
association between stock returns and accounting earnings, I start off my 
investigation by a simple model which suggests that market value is a simple linear 
function of accounting earnings (net income). Letting MVj, represent market value 
for firmj at time t and NI,, represent the net income for the firmi for the accounting 
period ending at time t, I initially investigate the following model: 
MVjt = ao + a, NI,, +c (5.9) 
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Where e is a mean zero error term which has constant variance U2 and cov(e, c, ) is 
zero. Model (5.9) can be interpreted that finns are priced by a constant price-earnings 
multiple if ao is zero. 
5.3.2.2 Extension of Ball and Brown model: the modified OhIson model 
The second model extends Model (5.9) by including BVj,, the book value for firmj 
at time t. As a consequence, the model investigated is: 
Mvit =, 6o +A NIjt + 
P2B Vjt +6 (5.10) 
Where e has the same characteristics as Equation (5.9). 
Note that Model (5.10) is actually the modified OhIson model. The modified OhIson 
model is widely believed to be superior to the Model (5.9) in that both balance sheet 
and income statement information, book value and earnings, has been linked to 
market values. Empirical evidence in the developed markets (Arce and Mora, 2002, 
Ohlson, 1995, Stark and Thomas, 1998, Ohlson, 1991) suggests that the addition of 
such a term improves the overall ability to explain market values. However, this line 
of research has not been extended to the emerging Chinese market. This study will 
contribute to the literature by investigating the issue whether including both book 
values and net income will enhance the value relevance in the context of Chinese 
market. 
Another point worth of mention is 82 , the coefficient of variable 
BVP I It 
is 
conceived that A measures the relationship between the market value and book 
value. In the context of China, it shall be expected that 82 is significantly greater 
than I on the ground that Chinese accounting rules require firms to write down the 
value of assets under the lower of cost or market accounting, but asset write-ups to 
the market value are prohibited. As mentioned earlier, Chinese listed firms are 
required to review the value of eight categories of non-cash assets periodically, at 
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least at the end of the accounting year, following the issuance of the Tentative 
Accounting Regulations for Shareholding Companies in 1998 and Accounting 
System for Business Enterprises in 2000 (Yang et al., 2005). Under these rules, 
impairment losses should be recognised and the value of the assets written down if 
the assets are found to be impaired. However, the assets are not permitted to mark 
upwards in the event that the market value of assets exceeds the book value. As a 
consequence, it is likely that assets of Chinese firms are under-valued under the 
prevailing accounting regulations. The divergence of market value from book value 
caused by the existing accounting practice is expected to be reflected through, 82 
which is predicted to be significantly greater than one 32 . 
5.3.2.3 Extension of the modified Ohlson model: the effect of abnormal earnings 
It is important to point out that the DAE model expresses firm value as a function of 
book value and expected stream of future abnormal earnings (Ohlson, 1991, Ohlson, 
1995). However, when the DAE model is replaced by the modified Ohlson model, 
the bottom-line net income was used to proxy for the abnormal earnings due to the 
fact that the abnormal earnings variable is not directly observable. Although using 
net income to proxy for abnormal earnings is a common practice in most empirical 
studies in the field of value relevance (e. g. Harris et al., 1994; Collins et al., 1996; 
Barth et al., 1998; Arce and Mora, 2000; Chen et al., 2001; Bai et al., 2003; Sami and 
Zhou, 2004), it is still worthwhile to investigate whether the modified Ohlson 
valuation model can be better estimated by choosing an alternative proxy for 
abnormal earnings. After all, there are fundamental differences between abnormal 
earnings and bottom-line net income. The net income, derived directly from the 
income statement, has been widely criticised for low-quality and lack of relevance to 
market value (Stewart, 2002). By contrast, abnormal earnings are net income 
adjusted for a capital charge computed as the cost of equity capital multiplied by the 
32 In the literature, 82 is often referred to as Tobin's Q if the assets are recorded at replacement cost. 
Here the assets are shown at realisable value. However, in the active asset markets there will be no 
difference between replacement cost and realisable value. 
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beginning book value of equity. Abnormal earnings therefore make an adjustment to 
reflect the fact that accountants do not recognise any opportunity cost for equity 
funds used (Palepu et al., 2004). 
The next model, therefore, specially investigates the value-relevance of an alternative 
proxy for abnormal earnings. Abnormal earnings, by definition, can be written as 
follows: 
AEj, = NIj, - kj, BVj(, -, ) 
Where: 
AE,, is the abnormal earnings for firmj for the annual accounting period ending 
at time t; 
NI,, is the net income for firmj for the accounting period ending at time t; 
kj, is the cost of equity capital; 
BVj(, 
-, ) 
is the book value for firmj at time t-1 
Therefore, extending equation (5.10) to reflect abnormal earnings requires the 
investigation of the following relationships: 
MVJ, = Zo + X, NIjt + X2 BVj, + X3 (NIjl - kj, BVJ(t-, )) +c 
The above equation can be expressed as follows: 
MVil ý ZO + (XI + X3)Njt + X2 BVjt - X3 kj, BVJ(t-, ) +c (5.11) 
This equation can be written as follows: 
MVJ, = 450 + 61 NIJ, + 
62 B Vj, + 63 B Vj(t-, ) +6 
Where (53 =ý X3 kj,, note that k j, =k I= k and k is a constant in the regression. 
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Note that Equation (5.12) does not explicitly include abnormal earnings term. Rather, 
it includes opening book value, BVj(, _, ), as a separate 
term to capture the capital 
charge element of abnormal earnings with a coefficient that is freely estimated. As a 
consequence, if abnormal earnings are to be regarded as helpful in explaining market 
value I would expect: 
83 'ýý 
5.3.2.4 Further extension of DAE model: the effect of dividends 
The other potential problem that the modified OhIson model suffers is that dividend 
has not been considered in estimating the model. Note that the modified OhIson 
model is built upon the theoretical foundation that equity value is the present value of 
future dividends. Therefore, dividends play a critical role in explaining the market 
value of the firm. By comparison with earnings and book values whose value 
relevance has been documented in a large volume of accounting literature, dividends 
frequently provide even more reliable and useful indication of the profitability and 
financial conditions of the firm. The market therefore places heavy weight on the 
dividend policy when valuing the market price of the firm. The financial information 
that investors obtain from companies may be biased by selective disclosure or even 
manipulative accounting. Managers are naturally inclined to present the company in 
the best possible light, even if the image they convey does not represent the truth. 
Companies that are really profitable will therefore seek to distinguish themselves 
from others that are not, through policies that latter cannot imitate because they lack 
the resources to do so. Quiry et al. (2005) argue that paying dividends is one such 
policy because it requires the company to have cash. A company that is struggling is 
not able to imitate a company that is prospering. For this reason, dividend policy is a 
mean of signalling that cannot be faked, and managers often use it to convince the 
market that the picture of the company they present is the true one. 
Not only are dividends more reliable in providing the true picture of the financial 
conditions of the company, but also dividend policy is widely viewed as a way for 
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the company's managers to signal the growth opportunity of the company. 
Companies frequently show the market that they have a plan for the future and are 
anticipating certain results through their dividend policies. If a company maintains its 
dividend when its earnings have decreased, that signals to the market that the decline 
is only temporary and earnings growth will resume. Furthermore, dividends are 
widely seen as a better signal of future abnormal earnings than abnormal earnings 
itself. 
To assess the effect of dividends, I further extend the Model (5.12) by including a 
dividend variable into the model. 
MVJ, = 00 + 01 NIjt + 02BVj, + 03 BVj(1-1) + 04DIVj, +c (5.13) 
It is important to appreciate that in the theoretical model BV would disappear as 
an explanatory variable once dividends are introduced. To see this note that from the 
accounting identity: 
BVAI-I) + Mil - DIVi, = BVjt , or, BVj(, -, ) = 
BVjj - NIj, + DIVjt 
Therefore we can have the following equation by substituting the above identity into 
Equation (5.11): 
mv 
it = ZO 
+ (XI + X3 + X3k) NIjl + (X2 - X3 k) BVjt m X3k DIVjt +e 
As can be seen from the above equation, BV disappears as the dividend variable 
is introduced. This, of course, assumes that the stock market understand the 
accounting structure. In reality, it may well be that the market as a whole does not 
fully appreciate the above theory. Therefore, including BVj(, -, ) 
into the model as 
stated in Model (5.13) can be used as one of the methods to test the market's 
capabilities of understanding market valuation theory. 
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5.4 Variables and Data 
5.4.1 Discussion of the variables 
Before running regressions, a brief discussion on the above variables is provided as 
follows: 
5.4.1.1 MV 
For the dependant variable, the market value for a firm in a given calendar year is 
measured at two different dates: one on the 30th April of the next year or the nearest 
trading day and the other on the 31 st December of the year or the nearest trading day. 
The reason to measure the market value in 4 months after the balance sheet date is 
that Chinese listed companies are required to disclose their annual accounts by the 
30th April of the next year. The market value around 4 months after the balance sheet 
was taken to ensure that the information in the financial statement for a given 
financial year is reflected in the market price. Also, I take the market value measured 
at the end of the year to further examine whether market value measured at different 
dates will make a difference in applying the above valuation model. Note that 
estimating the modified Ohlson model by taking market values at two different dates 
will be applied in addressing question I only. If there is no significant difference, the 
rest of the study will use the market value data at the end of the year. If the market 
value at the 30th April of the next year is found better than that at the end of the year 
in estimating the model, the former will be used for the rest of the study. 
Tests on whether the market value at the end of April of next year is preferable over 
the market value at the end of the year have been undertaken by regressing the two 
market values on book value and net profits separately. However, no significant 
difference between these two sets of market values has been identified 33 . Therefore, I 
33 The empirical results are presented in the Appendix E 
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will use the market value at the end of the year. The reason for this is that if the 
market value at the end of April of next year is used, I will lose the sample in 2001 
because the MVj, in 2001 is measured at the market value at the 30thApril 2002. 
However, data in 2002 is not available. 
5.4.1.2 E 
Note that E ., 
in the model refers to the bottom-line accounting earnings, namely the 
net profit. From the economic perspective, however, the net profit based on the 
generally accepted accounting principle is somehow subject to serious distortions 
(Palepu et al., 2004). The most evident example is the treatment of R&D. The 
accounting rules in China, as well as elsewhere, requires firms to expense research 
outlays immediately when they are incurred. Clearly, some research expenditures 
have future value while others do not. However, because Chinese GAAP does not 
allow firms to distinguish between the two types of expenditures, it leads to a 
systematic distortion of reported accounting numbers including the net profit. As a 
consequence, accounting earnings under the current Chinese regulations normally 
include an expense investment in intangibles such as R&D expenditures. To restore 
the distortions caused by accounting rules and to capture the effect of R&D in 
explaining the market value, Stark and Thomas (1998) investigated the empirical 
relationship between market value and earnings by segmenting the measure of 
earnings into two components-(E ,+ RD, ) and RD,. Based on the evidence 
from 
the UK market, they find that market value is better explained if earnings are 
segmented into R&D expenditures and earnings plus R&D expenditures. 
It therefore would be ideal for this study to adopt the same method to examine if this 
is the case in the emerging capital market, the Chinese stock markets. However, the 
R&D data in most Chinese listed companies are not available as Chinese companies 
are not required to disclose R&D expenditures in financial reports. Further research 
in this area is needed to examine the effect of R&D expenditures in explaining 
market value when the R&D data are available. 
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Furthermore, to extend the line of research of Chen et al. (2001), this study is going 
to use both net profit, the bottom-line figure from the income statement, and earnings 
before exceptional items to proxy for the earnings. It is widely accepted that net 
earnings before non-recurring items might be preferable to net income as the 
exceptional items have little associations with the ordinary operations of the firm 
(Arce and Mora, 2002). A true and fair picture of the profitability of the firm can be 
seriously biased as the result of the non-recurring items, such as disposal of assets 
and subsidies from the government etc., being included. As mentioned before, to 
incorporate transitory components in the net profit could mislead investors (Collins 
et al., 1997). However, the empirical evidence supporting the preference of earnings 
before non-recurring items over net profits as the proxy for abnormal earnings seems 
to be lacking in the literature. Therefore it would be rather interesting to see if there 
is any significant difference by using these two sets of data in the context of Chinese 
equity markets. Using data for both net profits and earnings before exceptional items, 
this study will investigate the difference between net profits (NP) and earnings 
before exceptional items (EBEI) based on the empirical evidence. It is noted that the 
earliest year in which Chinese listed companies were required to disclose EBEI in the 
financial reports was 1999. Therefore, the data for testing the difference between NP 
and EBEI cover a three-year period from 1999 to 2001. If EBEI is found not to be 
superior to NP in explaining the market value of the firm, NP data will be used 
throughout this study because NP data span an eight-year period from 1995 to 2001. 
Tests on whether earnings before exceptional items are preferable over net profits 
have been carried out by regressing the market values on book value and earnings 
before exceptional items, and on book value and net profits separately. However, no 
significant difference between these two market values has been identified 34 . For the 
reason suggested earlier, net profits will be used throughout the study. 
34 The empirical results are presented in the Appendix E 
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5.4.1.3 BV j, and BV j(, -, ) 
Book value is measured as the sum of the shareholder equity plus various reserves at 
the end of the year. To be more specific, BV is derived from the following equation: 
BV = Share capital + Capital reserve + Surplus reserve + Retained profits for the 
financialyear 
It should be noted that benefit reserve in the owner's equity, which accounted for 5- 
10 per cent of the profits after tax, has not been included in the book value as the 
fund in this account is solely used to provide benefits for employees and managers of 
the firm. Although in nature it belongs to shareholders of the firm, in practice 
shareholders don't have any beneficial interests in this fund. Including the benefit 
reserve would therefore overstate the book value of equity. 
5.4.1.4 DIV 
Cash dividends for common shares for firrnj at time t are taken from the database to 
capture the effect of including dividends into the model. 
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5.4.2 Description of the data 
The sample of listed companies used in this study was obtained from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMSAR database) jointly produced by 
the Research Centre for China Accounting and Finance Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University and Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Limited Corporation, and 
China Corporate Governance Research Database (CCGR Database) produced by the 
Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Limited Corporation. The databases consist 
of enterprises which issued A-shares on both Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1992 to 2001. However, this study selected a period 
spanning from 1994 to 2001 for two reasons. Firstly, China experienced a substantial 
change in its accounting practices in 1993 following the promulgation of ASBE - 
Basic Standard by the MoF, which became effective on I't July 1993 (Sun and Tong, 
2003). In effect, ASBE - Basic Standards brought China's accounting practices 
much in line with international conventions. This study excludes the data before 
1994 to ensure the relative consistency of the accounting regime and to facilitate the 
comparability of the data across years. Secondly, China established the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges in December 1990. At the early stage of development of 
the stock markets, the number of listed companies was significantly smaller than that 
in later years. As indicated in Chapter 2, there were altogether 10,14,53 and 183 
listed companies on both the stock exchanges in 1990,1991,1992 and 1993 
respectively. These are negligible by comparison with more than 1000 listed 
companies after 2000. This study excludes the data in the earlier years to eliminate 
the problems caused by small samples and to ensure the steadiness of the data. 
For a firm to enter into any annual cross-section, it must satisfy, for that year, the 
following condition: 
1. All the required data described above must be available for that calendar year 
from the CSMAR Database. 
2. Firms in the financial sector (insurance, banks, investment companies etc. ) 
are excluded from the data due to their unique characteristics. Accounting 
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practice for these firms is so distinct that their valuation parameters are likely 
to be substantially different from that for industrial firms. 
3. Firms with negative book value are also excluded from the data because 
negative book value derived from the above formula is mainly caused by the 
extraordinary losses for the year, but bears no economic sense. 
It should be stressed that data in year 1994 are used in this study; however, they are 
not presented in the tables for analytical purposes. This is because the opening 
market value (MV, -, 
) is used to deflate all the variables in the regression models. 
Following the methods taken by Stark and Thomas(1998), all the variables in the 
regression models are deflated by the opening market value (MV, -, 
) to correct the 
heteroscedasticity problem. Data in year 1994 cannot be used for analytical purposes 
because the closing market value data (MV, ) in 1993 are needed to get the deflated 
data for 1994. However, data before 1994 are not included in the databank used by 
this study for the reasons mentioned earlier. 
The sample selection criterion results in sample size of 174 firms in 1995,243 firms 
in 1996,362 firms in 1997,493 firms in 1998,594 firms in 1999,740 firms in 2000 
and 914 firms in 2001. In total, the pooled number of observations for this study is 
3520. The distribution of sample firms by exchanges and years is presented in Table 
5.1. 
Year Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange Total 
Total 1823 1697 3520 
1995 97 77 174 
1996 144 99 243 
1997 209 153 362 
1998 261 232 493 
1999 306 288 594 
2000 357 383 740 
2001 449 465 914 
Table 5.1 Sample distribution of firms by years and stock exchanges 
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As further investigation over the market valuation of Chinese equity market across 
industrial sectors will be carried out as the study goes deeper, it is therefore useful to 
present the sample distribution by sectors and years. As mentioned earlier, Chinese 
listed companies are classified into 13 sectors and finance and insurance companies 
are excluded from this study, the sample distribution by sectors and years is 
presented on Table 5.2. Two striking features about the samples are worth mention. 
Firstly, more than 50% of the observations are clustered around the manufacturing 
industry in this study, indicating that manufacturing companies are the dominant 
factor of the equity markets in China. Secondly, there are only 16 observations in the 
mining industry. This study will further exclude the mining industry from the sample 
due to the exceptionally small sample size. 
Sector 
Year 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Agriculture 2 2 6 8 10 15 23 66 
Mining 0 0 1 1 2 3 9 16 
Manufacturing 78 112 162 1 229 298 399 519 1797 
utility 6 8 12 17 18 24 33 118 
Construction 1 2 3 7 9 12 16 50 
Transportation & 
Warehousing 
4 6 12 
I 
15 21 25 32 115 
Information 
Technology 
13 14 21 28 33 41 47 197 
Retail & 
Wholesaling 
20 31 49 
1 
67 75 76 85 403 
Services 16 21 25 27 26 28 27 170 
Real Estate 2 4 12 22 24 32 36 132 
Communication & 
Culture 
5 5 5 
16 
6 8 9 
1 
44 
Conglomerate 27 38 54 66 72 77 78 412 
Total 174 243 362 49-3 594 740 914 3520 
Table 5.2 Sample distribution of firms by years and industrial sectors 
The summary descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are presented in 
Table 5.3. 
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Variable Mean 
(million) 
S. D. 
(million) 
Minimum 
(million) 
Median 
(million) 
Maximum 
(million) 
Panel A: Pooled data 
Mv 3,261.20 5,744.47 195.00 2,247.63 299,123.42 
BV 834.67 2,385.38 -1,923.00 508.50 139,040.00 NP 59-00 261.79 -2,257.00 38.91 14,018.00 DIV 29.02 125.00 -13.50 4.40 6,936.00 
Panel B: Data in different years 
1994 
mv 1,469.27 2,165.33 195.00 832.65 14,997.00 
BV 610.77 1,100.50 68.12 345.83 10,586.00 
NP 79.51 141.36 -26.06 41.20 1,493.47 DIV 38.66 83.00 0 15.00 818.75 
1995 
mv 1,281.30 1,962.13 205.25 672.11 14,803.00 
BV 651.89 1,143.26 65.80 353.75 10,565.00 
NP 64.71 167.40 -254.10 28.18 2,126.80 DIV 39.05 75.67 0 18.43 851.50 
1996 
mv 2,210.24 3,993.95 301.98 1,260.46 43,005.00 
BV 599.55 1058.23 51.43 333.97 11,940.00 
NP 48.36 96.65 -234.22 30.07 1,144.82 DIV 19.73 60.53 0 0 858.00 
1997 
mv 2,580.63 3,419-07 397.78 1,608.21 31,860.00 
BV 661.12 1037.52 7.80 393.54 12,593.00 
NP 53.85 98.49 -515.64 39.48 794.35 DIV 26.10 54.17 -13.50 6.90 526.62 
1998 
mv 2,463.74 2435.84 292.30 1742.29 20,880.00 
BV 713.77 963.42 -320.07 465.84 12,581.00 NP 44.03 134.80 -1044.00 41.16 809.46 DIV 18.16 52.41 -1.19 0 620.69 
1999 
mv 3,050.67 3,123.91 572.84 2191.13 31,992.00 
BV 749.56 995.48 -1285.00 509.68 12,959.00 NP 56.51 120.31 -956.98 41.94 834.60 DIV 20.69 52.91 0 0 588.00 
2000 
mv 4,783.25 4,452.26 -965.76 3,558.77 69,942.00 
BV 919.74 1,364.24 -1,320.00 592.08 25,282.00 
NP 68.80 176.30 -934.79 44.91 2,992.10 
DIV 31.47 81.06 0 11.50 1722.15 
2001 
mv 3,985.55 9,943.44 573.09 2660.15 299,120.00 
BV 1,132.12 4,520.33 -1,923.00 635.37 139,040.00 NP 62.56 483.04 -2,257.00 35.71 14,048.00 DIV 39.67 231.31 -0.30 9.61 3,936.00 
Table 5.3 Basis descriptive statistics for variables 
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Panel A shows the basic descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional and pooled data. 
The average market value, book value, net profit and dividend for ordinary 
shareholders are RMB 3,261.20,834.67,59.00, and 29.02 million respectively. What 
strikes out of these figures is the great divergence of the market value and book value, 
with the former nearly 4 times as high as the latter. A number of factors are likely to 
be able to explain the difference. First, the Chinese stock market experienced 
explosive growth during the 1990s (Gao, 2002). The impressive returns delivered by 
the fast-growing market attracted the investments to flood into the stock market. As a 
consequence, market demands for shares grew at a massive pace. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the imbalance between supply and demand was further worsened by the 
government's quota system, which considered listing for state-owned companies 
exclusively. A large number of non-state-owned companies were kept out of the 
game. Unsurprisingly, share prices were driven to a sky high during the 1990s. 
Second, the accounting practice prohibiting revaluation of assets upwards to the 
market value can partially explain the divergence between market values and book 
values. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, under the existing regulations, eight classes 
of assets are required to mark downwards if assets are found to be impaired. 
However, revaluation of assets upwards to the market value is not permitted by the 
existing regulations. The effect of these accounting practices is that assets are likely 
to be under-valued, hence causing the market value to depart from the book value. 
Panel B presents the statistics by years. Overall, the average market value of the 
listed company in China has been on the increase from RMB 1,469.27 million in 
1994 to RMB 3,985.55 million in 2001 with slight fluctuations in 1995,1998 and 
2001. The similar trend could be observed by looking at the median value. 
The most striking phenomenon is the huge increase in the mean value of market 
value occurring in 2000. The average market value jumped from RMB 3,050 million 
to RMB 4,783 million, an increase of more than 50%. The median value provides the 
similar story (from RMB 2,191 million to RMB 3,558 million). By sharp contrast, 
the increase in the average book value (from RMB 749 million to RMB 919 million) 
was only 23%. The story behind the abnormal increase in the market value is 
intriguing. Again, political power was playing a vital role in this wave of unusual 
price increase. An editorial published by The People's Daily, a powerful propaganda 
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tool of the government, on 19'h May 1999, has signalled the government's 
determination to develop the stock market (He, 2004). Unsurprisingly, investments in 
shares peaked in the following year, hence pushing share prices and market values to 
a new high. 
Another point worth noticing is the sharp decline in 2001. The market value soared 
up to RMB 4,783.25 million in 2000 and then plunged significantly to RMB 3985.55 
million in 2001. The reason for this sharp downturn is mainly attributed to the 
issuance of 'The Contemporary Measures to Raise Capital for Social Security Funds 
by Decreasing the State Share-holding in the Listed Companies' by the State Council 
on 13th June 2000. The new policy required listed companies to sell the state shares 
to the public at market prices. Capital raised through the sales of state shares would 
be injected into the social security funds. The government's decision to sell the non- 
tradable state shares at the price of tradable shares has caused panic and anger among 
investors. With investors pulling capital out of the stock markets, the market value of 
the firm could only go down, triggering the most serious market crash since the 
beginning of the stock market in China since the 1990s. In response to the pressure 
from the market, the State Council finally abandoned the policy in June 2001. 
However, feared that the government is likely to issue the similar policies in the 
future, the stock market has not fully recovered. 
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5.5 Findings and Discussion 
5.5.1 The overall picture of value-relevance in China 
Estimating the modified Ohlson Model for the pooled cross-section and time-series 
sample as well as for each year, I obtained the results of regressions in Table 5.4. 
Before jumping into findings and discussion, one needs to be reminded that all the 
variables in the equation has been deflated by the opening market value, MV j(, I) , 
The reason for this is, as discussed earlier, to correct the heteroscedasticity problem. 
As shown by the coefficients for net profit and book value based on the pooled data, 
the two independent variables, net profit and book value, are both significant at 
a <0.01 level. This suggests that overall the accounting information reported by the 
Chinese listed firms is playing a significant role in explaining the market value. It 
also indicates that investors in the Chinese equity markets do rely on financial reports 
when making investment decisions. In addition, the regression results from the yearly 
sample lend further support to the claim that net profit and book value provide 
explanatory power to the market value. As shown in Table 5.4, with the exception of 
the book value in 1999 and 2000, net profit and book value are consistently 
perceived as value relevant (at a <0.01 level) by investors in China in most of the 
years studied although coefficients vary substantially from year to year. 
To further investigate the question of whether Chinese accounting information is 
value relevant, the modified Ohlson model has been estimated based on the data 
across sectors and the regression results are presented in Table S. S. It can be found 
that the coefficients for book value are significant at a <0.01 or a <0.05 levels in all 
the sectors studied, and coefficients for net profit are significant a <0.01 or a <0.05 
levels in most sectors with the exception of transportation & warehousing, social 
services and real estate. Overall, these results provide further empirical evidence to 
suggest that book value and net profit do play a significant role in valuing the listed 
firms across various industries. Based upon the regression results from the pooled, 
yearly and across-sector sample, it seems that I can conclude that accounting 
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information as reflected in the income statement and balance sheet is value relevant 
to investors in the Chinese equity market. 
It seems that the results of this study is consistent with those of Bao, and Chow (1999) 
and Chen et al. (2001), who documented the value-relevance of Chinese accounting 
information in their studies. These results are particularly intriguing if one takes into 
consideration all the seemingly convincing reasons listed by those who are sceptical 
about the value-relevance of Chinese accounting information. Despite the fact that 
Chinese equity market is an emerging market and the development is at the early 
stage and despite all the criticism over the quality of Chinese accounting information 
and the legal settings of accounting regulatory framework, financial reports disclosed 
by Chinese listed companies do contain significant value-relevance not only on the 
pooled basis, but also across years and sectors. In particular, the record of value- 
relevance of accounting information can be traced back to as early as 1995. As can 
be seen from Table 5.4, coefficients for book value and net profit are both significant 
at a<0.01 level, suggesting that accounting information such as book value and net 
profit do provide key information in terms of valuing listed companies even in 1995, 
when the Chinese stock market was at its infancy and Chinese accounting regulatory 
system just began to undergo a dramatic transition to cater for the needs of fast 
development of equity markets. 
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a,, a, a2 AdjustedR 2N F No. of obs. 
0.84*** 3.33*** 1.20*** 
Pooled Data 22.9 524.19 3504 
(44.69) (13.85) (21.40) 
0.67*** 0.83** 0.62*** 
2001 9.3 47.53 914 
(41.07) (2.39) (8.03) 
1.56*** 4.01*** 0.30 
2000 7.0 28.86 740 
(32.99) (5.92) (1.83) 
1.17*** 4.13*** 0.15 
1999 11.1 37.91 594 
(26.47) (7.57) (1.04) 
0.90*** 2.99*** 0.565*** 
1998 13.8 40.36 493 
(16.72) (6.56) (3.75) 
0.89*** 4.12*** 1.05*** 
1997 22.6 53.75 362 
(13.00) (6.75) (5.46) 
0.52*** 3.45*** 2.18*** 
1996 56.2 156.32 243 
(4.62) (6.37) (12.30) 
0.67*** 1.38*** 0.27*** 
1995 13.1 14.05 174 
(14.55) (3.62) (3.04) 
Equation: MV /MV j(, -, ) ao 
+ a, NP j, /MV j(, _, ) 
+ a2 BV j, /MV j(, _, ) 
+C 
Notes: 
MVj( : Market value of the equity for firinj at the end of fiscal year t; 
MV 
j (1-1) : 
Market value of the equity for firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
NP j, Reported net profit for firm j for fiscal year t; 
BV it Reported book value for firm j for fiscal year t; 
All variables are scaled by opening market values. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; * statistical significance at 0.10 level; 
** statistical significance at 0.05 level; *** statistical significance at 0.01 level; 
Table 5.4 Regression of market value on net profits and book value for pooled 
and yearly sample 
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Adjusted No. of 
Intercept a, a, 2 0/ 
F 
obs. R ( 0) 
0.84*** 3.33*** 1.20*** 3520 
Pooled Data 22.90 524.19 
(44.69) (13.85) (21.40) 
0.70*** 5.76*** 1.32*** 66 
Agriculture 37.70 20.67 
(6.44) (4.10) (4.06) 
0.82*** 4.29*** 1.13*** 1197 
Manufacturing ' 25.20 302.92 (29.87) (12.52) (13.60) 
0.72*** 4.42** 1.14*** 118 
Utility 25.20 20.70 
(6.93) (2.85) (4.46) 
0.65*** 9.70** 1.26** 50 
Construction 25.70 9.47 
(4.08) (2.74) (2.13) 
Transportation & 0.79*** 1.59 1.37*** 115 
16.80 12.53 
Warehousing (7.35) (1.42) (4.33) 
0.94*** 3.62** 1.26*** 197 
Information Technology 11.90 14.19 
(11.28) (2.91) (3.99) 
0.87*** 2.04 1.03*** 403 
Retail & Wholesaling 21.30 55.33 
(17.56) (2.81) (6.76) 
0.66*** 0.28 2.04*** 170 
Real Estate 36.50 49.49 
(7.87) (0.30) (9.21) 
0.75*** -0.35 1.85*** 132 Social Service 16.10 13.58 
(7.74) (-0.27) (5.21) 
Communication & 0.96*** 4.07** 0.92** 44 
10.70 3.58 
Culture (6.00) (1.88) (1.91) 
0.93*** 3.27*** 1.14*** 412 
Conglomeration 21.60 57.5 
(17.39) (4.90) (7.39) 
Equation: MV , /MV j(, -, ) -= ao 
+ a, NP , /MV j(, _, ) 
+ a2 BV , /MV j(, -, ) 
+ 
Notes: 
MV it : Market value of the equity for firm j at the end of fiscal year t; 
MV i(I-1) : Market value of the equity for firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
NP 
jt : 
Reported net profit for firm j for fiscal year t; 
BV 
jt : 
Reported book value for firm j for fiscal year t; 
All variables are scaled by opening market values. Numbers in parenthesis arc t-statistics; * statistical significance at 0.10 level, 
** statistical significance at 0.05 level; *** statistical significance at 0.01 level; 
Table 5.5 Regression of market value on net profits and book value for pooled 
and sector sample 
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I inic scrics trend 
It is %%orth mentioning that the adjusted R,, termed as explanatory power. presented 
in I'able 5.4 gl\ es an indication ofhow much of variation of market 'value is jointly 
explained bý book \alue and net profit combined (Collins et al., 1997). The adjusted 
R for the cross-sectional time series regression indicates that earnings and book 
values jointlý e\plain about 23 per cent of the cross-sectional variation in the market 
\ alue of Chinese listed companies. The result is substantially lower than that of the 
Collins et al. (1997), %%ho carried out a study on the changes in the value-relevance of 
earnings and book %alues in the U. S. market over the past forty ýears and 
documented a joint explanatory power of -54 per cent 
for eamings and book value in 
the V. S. market. 
Changes in the value-relevance of net profits and 
book value from 1995 to 2001 
60 
50 
40 
30 
Year 
Figu re 5.1 Changes in the , alue-rele, * ance of net profit and book value from 
1995(o2001 
( hangcs in the joint c\planatorý po\\er of net protit and book value in the Chinese 
equitý markets from 1995 to 2001 are presented in Figure 5.1. As illustrated by 
Figure 5.1. the joint explanator\ power of net profits and book value increased 
drarnatlcallý from 13.1 per cent in 1995 to 56.2 per cent in 1996, and then plunged to 
2121.6 per cent In 1997. During the period between 1997 and 2001, the joint 
explanatory rKmer of net profit and book value continued to decline, reaching the 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
lowest level of 7 per cent in 2000, before bouncing back to 9.3 per cent in 2001. 
Overall, with the exception of 1996 and 2001, the power of accounting infonnation 
in explaining the market value the finns has been on decline during the period 
studied. 
In fact, it comes as a surprise to observe the general declining trend in terms of the 
joint explanatory power of net profit and book value in the Chinese equity markets. 
One would expect that the accounting information reflected in the financial reports 
provide increasing explanatory power for two reasons. Firstly, with the government 
endeavouring to reform the accounting system by issuing regulations in line with 
international conventions, the quality of accounting information reported by the 
Chinese listed firms is expected to improve. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
more financial information is available to investors as the government issues 
increasingly detailed regulations requiring companies to improve the transparency of 
information disclosure. Secondly, although it is still an emerging market, the Chinese 
equity market is developing at a phenomenal pace and consequently the market as a 
whole tends to become more and more mature as time goes by. Investors 
increasingly rely on accounting information when making investment decisions, 
especially given that other forms of information is not directly available and 
accessible for individual investors. Both of the above reasons lead one to believe that 
accounting information would play an increasing role in explaining the variation of 
the market value of listed firms. 
However, the result of this study provides the evidence for the contrary. One possible 
explanation would be that the declining explanatory power of net profit and book 
value might be caused by the sudden impact of government policy. As mentioned 
previously, Chinese accounting N-. -as undergoing a revolutionary reform to meet the 
changing economic and social environment. To construct the accounting regulatory 
framework in accordance with intentional conventions and the needs of Chinese 
economic development, the government has laid out a large quantity of new 
regulations and rules in a relatively short space of time. Take accounting standards 
for example, the NIoF has issued 16 specific accounting standards within a period of 
5 ycars from 1997 to 2001 since the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises- 
Basic Standards was promulgated in 1992, when China determined to incorporate the 
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international accounting standards into its own accounting system. What's more, it is 
not surprising to sce the issued regulations to be frequently amended. For instance, 
the Accounting Law was first enacted in 1985 but has been amended 3 times since 
then. China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) first issued the Standards of 
Contents and Format of Information Disclosure by Publicly Listed Companies in 
1994 and modified it nearly on the yearly basis. The issuance of regulations at such a 
rapid pace and frequent change of polices would without any doubt bring radical 
changes to the financial reporting by the listed companies. 
For example, to implement the principle of prudence, the MoF in 1998 issued a 
mandate requiring Chinese share-holding companies to review the value of assets at 
the end of the accounting year and rccognise impairment losses on four types of 
assets, namely short-term investments, long-term investments, trade accounts 
receivable and inventories if the assets are found to be impaired. In 2000, the scope 
of assets %%hich are subject to recognition of impairment losses has been extended to 
fixed assets, intangible assets, projects under construction and third-party loans. The 
purpose of requiring companies to rccognise impairment losses is obvious: to 
squeeze 'water' out of profit and asset figures by implementing the principle of 
prudence and thus improve the quality of accounting information reported by the 
Chinese listed companies. However, introducing such a policy has triggered a series 
of avalanches in the emerging Chinese stock market. The direct impact of writing off 
impairment losses is rcilected in the plunge of profitability and book value of assets 
reported by the listed companies. It is reported that a staggering RMB 21 billion of 
impaired assets -, %-as written off as a result of listed companies implementing the new 
rules in 2001 (Duan, 2002). The total impairment losses recognised in 2001 also 
slashed the book value of assets for over 1000 listed companies by nearly 2 per cent. 
It can be clearly seen that both net profit and book value of assets have been 
dramatically affected by the introduction of the concept of impairment losses. Tle 
introduction of new regulations has produced a huge gap between the accounting 
figures under the old accounting regime and the new accounting regulatory 
framework. As a consequence, accounting practices and accounting information such 
as net profit and book value reported under the new regulations diverge significantly 
from those under the old rules. The equity market, especially investors in the market, 
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, %%ill have to make sudden reactions to the 'shock' produced by the newly-issued 
policies in a relatively short space of time. It is therefore understood that the equity 
market as a %%hole mill behave in an unpredicted pattern to incorporate the new 
policy. 
In fact, the argument that the equity market reacted to the introduction of impairment 
losses in an unpredicted fashion is supported by the statistics presented in Table 5.4. 
As can be seen from Table 5.4, cocfficients for book value in 1999 and 2000 are not 
significant and adjusted R' , the joint explanatory power of 
book value and net 
profits, has been on decline since 1998, the year in which the concept of impairment 
losses, %%-ere introduced. In 1999 and 2000, book value was unable to play its role in 
explaining the market value of the firms simply because 'water' has been effectively 
squeezed out and the book value figures subject to impairment losses did not mean 
the same as those before the introduction of the new regulations. Investors, 
regardless of whether they are institutions or individuals, and the equity market chose 
not to rely too much on the book value flgures reported under the new rules in 
valuing the listed firms. With book value providing little indication of market value, 
it is easily understood that the joint explanatory power of net profits and book value 
dropped to 7 per cent in 2000. However, year 2001 showed the sign that the market 
'shock' caused by the government policy started to disappear as evidenced by the 
significance of book value at a<0.01 level and the increase in the joint explanatory 
power of net profit and book value. It is worth noting that goverriment introduced 
impairment losses with the intention of improving the quality of accounting 
information and ultimately protecting the interests of investors. However, the 'shock' 
caused by the good-intention policy was significant and immediate. In practical 
terms, it seems that the result of this study also suggests that the government should 
take the 'shock effect' into consideration when issuing new rules to regulate the 
market and accounting regime because new rules do have a significant impact on the 
whole market and the patter of the impact is often not predictable. 
The other possible reason for the unpredicted trend in terms of market valuation in 
the Chinese equity market might be attributed to the relatively short period being 
studied. Using data over the past 40 years, Collins et al. (1997) document the joint 
value-relcvancc of earnings and book value has increased slightly. However, as 
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mentioned previously, this study covers a period of only 8 years from 1994 to 2001 
due to the short history of Chinese equity market and limited availability of the data. 
Ile short period of time makes it impossible to observe a pattern without being 
affected by the noises and shocks inherent to the equity market. To obtain a better 
picture on the overall trend in terms of the market valuation, the period being studied 
needs to be extended and therefore the study aiming at obtaining a long-term pattern 
should be carried out in the future. 
5.5.3 Other factors apart from net prorit and book value 
In this section, the line of research has been extended to investigate the effect of 
some other factors apart from net profit and book value on the market valuation in 
the Chinese equity market by adding some more accounting variables on to the 
modified OhIson models. The fundamental issue to be addressed is whether there are 
other factors contributing significantly to the market value of listed companies in the 
Chinese equity market. 
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Equat AdjUsted No. 
ion ao a, 
a2 a3 a4 a, a6 
R2 
F of 
obs. 
5.1 
1.17*** 
(104.76) 
5.37*** 
(22.86) 12.90 522.50 3520 
5 2 0.92*** 13.30*** -15.20*** 29 50 737 50 3520 . (69.22) (38.31) (-28.79) . . 
5 3 0,77*** 10.70*** . 12.50*** 0.69*** 32 30 559 39 3520 . (43.46) (26.53) (-22.03) (11.99) . . 
5 4 0.80*** 9.77*** -12.70*** 1.55*** -0.97*** 33 10 435 89 3520 . (44.21) 1 (23.06) (-22.46) (11.00) (-6.68) . . 
5 5 0.79*** 12.00*** -14.70*** 1.44*** -0.80*** -7.75 35 40 386.62 3520 . (44.79) (26.04) (-25.21) (10.36) (-5.53) (-11.27) . 
5.6 0.73*** 11.80*** -14.20*** 1.46*** -0.86*** -5.29 *** 0.12*** 35.90 329.30 3520 (34.75) (25.53) (-24.13) (10.54) (-5.99) (6.40) (5.28) 
Equation 5.1: MV j, /MV j(, -, ) a, + a, 
NP /MV j(, -, ) +C 
Equation 5.2: MV j, /MV J(t-, ) ao + a, NP,, /MVj(, -, ) + 
a2 D 
np 
*NP 
j, 
/MV 
j(, -, ) 
+6 
D 7P =0 where NP jt >0; otherwise D IP =I 
Equation 5.3: MV ., /MV j(, -, ) ý ao + a, 
NP jt /MV jQ-1) + a2 D nP * NP jt /MV J(t-, ) + a3 BV j, /MV J(, _, ) +6 
Equation 5A MV j, /MV j (1-1) ý ao + a, NP j, /MV j(, _, ) + a2 
D nP * NP j, /MV j(, -, ) + a3 
BV j, /MV j(, -, ) 
+a4 BV J(, _, ) 
/MV j(, _, ) +C 
Equation 5-5: MV J, /MV J(t_, ) ý ao + a, NP j, /MV j(t_, ) + a2D P* NP ji. /MV j(, _I) + a3BV j, /MV j(t_l) 
+ a4BV J(, -, ) /MV j(, _, ) + a, DIV j, 1MV j(, _, ) +6 
Equation 5.6: MV J, /MV j(, _, ) ý ao + a, NP j, /MV j(, _, ) + a2l) nP * NP , /MV j(, -, ) + a3BV j, /MV j(, _') 
+ a4BV j(, -, ) /MV J(1_1) + a, DIV j, /MV j(, _, ) + 
a6Dd,, + .6 
Dd, =0 where DIV J, >0; otherwise 
Ddwý 1 
Notes: 
MV it : Market value of 
the equity for firm j at the end of fiscal year t; 
MV j(, _, ) : 
Market value of the equity for firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
NP jt Reported net profit for 
firm j for fiscal year t; 
13V jt Reported book value for firm j at the end of fiscal year t; 
BV j(t-, ) : Reported book value for firmj at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
DIV j, : Reported dividend for firmj for fiscal year t; 
D, p=OwhenNPjt >0; otherwise D np ý 1; 
D d,, ý0 when DIV J, >0, otherwise D div ýI 
All variables are scaled by opening market values. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics, statistical significance at 0.10 level; statistical significance at 
O. o5 level; *** statistical significance at 0.01 level; 
Table 5.6 Regression of market value on various accounting variables 
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5.5.3.1 Starting point: net profit and P/E ratio 
As can be seen from Table 5.6, Equation 5.1 was constructed to examine the linear 
relationship between market value and net profit. In addition, special attention will 
be focused upon the coefficient for net profit as it provides an indication of the 
price/earning (P/E) ratio. Unsurprisingly, the regression result indicates that the 
significant (at a<0 level) linear relationship between market value and net profit 
does exist in the Chinese equity market. Net profit alone provides 12.9 per cent of the 
variation of the market value as evidenced by the adjusted R2. However, the 
coefficient of net profit being equal to 5.37 comes as a great surprise because this 
figure is significantly lower than the average P/E ratio in the Chinese equity market. 
In fact, the unusually high P/E ratio has been a great concern in the Chinese equity 
market. Gao (2002) reported an average P/E ratio of 44.2 for the Chinese market, far 
higher than average level of (23.4) the world as a whole. Two factors are widely 
believed to be attributable to the P/E ratio being pushed to the sky high level. Firstly, 
stock market bubble exists in the Chinese equity market. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
shares that can be traded on the open market have become the scarce resources in 
China due to the fact that two thirds of the shares are in the hands of the government 
and they are not tradable. The quota system which is used to approve the listing of 
shares on the stock exchanges further limits the number of shares available for 
trading, thus exacerbating the imbalance between the supply and demand. On the 
other hand, demands for tradable shares as a means of investments have roared 
following a series of interest cuts by the People's Bank of China (PBC), the Chinese 
central bank since 1998. The soaring demands combined with the limited number of 
shares available for trading have pushed stock prices to go up despite the 
disappointing earnings reported by the Chinese listed companies. Secondly, putting 
China's equity market in an international perspective, Gao (2002) pointed out that 
the stock market in China is isolated from the international markets. The non- 
convertible Chinese currency, Renminbi, acts as a high wall separating China from 
the rest of the world's markets. Since the capital cannot move freely across the 
border, Chinese investors have no alternatives-they are operating in a closed or 
insulated market. Such encapsulation has resulted in a huge difference between the 
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P/E ratio of Chinese companies listed in domestic and overseas markets. Most of 
companies operating in China but listed elsewhere have normal P/E ratio. For 
example, those for China Mobile, China Unicorn and Legend-all components of the 
Heng Seng Index-range between II and 29. 
The coefficient for net profit (5.37), although highly significant, seems to provide 
little explanation to the sky high P/E ratio in the Chinese equity market. To conduct 
further investigation into the cause of the unusually low coefficient for net profit, 
differential effects of positive net profit and negative net profit reported by the listed 
companies on the market valuation need to be addressed. As evidenced by precious 
discussion, investors in China do heavily rely on net profit, the key indicator of 
corporate profitability, when making investment decisions. Therefore investors in the 
market will beyond any doubt react differently to the positive and negative net profit 
reported by the listed companies. More interestingly, it is found from the sample that 
there are altogether 351 samples that report the negative net profit out of the 3,520 
observations. An interesting question is worth being explored: will the coefficient for 
net profit increase if one controls for the negative net profit. 
5.5.3.2 A further look at net profit: positive vs. negative 
Equation 5.2 was constructed to investigate the effect of negative net profit reported 
by the listed firms on the market valuation. A dummy variable DV was introduced to 
differentiate the positive from negative net profit. Dnpwas defined as 0 when sample 
companies report a positive net profit, otherwise D nP equals 
1. 
The results of regression of market value on net profit with the effect of negative net 
profit being added are presented in Table 5.6. As illustrated by Table 5.6, coefficients 
for both net profit and D nP 
* NP (a, =13.30; a2=-15.20) are both significant at 
a< 0.0 1 level. The significance of variable D MP 
* NP and the sign of a2 being 
negative are particularly interesting since the results strongly suggest that investors in 
Chinese stock market do differentiate between positive and negative net profit when 
valuing the listed companies. When a company reports positive earnings that 
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information is soon incorporated by investors and accordingly market value increases 
to respond to the 'good news'. A reported loss leads to a decrease in the market value 
as evidenced by the sign of a2 being negative. 
Another point worth mention is that the explanatory power of net profits has more 
than doubled from 12.90% to 29.50% as a result of including the dummy variable 
DP into the model. This finding is interesting because the variation of market value 
is much better explained by differentiating the effect of positive earnings from the 
negative earnings. 
What is more exciting about the results lies in the significant increase in coefficient 
for net profits (a, ) from 5.37 in Equation 5.1 to 13.30 in Equation 5.2. Although still 
far lower than the P/E ratio equal to 44.3 reported by Gao (2002), nevertheless, the 
coefficient for net profit has more than doubled as Equation 5.1 is replaced by 
Equation 5.2. It appears that the coefficient for net profit in Equation 5.2 is likely to 
provide a better indication on the P/E ratio than in Equation 5.1. Given the above, 
one can also conjecture that the unusually low coefficient for net profits in Equation 
5.1 might be caused by the effect of negative net profit in the sample. 
As discussed earlier, differentiating positive from negative net profit by introducing a 
dummy variable has brought about multiple benefits for the study. The ability of 
explain market values has been significantly improved. Coefficient for net profits is 
able to provide a better indication of the P/E ratio. The impact of negative earnings 
has been identified. It can be concluded that Equation 5.2 is superior to Equation 5.1 
in explaining the market value. Therefore, this study will include the dummy variable, 
D 
nP , 
into the model throughout this section. 
5.5.3.3 Modifying the modified Ohlson model 
In Equation 5.3, the dummy variable D np 
is included. The coefficients for three 
variables ( a, =10.70; a, =-12.5; a3 =0.69) are all significant at a<0.01 level, 
suggesting positive and negative net profit are consistently playing the opposite roles 
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in explaining the market value as the book value variable is included. The coefficient 
for book value ( a3=0.69), as expected and as tested in the previous section, is 
continuing to be significant in, however, it has dropped from 1.20 in the DAE model 
to 0.69, less than 1, in the Equation 5.3. Moving from Equation 5.2 to Equation 5.3, 
one can find that joint explanatory power increases from 29.50 per cent to 32.30 per 
cent as a result of including the book variable into the model, suggesting the market 
value of listed companies is further better explained by adding the book value 
variable. 
To further investigate the effect of positive and negative net profit on the modified 
OhIson model. The pooled cross-section and yearly data are used to run the 
regressions of market value on positive & negative net profits and book value. The 
results, together with the regression results based on the original model, are 
presented in Table 5.7. 
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Adjusted No. of Data Equation ao a, a' 2 a 3 R2 (%) 
F 
obs. 
Pooled OE 0.84*** 3.33*** 1.20*** 22.9 524.19 3520 (44.69) (13.85) (21.40) 
Data 
ME 0.77*** 10.70*** 
0.69*** -12.50*** 32.30 559.39 3520 
(43.46) (26.53) (11.99) (-22.03) 
OE 0.67*** 0.83** 
0.62*** 9.30 47.53 914 
2001 
(41.07) (2.39) (8.03) 
- 
ME 0.64*** 4.38** 
0.47*** -5.11 11.70 41.39 914 
(38.63) (5.69) (5.78) (-5.14) 
OE 1.56*** 4.01*** 0.30 7.0 28.86 740 
2000 
(32.99) (5.92) (1.83) 
- 
ME 
1.45*** 12.00* ** -0.07 -13.90*** 15.60 46.52 740 
(30.82) (10.71) (-0.42) (-8.72) 
OE 1.17*** 4.13*** 
0.15 11.1 37.91 594 
1999 
(26.47) (7.57) (1.04) 
ME 1.05*** 10.50*** -0.10 -10.50*** 18.60 
- 
46.04 594 
(23.34) (10.48) (-0.74) (-7.44) 
OE 0.90*** 2.99*** 
0.57*** 13.8 40.36 493 
1998 
(16.72) (6.56) (3.75) 
ME 0.67*** 13.00*** 
0.35** -15.10*** 35.30 90.65 493 
(13.45) (14.86) (2.33) (42.82) 
OE 0.89*** 4.12*** 
1.05*** 22.6 53.75 362 
(13 00) (6.75) (5.46) 
1997 . 
ME 
0.58*** 14.80*** 0.82*** -16.90*** 43.60 93.87 362 
(9.02) (13.97) (4.99) (-11.58) 
OE 
0.52*** 3.45*** 2.18*** 56.20 156.32 243 
6 
(4.62) (6.37) (12.30) 
199 
ME 0.47*** 
10.30*** 1.58*** -12.10*** 71.40 202.77 243 
(5.12) (13.82) (10.35) (41.36) 
OE 
0.67*** 1.38*** 0.27s** 13.1 14.05 174 
995 
(14.55) (3.62) (3.04) 
1 
ME 
0.66*** 2.55*** 0.16* -4.32*** 20.20 15.59 174 
1 (14.92) (5.46) (1.85) ( . 02) 1 1 1 
Original equation: MV j, /MV j(, -, ) ao + a, 
NP j, /MV j(, _, ) + a, 
BV jt /MV j(, _, ) +C 
Modified equation: MV j, /MV j(t-, ) ao + a, NP j, /MV j(t-, ) + a2 BV J, /MV j(1-1) + a3 D np NP jt 
/MV j(t-, ) +C 
Notes: 
MVJ, -Market value of the equity for firinj at the end of fiscal year t; 
MV 
J . (t-, ) : 
Market value of the equity for firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
NP Reported net profit for firm j for fiscal year t; 
BV Reported book value for firm j for fiscal year t; 
All variables are scaled by opening market values. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; * statistical significance at 0.10 level; so statistical 
significance at 0.05 level; so * statistical significance at 0.0 1 level; 
Table 5.7 Regression of market value on net profits and book value for pooled 
and yearly sample: on original and modified models 
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To facilitate the comparison, regression results based on both the original and 
modified models are shown together. As can be seen from Table 5.7, the coefficients 
for net profit variable have increased considerably across all years being studied as 
the dummy variable is introduced in the model. In most years (except for 1995 and 
2001), a, goes up from less than 5 in the original model to more than 10 in the 
modified model. In 1995 a, increased from 1.38 to 2.55; and in 2001 a, from 0.83 
to 4.38. This suggests that ability of net profit to explain market values has improved 
significantly during the period studied. Book value remains insignificant for 1999 
and 2000 despite the modification of the model, providing strengthening evidence 
that Chinese equity market was radically affected by the 'shock' caused by the 
government's policies requiring listed companies to recognise impairment losses in 
1998 and 2000. The effect of the 'shock' can also be seen from Figure 5.2. As 
illustrated by Figure 5.2, the joint explanatory power of net profits and book value 
has been considerably boosted following the introduction of the dummy variable, 
D, 
p . 
However, the overall trend remains unchanged. In particular the decline in the 
adj usted 1ý 2 in 1999 and 2000 observed in both models has provided further evidence 
to explain the market 'shock' following the government's policies. 
Changes in the joint explanatory powerof net profits 
and book values based on different models 
140 
120 
0 
100 Results from the 
0 80 modified model 
60 0 Results from the! 
40 original model (D 
20 
0 0 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Year 
Figure 5.2 Changes in the joint explanatory power of net profits and book 
values based on different models 
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5.5.3.4 Abnormal earnings and opening book value 
The purpose of establishing Equation 5.4 is to investigate the effect of abnormal 
earnings. As discussed previously, the DAE model establishes a linkage between 
market value and abnormal earnings & book value by expressing the book value in a 
linear relationship with abnormal earnings and book value. Abnormal earnings are 
defined as the difference between net earnings and cost of equity capital. 
Theoretically, abnormal earnings shall be superior to net profits in estimating the 
regression model. However a practical problem arises when using abnormal earnings 
for estimating the DAE model because the cost of equity capital is not directly 
observable. Although cost of equity capital could be estimated by using the CAPM 
model, the relatively short history of Chinese equity market makes it impossible to 
make a reliable estimation offl and market risk premium (Quiry et al., 2005). To 
solve this problem, the DAE model has been modified and the net profit variable has 
been used to proxy for the abnormal earnings. As evidenced by the regression results 
in Table 5.4,5.5,5.6 and 5.7, the net profit variable is found to play a significant role 
in explaining the market value in the Chinese equity market. 
Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to further examine the effect of abnormal earnings 
by selecting some other proxies. In Equation 5.4, the opening book value, BV At-1) , 
has been chosen to act as a proxy for abnormal earnings. Recall that in the DEA 
model, abnormal earnings are expressed as follows: 
AE j, = NP j, -r. * BV j(t-, ) 
Where: AE 
J, = 
Abnormal earnings for company j at the end of year t; 
NP j, = Net income for company j at the end of year t; 
r, = Average rate of cost of equity capital; 
BV Book value of equity for company j at the beginning of year t. 
Extending Equation 5.3 to reflect abnormal earnings requires the investigation of the 
following relationship: 
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MVjt = a,, + a, NP,, + a2BVj, +a3Dp *NPj, +a4 (NP j, -r. * BV J(, -, )) 
+a 
Reorganising the above expression yields to the follow equation: 
MVjt = a,, +(a, +a4)NP,, + a2BV,, +a3 D np *NPi, -a4 r, * BV j((-, ) +a 
The above equation provides a theoretical justification that opening book value 
variable, BV j(, _, ) , 
is the suitable proxy for abnormal earnings in explaining market 
values of listed firms. Stark and Thomas (1998) generated a similar equation and 
pointed out that opening book values can be interpreted as the accounting value 
placed on assets which generates the income stream. Note that Equation 5.4 does not 
explicitly include an abnormal earning term. Rather, it includes opening book value 
as a separate term to capture the capital charge element of abnormal earnings with a 
coefficient that is freely estimated. As a consequence, I would expect: 
a4 < 
if abnormal earnings is to be considered helpful in explaining market value. - 
The results of regression of market value on positive and negative net profits, closing 
book value and opening closing book value are presented in Table 5.6. Coefficients 
for the three variables used in Equation 5.3 (a, = 9.77; Ct 2 -12.70; a3 ý-ý 1.55) are 
all significant at a<0.01 level in Equation 5.4, suggesting the roles that these 
accounting variables are playing in explaining market value in Equation 5.4 remain 
unchanged. In addition, the coefficient (aO for the added variable, opening book 
value, is -0.97 and highly significant (at a<0.01 level). The sign of the coefficient 
showing negative provides empirical evidence to support my conjecture that opening 
book value in Equation 5.4 is to capture the capital charge element of abnormal 
earnings. This finding is consistent with that of Stark and Thomas (1998), who 
document the significantly negative coefficient for opening book value in the similar 
model for the U. K. market. Furthermore, as found in Table 5.6, adjusted R2, the 
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joint explanatory power of independent variables has achieved a slight increase from 
32.30 per cent to 33.10 per cent with an opening book value variable being 
introduced into the model. Again, it can be concluded that adding an opening book 
value term which attempts to capture the capital charge element of abnormal 
earnings results in a further improvement of the model's ability to explain market 
value. 
5.5.3.5 Dividends: good or bad news? 
To examine the impact of dividends, Equation 5.4 was further extended by adding 
one more variable: dividends. Equation 5.5 specifies the equation. As mentioned 
earlier, finance theory has long accepted that the equity value is the present value of 
future dividends (Palepu et al., 2004). In addition, in developed markets, dividends 
are frequently conceived to be able to provide more reliable indication of a 
company's profitability, long-term future growth and financial health than net profits 
and book value (Emery et al., 2004). However, the Chinese emerging equity market 
differs considerably from the developed markets in that listed companies in China 
seldom pay off dividends to their investors. Among 3,520 observations in this study, 
1,777 observations show the dividends as 0, suggesting that more than half of the 
listed companies never pay off dividends to shareholders at all during the period 
from 1995 to 2001. As a matter of fact, Chinese listed companies have seemingly 
justifiable reasons not to pay off dividends. Firstly, there is no legislative 
requirement that listed companies pay off dividends to investors. Whether or not to 
pay off dividends is largely at the discretion of the management of listed companies. 
Secondly, it is not uncommon for many profitable companies choose not to pay off 
cash dividends because they are at early stage of development. Cash flow generated 
by the company is frequently re-invested to the operation to fulfil greater ambitions. 
Thirdly, it is widely conceived that investors in the Chinese equity market do not 
place heavy weight on dividends paid by the listed companies. For the vast majority 
of individual investors in China, the purpose of investment in the stock market is to 
seek for short-term speculative opportunities, rather than long-term returns (Gao, 
2002). Therefore capital gains generated from investing activities have dominated 
dividends, the indicator of long-term returns, in the Chinese equity market. 
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The results of regression of market value with the added dividends variable are 
presented in Table 5.6. As can be seen from Table 5.6, coefficients for variables such 
as positive and negative net profits, opening and closing book value (a, = 12.00; a2 
=-14.70; a3=1.44; a4=480) are all consistently significant at a <0.01 level and the 
signs of the coefficients remain unchanged, indicating that theoretical robustness of 
Equation 5.5 in terms of linking market value and accounting information is not 
affected by adding the dividends variable into the model. 
Another finding out of these results is that the dividends variable is statistically 
significant at a <0.01 level, which suggests that dividends are not completely 
ignored by the investors in the Chinese equity market. Contrary to the above- 
mentioned belief that investors in China place little weight on dividends when 
valuing listed companies, the market as a whole does pay close attention to the 
dividends paid by the listed companies to investors. However, the sign of the 
coefficient for dividends variable being negative (a, = - 11.27) comes as a great 
surprise. If this is the case, obviously, the Chinese equity market does not see listed 
companies paying off dividends as good news. Rather, paying dividends frequently 
results in considerable decline in the market value of listed companies. It appears that 
this finding has provided empirical justification that Chinese listed companies do not 
pay off dividends at the early stage of development. Cash is playing a critical role in 
the development of a company and is the scarcest resource in the emerging capital 
market such as China in which companies crave for capital to achieve a long-term 
development (Delios and Wu, 2005). Investors in China would prefer listed 
companies to retain the cash for future development to boost the long-term 
performance. Interestingly, this logical finding seems to disprove the widely-spread 
perception that Chinese individual investors usually seek for the short-term 
speculative opportunities and do not account for long-term performance when 
making investment decisions. 
Furthermore, it is found that there is an increase in the joint explanatory power from 
33-10 per cent to 35.40 per cent as the dividends variable is included. Although the 
increase in adjusted R' is slight, this result is providing statistical evidence that the 
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model's ability to explain market values has been further boosted as a result of 
dividends being considered in market valuation. 
5.5.3.6 A further look at dividends 
As discussed earlier, more than half of, 1,777 out of 3,520, the sample companies do 
not pay off dividends to their investors. The question of whether there is significant 
difference in terms of market value between companies paying off dividends and 
companies paying nothing is therefore worth being explored. A dummy variable, 
Dd, is created. Ddj, is defined as 0 where sample companies paying off dividends, 
and otherwise Ddiv equals 1. Equation 5.6 is then constructed to include the dummy 
variable Dd,, in an attempt to further investigate the effect of dividends on the 
market value in the Chinese equity market. 
Regression results of Equation 5.6 are presented Table 5.6. As shown by the t 
statistics, all independent variables including the dummy variable, Ddi,, are highly 
significant at 6<0 level. The signs of coefficients used in previous models remain 
unchanged. What is more, the adjusted R' , has seen a slight increase from 3 5.40 per 
cent to 35.90 per cent. Again, it can be concluded that Equation 5.6 keeps the 
theoretical consistency with the previous models and is better able to explain the 
market value by including the dummy variable, Dd, into the model. 
Note that the coefficient of dummy variable, Dd,,, 2 is significant and equals 0.12, 
greater than 0. This result is interesting because it suggests that companies which do 
not pay off dividends are systematically better valued than firms paying off cash to 
investors in the Chinese equity market. Given the previous discussion on Equation 
5.5, this finding can be understood to provide strengthening evidence to support the 
claim that Chinese investors tend not to see listed companies paying off cash 
dividends as 'good news'. On the contrary, paying off dividends destroys the market 
value of listed companies as evidenced by the finds from both Equation 5.5 and 5.6. 
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In summary, this section applies a number of accounting variables which are 
theoretically relevant to market valuation into the modified OhIson model in the 
unique context of Chinese equity market. Putting the regression results of 6 equations 
together, a few basic conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, all the accounting variables 
tested across all the models are found to be significantly different from zero. It can 
be suggested that accounting information reported by the Chinese listed firms 
including positive net profits, negative net profits, closing book value, opening book 
value, dividends etc together are playing significant roles in explaining the market 
value. Positive net profit and closing book value are found to be positively related 
with the market value. Negative net profit reported by the listed companies lead to a 
considerable decrease in the market value because investors see negative net profit as 
an indication of poor performance. Opening book values are proven to be negatively 
related to market values in that they represent the capital charge element of the 
abnormal earnings. Paying dividends in the Chinese equity market results in the 
destruction of market value since cash is expected to be retained by the companies 
and be invested for the future investment. Based on the above, it can be concluded 
that although the Chinese equity market is an emerging market and China is 
developing its share-holding and share-trading systems in a way that differs hugely 
from the rest of the world (Tian, 2001), the finance theory in ternis of market 
valuation established in the developed market still holds firmly in the Chinese market. 
Secondly, as can be seen from the increase in the adjusted R' with more variables 
being added into the model, the joint explanatory power of variables witnesses a 
consistent and dramatic increase from 12.9% in Equation 5.1 to 35.9 per cent in 
Equation 5.6. This shows that the models' ability to explain market values of listed 
companies is substantially improved as more accounting information is taken into 
consideration. 
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Chapter 6. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND MARKET 
VALUATION 
6.1 Introduction 
An interesting feature of Chinese listed companies is that nearly all firms are 
transformed from state enterprises. To be a listed company, a SOE must first be 
restructured to a stock company by selling shares to its own employees and other 
SOEs etc. at a price around the book value of equity. After the stock company is 
formed and the listing criteria are satisfied, it can apply for the approval of listing 
from the CSRC and the stock exchanges. Upon the approval, the firm usually sells 
about one third of ownership to the general public at the time of IPO. The shares of 
listed firms are split into non-tradable shares, namely state shares and legal-person 
shares, and the tradable shares, namely the A-shares, B-shares and H-shares etc. 
Therefore, a typical listed company has a mixed ownership structure. It is noted that 
all types of shares of a listed company have the same voting rights and cash-flow 
rights, which means that one share is entitled to one vote. There is no cross-listing 
between the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Xu and 
Wang, 1999). Table 6.1 presents an overview of the percentage of the total shares in 
each of the different share classes from 1993 to 2001. 
Ownership identity 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
State 45.25 43.67 37.20 34.03 31.03 33.70 35.85 38.97 33.27 
Legal Person 26.87 22.04 28.34 30.96 32.93 30.73 28.27 24.54 25.26 
Employee 2.22 0.99 0.35 1.15 2.01 2.01 1.19 0.64 0.83 
A-share 14.59 21.18 20.36 21.06 22.44 23.67 26.13 28.55 
1 
32.84 
B-share 5.88 6.11 6.40 6.20 5.95 5.22 4.56 4.01 3.29 
Other Shares 5.10 6.01 7.36 6.61 5.65 4.67 4.00 3.29 4.51 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Data arefrom the website of the China Securities Regulatory Commission: www. csrc. org. cn 
Table 6.1 Ownership structure of Chinese listed firms (1993-2001) 
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As mentioned in the previous section, state shares reflect the interests of the state in 
the company, normally represented by the government body, the State Property 
Management Bureau (SPMB). Central and local governments have the right to 
appoint government officials as an agent to exercise ownership rights on the state- 
controlled firms. For most listed companies, the state is the largest shareholder. As 
Table 6.1 indicates, state ownership has always been the dominant factor, accounting 
for 37 per cent of the interests of the listed company in 2001 despite the overall 
declining trend in the period between 1993 and 200 1. 
Legal person shareholders emerged as a form of ownership when the government 
established the domestic stock markets in 1990. As part of its economic reform plans, 
the central government aimed to reduce government intervention in state-owned 
enterprises and to encourage profit-seeking incentives and competition, thus 
enhancing the efficiency and profitability of SOEs (Delios and Wu, 2005). In 
practice, legal persons refer to domestic institutions including stock companies, non- 
bank financial institutions and other companies etc. They bear a certain level of 
resemblance to the institutional shareholders in the U. S. and the U. K. market in 
monitoring the performance of listed companies. However, their roles are 
substantially limited in that legal-person shares are not open for public trading. 
Transferring shares among legal persons is allowed, however it must be subject to 
the approval of the government and transfer price is usually unknown to the public. 
From Table 6.1, one can see that legal persons own on average 27 per cent of the 
interests of the listed firms through 1993 to 2001 with a range between 22.04 per 
cent and 32.93 per cent. 
A-shares are owned and traded by Chinese domestic individual residents or 
institutions, but are not allowed to be owned by foreign investors. A-shares are the 
only type of tradable shares that can be publicly traded among domestic investors on 
stock exchanges. Usually, the market price of a listed company refers to the price of 
A-shares. Table 6.1 shows that A-shares account for some 23 per cent of all the firm 
shares. In addition, the percentage of A-shares has been on the continual rise from 
14.59 per cent in 1993 to 32.84 per cent in 2001. It is worth noting that A-shares 
have overtaken legal-person shares from 2000. 
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B-shares were initially available exclusively to foreign investors and some authorised 
domestic securities firms. From 2001 onwards, domestic individuals have been 
allowed to invest in the B-share market. The B-shares market is separated from the 
A-share market in that investors can only use foreign currencies to invest in B-shares 
(US dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong dollars on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange). Foreign shares are the shares that are issued on overseas 
stock markets such as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H-share) and the New York 
Stock Exchange (N-share). These shares, together with the employee shares, 
typically make up around 12% of the total outstanding equity. 
Ownership structure has been found to be significantly associated with firm value. 
Prior research in China and elsewhere indicates that the ownership structure, among 
the other factors related to corporate governance, has a significant impact on firm 
performance. Using pooled firm-level data from 1993 to 1995, Xu and Wang (1999) 
investigated whether ownership structure significantly affects the performance of 
publicly listed companies within the framework of Chinese corporate governance. 
They found that the firm's profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of 
legal-person shares, but it is either negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the 
fractions of state shares and tradable A-shares held mostly by individuals. Focusing 
upon the government shareholding, Tian (2001) documented the large equity 
holdings of the government and found that corporate value decreases with an 
increased size of government shareholding when the government is a small 
shareholder. When the government shareholding is sufficiently large, corporate value 
goes up with the increased government shareholding. 
Table 6.1 suggests that the state, legal persons and domestic individuals are the three 
largest groups of shareholders. Each of the three ownership identities averages a 
holding of 30 per cent of the total outstanding shares. Such unique ownership 
structure of Chinese listed companies provides an excellent laboratory for 
investigating the impact of ownership by type of shareholder on firm performance. In 
particular, with non-tradable shares accounting for nearly two thirds of the whole 
market, state shares and legal-person shares have attracted a great deal of interest 
around the world. Therefore examining how the Chinese market interprets the roles 
of these types of shareholdings is the focal point in this chapter. 
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This remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
arguments in the existing literature surrounding the effects of ownership structure on 
the firm value. Section 3 introduces the methodology taken in this chapter. Empirical 
results will be presented and findings will be discussed in detail in Section 4. 
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6.2 Arguments Surrounding the Relationship between Ownership Structure 
and Market Value 
6.2.1 State ownership and market value 
The Chinese government carried out the experiment of share-holding system in a 
belief that creating different types of owners in a company could help establish an 
enterprise system with diversified ownership structure and clear-cut property rights, 
thus putting the much-needed corporate governance in place and ultimately 
improving the efficiency. When an SOE is transformed to a listed company, part of 
the ownership and control of public assets are also shifted to the hands of 
institutional and private investors. From the sole owner of the SOEs to one of the 
multiple owners of the share-based companies, from both owning and operating the 
SOEs to controlling and influencing the shareholding companies, the government 
appears to have changed its role. As far as the experiment is concerned, it seems that 
the government has prescribed a right remedy to the long-standing problem facing 
the SOEs-a lack of a clear-cut property rights. However, it is not clear how exactly 
the changes in government ownership and role affect firm performance. The existing 
literature on the relationship between state ownership and firm performance can be 
broadly broken into two schools of thoughts. While some argue that state ownership 
is the underlying cause of all sorts of problems facing the listed firms, some other 
assert that state shareholding is not always bad (Sun et al., 2002, Xu and Wang, 1999, 
Megginson et al., 1994, Megginson and Netter, 2001, Chen and Wang, 2004, Bai et 
al., 2004, Tian, 2001). On the whole, these arguments seem to suggest that the 
government shareholding has a complicated impact on investors' perceptions of firm 
value. 
On one hand, some economists argue that, in a competitive market without 
significant externalities, government ownership is inferior to private ownership (Sun 
et al., 2002). Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994), among others, 
provided the empirical evidence for the proposition that government ownership is 
less efficient than private ownership. Furthermore, Megginson and Netter (2001) 
pointed out that privatisation results in improved performance. In particular, the 
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dominance of state shares in the Chinese listed companies has been widely criticised 
for the excessive intervention of government, lack of liquidity, and the continuation 
of bureaucratic management style (Chen and Wang, 2004, Wang and Jiang, 2004, 
Bai et al., 2004). In the context of Chinese listed companies, as discussed in Chapter 
2, the core problem with the existence of state share lies in that the corporate 
governance cannot function efficiently within the listed firms. Although nearly all 
listed companies have established a whole set of corporate governance mechanism 
copying their Western counterparts in the industrial countries, they frequently 
encounter great difficulties when implementing these rules (GTA, 2002). The 
primary reason for this is that, with the bulk of shares in the hands of the state, 
management cannot be substantially separated from ownership and the government 
still enjoys direct and/or indirect control over the board to influence corporate 
policies. 
Ironically, this is contrary to the ultimate objective of the government's SOE reform 
scheme aiming at liberalising management from the intervention of government. 
Tian (2001) argued that the newly-established publicly listed companies continue to 
be more bureaucratically than commercially-oriented even after transformation. As a 
consequence, poor governance practice is still rampant among the Chinese listed 
companies. For instance, in 2001, the largest shareholder of Meierya, which had been 
a profitable company, colluded with other related parties and embezzled RMB 368.8 
million or 41 per cent of the company's total equity. In the same year, the largest 
shareholder of Sanjiu Pharmacy extracted RMB 2.5 billion or 96 per cent of the 
company's total equity (Bai et al., 2004). The underlying cause of the above- 
mentioned problems is the lack of effective corporate governance. 
Another fatal flaw of state ownership in the listed companies is political interference 
(Tian, 2001). Based on the voting rights from the majority holding shares, the 
government enjoys and exerts direct control over the corporate management. In some 
listed companies, with the state being the dominant shareholder, even directors and 
board members are appointed by the goverriment. However, the profit-seeking 
objective of the company does not always coincide with the fast-changing political 
needs of the government. When political objectives conflict with corporate goals, the 
government always pursues its political interests by forcing management to 
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compromise. And this usually comes at the expense of corporate profitability. For 
example, it is well known that the long-standing problem of inefficiency of state- 
owned companies can be attributed to severe overstaffing in the state firms. However, 
the Chinese government frequently finds itself in a dilemma in seeking for a solution 
to the problem: to improve the efficiency of the state-owned companies, tens of 
millions of workers need to be laid off-, on the other hand, sky-high unemployment 
level will undoubtedly give rise to social unrest. In a country where stability 
overrides everything, to improve the efficiency of state-owned companies simply by 
making employee redundant will have to give way to the political challenge-to 
keep the social stability 35 . 
On the other hand, state ownership may not necessarily be bad because the 
companies with substantial state shares could also enjoy a series of benefits that are 
likely to increase corporate value. Firstly, the government may provide the state- 
controlled firms with a wide range of preferential treatments (Wang, 2005). In China, 
the benefit of getting the political support from the government is extremely 
important. Backed up by the government, firms with a substantial proportion of state 
shares are frequently seen as an advantage in obtaining bank loans, establishing 
credibility in the general public, and providing better protection to shareholders' 
value, etc. Furthermore, the fact that government is holding a majority of shares 
could also send a strong signal to the market that the company is in a state- 
monopolised industry, i. e. utility, petroleum and telecommunication industries. 
Companies in these industries always enjoy extraordinary profits largely thanks to 
the protection of the government policies. Even more importantly, the Chinese 
government has put forth a series of policies to revitalise the companies with 
substantial state share (Sun et al. 2002). These include reducing the tax burden, 
injecting capital to repay part of the debt, and debt-for-equity swap measure. 
According to Sun et al. (2002), one successful example is the RMB 30 billion debt- 
35 The issue of providing unemployment benefits to laid-off workers has always been the biggest 
headache for the government to push ahead the SOE reform. In developed countries such as the U. K., 
laid-off workers can seek for benefits from the government. However, anecdotal evidence in China 
suggests that a great number of workers are laid off without receiving any benefits at all. To minimise 
the impact of unemployment on the society, the province-based security funds have been set up by the 
provincial governments. However, severe under-funding has always been a problem. 
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for-equity swap of thirteen large petrochemical SOEs. Their average debt ratio was 
brought down from 76.25 per cent to 47.90 per cent and many of them turried from 
making losses to gains after the swap. 
Secondly, government can also help monitor the management of listed companies. 
Agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) arise from the disparity in objectives 
between shareholders and managers. Monitoring management is one way to reduce 
such an agency conflict. In developing economies such as China where the 
development of markets is at its infancy, the legal system to protect shareholders is 
under construction, and information asymmetry is severe, monitoring management is 
particularly important (Sun et al., 2002). Especially, in the listed companies with a 
majority of state shareholding and vastly dispersed individual shareholders, the 
government is a powerful force to take up the monitoring role in the listed companies. 
In fact, the government has created a set of mechanisms to monitor the behaviour of 
management. A governmental body, the Bureau of State Property Management 
(BSPM), was established at the central and local levels to fulfil the commitment to 
preserving and increasing the value of state assets in the listed companies. Although 
the effectiveness of the BSPM is criticised by some researchers such as Xu and 
Wang (1999), the BSPM has more or less filled in a vacuum in monitoring the 
management. 
Although it is hard for the above arguments to lead to one simple conclusion, the 
existence of various propositions suggests that government ownership has 
complicated impacts on the market value of listed companies in China. The great 
difficulty in establishing effective corporate governance and conflicting interests 
between the government and management frequently pose a serious threat to the 
corporate performance, leading researchers to argue that the excessive state 
shareholding is destroying the value of listed companies. Tian (2001) documents that 
corporate value decreases with an increased size of government shareholding when 
the government is a smaller shareholder. Hovey et al. (2003) document a negative 
relationship between firm value and state ownership. Bai et al (2005) finds that the 
largest shareholder being the government has negative effects on the firms' market 
value. However, the monitoring and policy effects provided by the government 
shareholding may also to some extent offset the problems produced by the 
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government ownership, and even boost the performance of listed companies. 
Contrary to other researchers, Sun et al (2002) find that government ownership is 
actually positively related to firm performance and this positive relationship holds for 
firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange as well as those on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. It holds no matter whether government ownership is represented by state 
share ownership or by legal person share ownership. Such mixed results may simply 
reflect the complexity of the issue. Therefore the exact relationship between state 
ownership and corporate value is an empirical issue. 
6.2.2 Legal-person ownership and market value 
The legal-person identity was created by the policy makers to aid the transition from 
SOEs to share-based firms. The legal person shareholder category is a mix of various 
domestic institutions. As discussed previously, it comprises private companies, state- 
owned enterprises and non-bank financial institutions such as investment funds and 
security companies (Xu and Wang, 1997). Legal-person ownership is a unique type 
of ownership in China and is of particular interest in that it combines the merits of 
both institutional investor shareholding in the industrial countries and state 
shareholding characterised in China. 
Legal-person shareholders in China are somehow acting like the institutional 
investors in the U. S. and the U. K. markets. Compared with domestic individual 
investors, legal persons are better equipped with the power, experience, and expertise 
to monitor the firm's performance (Tan, 2002). In addition, legal-person shareholders 
frequently have access to corporate inside information, and the right to question chief 
officers at any time about the operations of the firm. In comparison with government, 
a legal-person shareholder does not have to consider the same political objectives 
that are important considerations faced by state shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000). 
Consequently, legal person shareholders in China are more economically oriented 
and geared towards profit-seeking. They also have relatively more freedom than state 
shareholders in deciding how to allocate profits, and in formulating and 
implementing firm strategy. 
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However the state-shareholding nature of legal-person ownership deserves the same 
level of attention. Although legal persons are a mixture of financial institutions, other 
forms of companies and even private individuals, in practice most of them are largely 
owned and/or controlled by the government. Delios and Wu (2005) further classify 
the legal person as state-related legal persons and non-state-related legal persons. 
They found that the average concentration of state-related legal-person ownership 
was 27 per cent of all ownership through 1991 to 2001, while non-state-related legal- 
person owners accounted for 4.5% of all ownership in the same period. More 
importantly, legal-person ownership suffers the same illiquidity problem as state 
ownership-both legal-person shares and state shares are not tradable on the open 
market. Under the existing regulations, legal-person shares are not permitted to trade 
on the market but transfer of legal-person shares among legal persons is allowed 
upon the approval of the CSRC. Because of the illiquidity problem shared by both 
state shares and legal-person shares, it is not surprising to see some researchers such 
as Sun et al. (2002) even put state shares and legal-person shares into the same 
category-goverriment shareholding. 
Similar to the arguments on state shareholding, lcgal-person ownership also have 
complex impacts on the firm value. Firstly, legal-person shareholders play an active 
role in monitoring the management, thus aligning the interests between the principal- 
(shareholders) and agents (management). In developing countries as China with 
weak protection of shareholders and severe information asymmetry, agency 
problems resulting from the separation of ownership and management are likely to 
be more serious than in industrial countries. The monitoring role is therefore 
extremely important. Sun et al. (2002) argue that legal-person shareholders in China 
are not only better motivated, but also equipped with power, to control and monitor 
the management. Unlike individual investors who have no control of the 
management, legal-person shareholders may ensure managers to work in the interests 
of shareholders through direct control. Compared with state shareholders, legal 
person shareholders' role in monitoring the management appears to be more effective 
and less politically-driven. The government exerts its control over the management 
though the BSMP, however, the BSMP's role in monitoring the management is 
severely restricted in that the representatives of the BSMP are government officials 
who have little know-how and incentive to effectively monitor the operation of 
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management (Xu and Wang 1999). By contrast, legal-person shareholders are more 
likely to better monitor the firm's management. Besides, legal-person shareholders 
are largely profit-seeking entities whose interests are closely associated with the 
performance of the company in which they have interest. 
Furthermore, the legal-person shareholder's role in monitoring management appears 
to be even more important in the context of China where there is no effective 
external control mechanism due to the lack of an active takeover market (Xu and 
Wang 1999). An active takeover market plays an essential role in disciplining the 
management simply because the firm with poor performance is likely to become the 
target of takeover and managers then face great risks losing their jobs. However, the 
active takeover market virtually does not exist in China because nearly two-thirds of 
listed companies' shares are controlled by the government and legal persons, and 
these shares are not tradable on the open market. Mergers and acquisitions have 
frequently taken place in China since the early 1990s. However, most of these 
activities are directly or indirectly operated by the government (Zhang and Jiang, 
2002). The lack of an active takeover market gives the China's managers substantial 
discretionary power to use the firm's resources for personal gains at the expense of 
shareholders. 
Although legal-person ownership can encourage better monitoring, when the 
concentration of legal-person shareholding reaches a certain high level, it is likely 
that legal-person shareholders are exposed to the lure to expropriate minority 
shareholders. A second type of agency problem (principal-principal problem) can 
arise between large shareholders (legal persons) and minority shareholders 
(Claesssens et al., 2000). Academic studies have provided empirical evidence for the 
large shareholders' expropriation hypothesis in both industrialised and emerging 
markets. La Porta et al. (1999) show that greatest source of agency problem stems 
from controlling shareholders expropriating value from non-controlling shareholders. 
In East Asian countries, Claessens et al. (2002) find that expropriation of minority 
shareholders is a rule rather than an exception. Delios and Wu (2005) argue that this 
exposure is particularly relevant in the context of China as'there are weak corporate 
governance regulations and an under-developed institutional environment. Anecdotal 
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evidence suggests that large shareholders expropriating minority shareholders is a 
fairly common phenomenon in the Chinese equity market. 
Based upon the above, one can see that the existence of legal-person ownership has 
complicated impacts on corporate value. On one hand, legal-person shareholders are 
likely to help increase the value of the company simple because legal persons play a 
crucial role in monitoring the management and limiting the manager's managerial 
discretion, hence solving or at least mitigating the type I agency problem (principal- 
agent problem) between shareholders and management. In China this role is 
irreplaceable at present in that no other investors can possibly do a better job than 
legal persons. Investors may see the existence of legal-person ownership as a value- 
adding factor and thus pay a premium for the firms with substantial legal-person 
ownership. On the other hand, when the concentration of legal-person ownership 
reaches a certain level, the type 11 agency problem (principal-principal problem) 
arises (La Porta et al., 1999). Legal persons may create conflicts of interests within 
the firm and collude with managers to benefit themselves at the expense of other 
shareholders, hence destroying the firm value. Therefore, the exact relationship 
between legal-person ownership and market value of the listed companies is an 
empirical issue. 
The dual characteristics of legal-person shareholding in the Chinese listed companies 
and its impact on corporate performance have drawn a great deal of interest in the 
fields of corporate governance and market valuation. Consequently there is a large 
volume of literature examining the effects of legal-person shareholding on corporate 
value. Xu and Wang (1999), Sun et al. (2002), Bai (2003) Delios and Wu (2005), and 
Wang (2005) have carried extensive research on the legal-person shareholders and 
how they affect the corporate performance. Xu and Wang (1999) find that firm's 
profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of legal-person shares. Sun et al. 
(2002) obtain the similar finding and document the legal persons, along with state 
shareholders, has a positive and significant impact on firm's performance. Hovey et 
al (2003) find that the concentration of legal-person shareholding is positively 
correlated with firm's profitability. By examining changes in the operating 
performance of Chinese listed companies around their public offerings, Wang (2005) 
documents a curvilinear relation between legal-person ownership and performance 
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changes. His finding seems to suggest that performance of the firm with low and 
high levels of legal-person ownership is positively associated with the legal-person 
shareholding, while firms with an intermediate legal-person ownership experience a 
negative relationship between ownership and performance changes. Delios and Wu 
(2005) provide the evidence for a U-shaped relationship between legal-person 
shareholding and firm performance. Their finding seems to suggest that legal persons 
have a positive monitoring effect on the firm's management, but only at high levels 
of legal-person ownership. In summary, although the above studies adopt different 
methodologies and produce various conclusions as to the relationship between legal- 
person ownership and firm performance, there is one thing in common: they all find 
that legal-person ownership has significant impacts on the performance of the firm. 
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6.3 Models Development and Methodology 
This section continues to explore the issue of market valuation in the context of 
Chinese listed companies. Rather than focusing on the impact of accounting figures 
such as net profit, book value, and dividends, etc. which have been investigated in 
Chapter 5, the emphasis of this chapter is placed on discovering the effect of non- 
accounting issues such as the ownership structure and ownership concentration. As 
discussed previously, various categories of shares were created by the policy-makers 
to aid the transformation from SOEs to share-based companies (Hovey et al., 2003). 
The non-tradable nature of state and legal-person shares could provide an assurance 
for the government to exert effective control over the listed companies. However, the 
effects of these types of shares on the market value remain unclear, or at least 
inconclusive, among the existing studies. 
To study the relationship between market value and ownership structure of listed 
companies in China, a basic model is constructed as follows: 
MVil = ao + a, BV,, + a2NP,, + a3p,, +6 
Whereby: 
MV Market value of firm i at the end of accounting year t; 
BV Book value of firm i at the end of accounting year t; 
NP ft: Net profit for firm i at the end of accounting year t; 
PI: Proportion of different types of shares in firm i at the end of accounting 
year t; 
Before testing the above model, two important methodology issues are worth 
discussing. Firstly, most existing studies examining the impact of ownership of listed 
firms in China establish the basic model as follows (Xu and Wang, 1999, Sun et at., 
2002, Hovey et al., 2003, Bai et al., 2004, Delios and Wu, 2005): 
Pil =a+ aP,, + a2GR,, + a3GEARi, + a4SALES,, + ev 
- 196 - 
Whereby: 
P t: Performance of 
firm i at the end of accounting year t; 
P 
It: 
Proportion of different types of shares in firm i at the end of accounting year 
t; 
GR,,: Growth rate of firm i at the end of accounting year t; 
GEAR,,: Gearing Ratio for firm i at the end of accounting year t; 
SALES ,: Sales of 
firm i at the end of accounting year t. 
Different studies use the above model in slightly different ways, but the spirit is the 
same. In general, these studies choose Tobin's Q and market-to-book value ratios as 
the proxy for the company performance and use sales growth rate, gearing ratios and 
sales as the control variables to control the effects of company growth, gearing and 
firm size. However, I did not take the conventional method for two reasons. First, the 
objective of this section is to examine the relationship between the market value of 
firms and ownership structure. Tobin's Q and market-to-book value ratio are 
commonly used to measure the firm performance; however, these measures are 
highly related to accounting issues since the calculation of these measures 
significantly involves accounting figures such as book value of assets etc. Therefore 
these measures are actually the combination of market and accounting figures and 
they are prone to the biases stemming from the accounting issues. For this reason 
they might not be the appropriate proxy for the market value of the firms. By contrast, 
market capitalisation is directly obtained from the market and is not subject to the 
changes resulting from accounting polices. Therefore using market capitalisation to 
proxy market value appears to be more objective36. Second, a theoretical connection 
between the work in this chapter and that in chapter 5 has been established by using 
Model 6.1. In previous sections, accounting information such as net profit, book 
36 It can also be argued that market valuation models, e. g. the modified OhIson model, are based on 
the linkage between market information and accounting information. The accounting information such 
as book value and net profit is somehow subject to managerial judgement and can not be absolutely 
objective. Therefore, the objectivity of variables discussed here may not pose a serious problem to the 
study. 
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value of equity, dividends, abnormal earnings etc has been found to be statistically 
significant in explaining the market value of the listed firms. This chapter focuses on 
the effect of ownership structure on market valuation by looking into issues beyond 
accounting information based upon the results obtained from previous work. It can 
be seen that Model 6.1 is constructed by adding an extra variable, P j, , into the 
modified Ohlson model, the foundation model of this study. With both accounting 
(net profits and book value) and corporate governance information (proportion of 
shares held by different types of shareholders) being put in the same model, BV , and 
NP t are treated as the control variables and P ft 
is added to examine the effects of 
different types of shareholding on market value. 
Secondly, as discussed in the existing literature, the impact of different types of 
shareholding on market valuation is complex (Xu and Wang, 1999, Sun et at., 2002, 
Hovey et al., 2003, Bai et al., 2004, Delios and Wu, 2005). The complexity is mainly 
reflected on the existence of non-linear relationship between various types of 
ownership and market performance. Sun et al (2002) document the relationship 
between government ownership and firm performance in China follows an inverted 
U-shape pattern. Xu and Wang (1999) identify a U-shaped curve between legal- 
person shareholding and the performance of companies measured by market-to-book 
value ratio, ROE and ROA. Similarly, Delios and Wu (2005) also find that the 
relationship between legal-person ownership and firm performance follows a U- 
shape pattern. To explore the possible non-linear relationship between different types 
of ownership and market value, the quadratic and cubic terms are introduced into the 
model and Model (6.1) is further developed into the models as follows: 
p2 + (6.2) MVII = ao + aBV,, + a2NP,, + a3 P it+ a4 U 
MVi, = a, + aBV,, + a2NP,, + a3 P it+ a4 P il + aP3,, +c (6.3) 2 
If a4 and a, are found to be statistically significant, it could suggest that non-linear 
relationship exists between the market value and different types of ownership. 
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6.4 Findings and Discussion 
The regression results are presented in Table 6.2. As can be seen from Table 6.2, four 
models are constructed to carry out the tests. The benchmark model takes the original 
form of the modified OhIson model and acts as the benchmark in the tests. Model 6.1 
is used to test whether there is a linear relationship between market value and 
different types of shareholding. Model 6.2 and 6.3 are developed to examine the 
possible non-linear relationship between market value and ownership. In Panel A, 
the proportion of both state shares and legal-person shares in the listed companies is 
used to represent P ,. The reason to put state shares and 
legal-person shares together 
is that these two types of shares bear substantial similarity in terms of liquidity and 
ownership. As discussed earlier, both state shares and legal-person shares are not 
allowed to be traded on the open market. More importantly, both types of shares are 
ultimately owned by the government. Although some legal persons are private 
owners, overall their control over the listed companies is at present negligible. Some 
researchers even treat the combination of state share and legal-person shares as 
government shares (Sun et al., 2002 and Tian, 2003). For simplicity, I also name the 
congregate of state shareholding and legal-person shareholding as government 
shareholding in this study 37 . 
In order to obtain a picture on the effect of government shareholding on the market 
value in a broad sense, I first put state shares and legal-person shares in the same 
category as government shares. I then investigate the impact of state shares and 
legal-person shares on the market value'of firms respectively by differentiating the 
former from the latter. As discussed earlier, although state shares and legal-person 
shares are widely regarded as the shares owned by the government, significant 
differences do exist between the two. Therefore, it would be expected that they play 
different roles in explaining the firm value. 
37 For simplicity, the term 'government shareholding' or 'government ownership' represents the 
aggregation of state and legal-person shareholding and will be used throughout the study. 
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Adjusted No. of 
Equation ao 
1 
a, a 2 a 3 a 4 a, R2 (0/0) 
F 
obs. 
Panel A: P,, ý State + Legal Person 
BM 0.31*** 
2.57*** 2.14*** 51.40 439.44 835 
(9.87) (23.81) (5.80) 
6.1 0.17** 2.62*** 2.09*** 0.35** 51.70 298.01 835 
(2.29) (24.07) (5.68) (2.09) 
6.2 0.47*** 2.64*** 2.05*** -2.08*** 3 . 86*** 53.20 238.38 835 
(5.16) (24.71) (5.67) (-4.35) (5.40) 
6.3 0.46*** 2.64*** 2.08*** -2.30*** 5.35** -1.97 53.20 190.71 835 
(4.79) (24.64) (5.71) (4.10) (2.49) (. 0.74) 
Panel B- P State 
6.4 0.32*** 2.57*** 2.13*** -0.051 51.20 292.78 835 
(8.82) (23.81) (5.78) (-0-50) 
6.5 0.32*** 2.58*** 2.08*** -0.59*** 1.44*** 51.80 224.96 835 
(8.78) (23.98) (5.67) (-3.06) (3.28) 
6.6 0.33*** 2.58*** 2.07*** 0.56** 0.82 0.97 51.80 179.90 835 
(8.55) (23.98) (5.65) (-2.76) (0.89) (0.75) 
Panel C: P it = Legal Person 
6.7 0.27*** 2.58*** 2.11 0.19* 51.20 292.47 835 
(6.95) (23.77) (5.72) (1.81) 
6.8 0.29*** 2.57*** 2.12*** -0.05 0.45 51.20 219.65 835 
(6.91) (2 . 66) (5.74) (-0.20) (1.05) t 
6.9 0.29*** 2* 57*** 2.13*** 038 2.36** -2.2 1 1.30 176.83 835 
(6.82) (23.68) (5.78) (2.0)5) (-1.79) 
Benchmark Model: MV It / MV I(, _, ) = ao 
+ a, BV it / MV i(t_, ) + a2 NP it / MV, ((_, ) +6 
Model 6.1: MV 11 / MV i(, _, ) = ao 
+ a, BV it / MV I(, _, ) 
+ a2 NP it / MV, (t_, ) + a3 P it +6 
Model 6.2: MV it / MV l(t_, ) = ao + a, BV it 
/ MV i(I NP It 
/ MV i(t +a2 
+6 
_l) + 
a2 
_l) + 
a3 Pit 4P it 
Model 6.3: MV it / MV i(t = ao + a, BV it / MV 1(, 
23 
_l) + a2NP, t/MV, (t_, ) + a3P,, + a4P,, + a, 
P,, +e 
Notes: 
MV Market value of the equity for firm i at the end of fiscal year t; 
MV i(I-1) : Market value of the equity for firm i at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
P it : Proportion of different types of shares in firm i at the end of accounting year t; 
NP it Reported net profit for firm i for fiscal year t; 
BV it Reported book value for firm i for fiscal year t; 
All variables are scaled by opening market values. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; * statistical significance at 0.10 level; ** statistical 
significance at 0.05 level; *** statistical significance at 0.01 level; 
Table 6.2 Regression of market value on various types of shareholding 
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6.4.1 Government ownership and markqt value 
Panel A in Table 6.2 presents the empirical results of examining the relationship 
between government ownership and the market value of listed firms in the Chinese 
equity market. From Model 6.1, it can be clearly seen that the coefficient for 
proportion of government shares in a listed company ( a3 0.35) is significant 
different from zero at a <0.05 level. The sign of the coefficient and the significance 
level lead me to draw a preliminary conclusion that when state ownership and legal- 
person ownership are treated as a whole they are positively associated with the 
market value of the listed firms. The significant impact of government ownership on 
the market value of listed firms is in support of Sun et al. (2002) who argue that the 
signalling effect, monitoring role and policy role resulted from government 
ownership in the Chinese listed companies could assist boost the performance of the 
listed companies. They document that the government ownership has a significant 
and positive impact on firm performance. It can also be found from Model 6.1 that 
the coefficient for book value, a, , is 2.62 with a t-statistic of 24.07 and the 
coefficient for net profit, a2 9is 2.06 with t-statistic of 5.68, hence providing an 
indication that book value and net profit are still significantly and positively 
associated with the market value of listed firms in China even after the ownership 
variable is introduced. 
The possible non-linear relationship beiween government ownership and market 
valuation is explored by introducing the quadratic and cubic terms in Model 6.2 and 
6.3. One striking finding is that a3 is -2.08 and a4 is 3.86 at a <0.01 level in Model 
6.2. There appears to be a quadratic relation between the market value and state 
ownership and legal-person ownership combined in the Chinese equity market. 
Interestingly, this quadratic relation has been strengthened by the results from Model 
6.3. As can be seen from the regression results from Model 6.2 and 6.3, the signs of 
the coefficients do not change as the cubic term is introduced in Model 6.3 with a3 
equal to -2.30 a <0.01 level and a4 is 5.35 at a <0.05 level. The coefficient for the 
cubic term is insignificant with a t-statistic of -0.74. It therefore can be concluded 
that a quadratic relation exists between government ownership and market value. It is 
- 201 - 
p2 worth noting, howe'v, er, that the signs of estimated coefficients with P, and it 
indicate a U-shaped curve, thus suggesting that the value of firms decreases with the 
proportion of state shares and legal-person shares combined when P, is low and 
increases when P, is high. It can also be found from the coefficients of a3 and a4 
in the Model 6.2 and 6.3 that the turning points are relatively stable in the 22-27% 
range of shareholding by the state and legal persons. This U-shaped relationship 
between mark- et value and government ownership is best depicted by Figure 6.1. This 
finding lends a further support for Tian (2001) who documents that the firms are 
valued lower vdien the shareholding stake of the government is higher, but after a 
certain threshold corporate value increases with the size of state's shareholding 
stakes. 
Market value of listed firms and government 
ownership 
4 
3.5 
3 
0 U) 2.5 
E 2 
> 1.5 
0.5 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Proportion of government ownership 
Figure 6.1 Government ownership and market value of listed firms in China 
The U-shaped relationship between the firm value and shares held by the government 
can be explained by the arguments existing in the literature on ownership and market 
valuation. As discussed previously, with state and legal-person ownership having 
both positive and detrimental impacts on the value of the firm, the company's market 
value is then dependent upon the trade-off of two competing forces. When the 
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government (state and legal persons) owns a small stake in a company, the 
detrimental effect of state ownership seems to dominate the positive impact, thus 
destroying the value of listed firms. As argued by Morck et al. (1988), when a legal 
person or the government owns a small -stake in a company, it may try to collude 
with management for undertaking business operations or investments that will 
benefit itself but harm the firm's value. The monitoring role that the government and 
legal persons could play in the listed company may be severely restricted due to their 
relatively small interest in the company and the resulting voting rights. As a 
consequence, management in a company with small proportion of state shares and 
legal-person shares are likely to enjoy more discretionary power to obtain personal 
gains at the expense of shareholders. Furthermore, the fact that the government holds 
a small stake in a listed company also seems to send a strong message to the equity 
market that the company is unlikely to get preferential treatments from the 
government. The 'policy role' played by the government argued by Sun et al. (2002) 
and 'helping hand' offered by the state -proposed by Tian (2001) seem to be less 
effective in a company with small government ownership. It has to be stressed that 
the government is playing a vital role in the business environment of China. In a 
country such as China where the government enjoys the absolutely unchallenged 
power to lead the economy, the support of the government frequently adds extremely 
valuable merits in determining the value of the firms. Therefore, based upon the 
above, it is not surprising to observe that the market value of the firm decreases with 
the size of the government ownership when the government owns a small proportion 
in the listed company. 
When the government's equity holding in the firm increases to a certain level the 
rising positive impacts of the goverm-nent ownership begin to dominate the 
detrimental effects. In a company with majority state and legal-person shareholding, 
the block-holder's goal coincides with that of outside shareholders-to maximise the 
firm's value. The market value of the firm is therefore likely to increase with the 
government ownership because investors anticipate the convergence of interest at a 
high level of government shareholding. The high proportion of state and legal-person 
shares in a listed company may also provide an incentive for the government to 
effectively monitor the management of the company simply because the 
government's interests are highly associated with the performance of the company. 
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Note that the monitoring role in the current Chinese equity market is extremely 
important given the weak corporate governance, severe information asymmetry and a 
lack of legal protection for minority shareholders (Wang 2005). Investors therefore 
place heavy weight on whether the company is subject to effective monitoring when 
making investment decisions. Legal persons are believed to be equipped with 
expertise and power to perform the monitoring role, therefore investors would rather 
pay a premium to the company with high level of government equity holding. What's 
more, companies with substantial government and legal-person shareholding are also 
likely to win the political and economic support from the government. As discussed 
earlier, the core objective of the SOE reform is to revitalise the poorly-performing 
state owned companies. To facilitate the transition from state-owned enterprises to 
listed companies the government has taken a series of measures. These include 
reducing the tax burden, injecting capital to repay part of the debt, and the debt-to- 
equity swap. All these measures have been taken on board by the equity market and 
seem to have contributed to the increase in the market value of the listed companies. 
Not even so, the companies with high level of state and legal-person shareholding are 
also likely to be in a government-monopolised industry. By looking into the average 
government (state plus legal-person) shareholding in the sample by industries, one 
could gain a clearer idea on what types of companies in terms of ownership are 
enjoying the benefits resulting from the goverment monopoly. 
- 204 - 
Industry Mean Median Minimum Q1 Q3 Maximum 
All 
0.58671 0.60000 0.00000 0.50204 0.71188 0.93965 
Companies 
Agriculture 0.44001 0.44001 0.41947 0.41947 0.46055 0.46055 
Manufacturing 0.59615 0.59953 0.28415 0.50324 0.68399 0.91016 
Utilities 0.6801 0.6223 0.4836 0.5764 0.8508 0.9387 
Construction 0.7044 0.6671 0.6671 0.6671 0.7628 0.7628 
Transport &, 
0.5721 0.5346 0.5039 0.5218 0.5884 0.8006 
Warehousing 
Information 
0.5468 0.5670 0.0000 0.4881 0.7225 0.8149 
Technology 
Retail & 
0.5972 0.6015 0.0859 0.5153 0.7223 0.8138 
Wholesale 
Real Estate 0.5887 0.6325 0.0000 0.5470 0.7256 0.8814 
Public 
0.5493 0.5739 0.2199 0.4444 0.5846 0.8007 
Services 
Media & 
0.6298 0.6298 0.1834 0.5416 0.8700 0.8831 
Culture 
Conglomerate 0.5421 0.6000 0.0000 0.3954 0.7279 0.9397 
Table 6.3 State and legal-person shareholding by industrial sectors 
As the mean and median values in Table 6.3 indicate, companies in industries such 
as construction, utilities and media & culture have the highest government (state plus 
legal-person) shareholding. These industries, in particular the utilities, are believed to 
be vital to the national economy and therefore they are under the protection of 
government monopoly. Also note that it is not surprising to witness the high 
proportion of government ownership in the media & culture sector given the 
government's long history of using the media as a propaganda tool. To exert control 
over the companies in these industries, the government naturally holds a majority of 
shares in the company. As shown by Table 6.3, the government on averageholds 
68.01 per cent of the total shares in the utilities companies and maximum 
goverment shareholding reaches up to 93.87 per cent. Perotti (1995) suggests that 
companies in regulated industries tend to enjoy the benefits related to the lack of 
competition and protection of government policies and therefore are likely to 
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outperform the companies in other industrial sectors. Sun et al. (2002) provide 
evidence that the firms in the regulated (government-monopolised) industries, such 
as utilities, perform better than those in the non-regulated sectors. 
It is worth mentioning that the linear relationship between government ownership 
and market value observed from Model 6.1 may not necessarily contradict with the 
U-shaped curve illustrated from Model 6.2 and 6.3 when the quadratic and cubic 
terms are introduced. Note that the turni ng point the U-shaped curve derived from 
Model 6.2 and 6.3 is in a range between 22-27 per cent, meaning that when the 
government ownership of a listed firm falls below 22-27 per cent, the market value 
of the company decreases with the size of the government ownership. However, 
when the government ownership reaches this threshold, increased government equity 
holding tends to push the market value up. However, this threshold of 22-27 per cent 
is far lower than the average government shareholding of 58.67 per cent in the 
sample, as shown in Table 6.3. The Q1 value of 50.20 per cent for the government 
shareholding further means that over 75 per cent of the listed companies in the 
sample have more than half of their equity owned by the government. Therefore it 
can be concluded that overall the U-shaped curve exists between government 
ownership and firm value and this curve has a longer tail towards the right. The 
linear relationship observed from Model 6.1 without including the quadratic and 
cubic terms captures only part of the curve after the government ownership reaches 
the turning point. 
6.4.2 State ownership and market value 
Panel B of Table 6.2 presents the results of investigating the relationship between 
state shareholding and market value. After discovering the impacts of the 
government ownership by combining the state and legal-person shareholders together, 
it is worthwhile to split up the state and legal-person shareholding and explore the 
effects of these two types of ownership separately. After all, distinct differences exist 
between state shareholders and legal-person shareholders, especially when one sees 
legal persons as business entities with the ultimate goal of profit maximisation and 
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the state shareholders as the government representatives who frequently have to put 
the social welfare objectives as a priority. 
As shown in Model 6.4, the coefficient for state ownership, a3 is -0.05 1. However it 
cannot be rejected that a3 is not significantly different from 0 because the t-statistic 
is -0.50. Therefore, state ownership alone in this model does not seem to provide any 
explanation to the market value of the listed firms. This result is strikingly different 
from what is obtained from Model 6.1 when the state and legal-person ownership are 
combined together. However, this result seems to be consistent with the findings of 
Xu and Wang (2002), Hovey et al. (200i),, and Wang (2005) whose studies suggest 
state ownership alone is not associated with the corporate profitability and 
performance. 
Following the method used in Panel A, the quadratic and cubic terms are included in 
the model to further investigate the possible non-linear relationship between state 
ownership and market value of listed firms. As shown in Panel B of Table 6.2, the 
coefficients for P, and P, (a3=-0.59; a4=1.44) in Model 6.5 are both statistically 
significant at a< 0.01 level. In Model 6.6, a3 is significant at a <0.05 level, but 
neither a4 nor a, shows any statistical significance at all. All these suggest that 
there appears to be a quadratic relationship existing between the proportion of state 
shares in the listed company and the firm value. It is worth noting that the signs of 
estimated coefficients for P,, and P,, indicate that this relationship is graphically a 
U-shaped curve with the turning point occurring at P, equal to 20 per cent. This 
suggests that firm value first declines with the increase in the proportion of state 
shares, then goes up with the increase in state ownership, when the state's equity 
holding surpasses the 20 per cent level. This relationship is better seen from Figure 
6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 State ownership and market value of listed firms in China 
the U-shaped association between state ownership alone and firm value seems to be 
consistent \\ith the finding obtained from Panel A when state and legal-person 
o\\nerslilp are combined together. It therefore can be understood that this finding has 
strengthened the conclusion drawn in the preceding section: the U-shaped 
relationship exists between government ownership and firm value and this 
conclusion holds not only %\, hen state and legal-person ownership are combined 
together but also \\hen state shareholding is considered alone. 
6.4.3 Legal-person ownership and market value 
When the initial investigation on the possible linear relationship is carried out in 
Model 6.7. a moderate positive relationship between legal-person shareholding and 
firm \ alue is reported as evidenced by a, which is significant at a<0.1 level in 
Panel C of' Table 6.2. This finding offers preliminary evidence that legal-person 
shareholding tends to increase the market value of listed firms. It comes as no 
surprise as it reinforces the findings of most literature studying the impact of 
ownership structure in the context of Chinese equity market. Using three-year data 
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from 1997 to 1999.1 lo\-ey et al. (2003) find that the level of ownership of shares by 
legal persons has a positive relationship with corporate performance as measured by 
Tobin's Q. Xu and Wang (1999) also document that the firm's profitability is 
positively correlated with the fractions of legal-person shares. 
Like tile previous sections, the existence of possible non-linear relations between 
firm VZ11LIC and the level of legal-person shareholding is further explored by 
embracing tile quadratic and cubic terms into the model. As can be seen from Panel 
C ofTable 6.2. the coefficients for P, and P, 2, (a3 ý -0.05; a4 ý0.45) in Model 6.8 are 
both insigiii1icant. However, the estimation of Model 6.9 has produced some 
interesting results with a4 being significant at a<0.0 1 level and a, at a<0.10 
le\, el. This seems to suggest that a curvilinear relationship has been detected between 
the market \, alue ofthe listed company and the level of legal-person equity holding 38 
This relationship is best depicted by a figure, which I have created in Figure 6.3. 
Market value of listed firms and legal-person 
ownership 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 k 
0.2 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Proportion of legal-person ownership 
Figure 6.3 Legal-person ownership and market value of listed firms in China -4 
" It has to be admitted that this regression result of Model (6.9) has provided some evidence for the 
hump-shaped relationship between market value and legal-person shareholding; however, the 
relationship is not too significant. 
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This hump-shaped curve between market value and legal-person shareholding is 
obviously opposite to the U-shaped relation found in the previous sections when the 
impacts of government ownership and state ownership are combined and examined. 
It clearly suggests that the market value of listed companies goes up with the 
increase in the fraction of shares held by legal persons and after reaching a turning 
point a further increase in the legal-person shareholding would lead to a decline in 
the market value. This finding is of particular interest because the largest legal 
persons in Chinese listed companies are usually institutions ultimately controlled by 
the government (Hovey 2003). And more importantly, legal-person shares, together 
with state shares, are in a same category labelled as non-tradable shares. Therefore 
intuitively it should be expected that association between legal-person shareholding 
and market value would follow the same pattern as that between state shareholding 
and market value. 
The hump-shaped relationship between legal-person ownership and market value can 
be explained by the particular roles that legal persons play in the context of Chinese 
equity market. As discussed in the preceding sections, legal persons can have both 
beneficial and adverse impacts upon the performance and market value of listed 
companies depending on the percentage of shareholding. When the legal persons' 
equity holding falls below the turning point, it can be expected that the beneficial 
effects dominate the adverse effects. Investors thus anticipate that an increase in legal 
person ownership -will lead to an increase in the market value of the listed firm. In 
fact, legal persons in Chinese listed companies are widely believed to be playing an 
active role in monitoring management to ensure that managers act in the interests of 
shareholders. As argued by Wang (2005), legal persons in China are analogous to 
institutional investors in the industrial world, e. g. the U. S. and U. K. They are well 
equipped with almost everything that is needed to monitor the management of listed 
companies, such as expertise, experience, ability, voting power and authority. Most 
importantly, unlike state shareholders who frequently have to strike a balance 
between seeking for profits and reaching social welfare targets, they are business 
entities ultimately pursuing profit maximisation. Their interests in the listed 
companies are closely tied up with the performance of the company. To protect their 
own interest legal persons are highly motivated to monitor management effectively. 
As a matter of fact, both the government and individual investors would anticipate 
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legal persons to fulfil the monitoring role simply because the former lacks motivation 
and the latter is short of expertise. 
What is more, legal-person owners in practice help to increase or strengthen the 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders (Hovey et al. 2003). They 
do this via their direct control. When they have a substantial representation in a 
company's board of directors, they have the power to change the management team 
when it is needed. Empirically, Xu and Wang (1999), Sun et al (2002), and Bai et al. 
(2004) all found that the concentration of legal person shareholding is positively 
correlated with firm performance, which is consistent with the idea that legal-person 
shareholders are playing an effective role in monitoring the firm's management. 
Ile fact that legal-person ownership helps to increase the market value of listed 
firms through playing the monitoring role does not necessarily mean that the higher 
concentration of legal-person ownership will lead to higher market value of the firm. 
When the level of legal-person shareholding reaches a certain high level, 60 per cent 
in this study, the type n agency problem (principle-principle) arises between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). As indicated 
by Figure 6.3, when legal persons' ownership exceeds 60 per cent, an increase in the 
shareholding Nvould lead to a decline in the market value. This suggests that investors 
in the Chinese equity market welcome legal persons to own the shares up to a certain 
level. However, too many shares owned by legal persons tend to gives rise to the fear 
that legal person might be exposed to the lure to expropriate minority shareholders. 
This fear is likely to be turned into reality given the fact that China's equity market is 
at its infancy and there is a severe lack of legal protection to the minority 
shareholders. Corporate governance regulations are weak. Majority shareholders 
enjoy more discretionary power to expropriate minority shareholders due to the 
information asymmetry. In fact, the events that majority shareholders expropriate 
minority shareholders occur so frequently and commonly in China that Claessens et 
al. (2002) claim that expropriation to minority shareholders is a rule rather than an 
exception. Responding to the above fear and events, market value goes down with 
the increased legal-person shareholding. 
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From the investors' perspective, the hump-shaped relationship between legal-person 
ownership and market value also reflects the complication in the market's attitude 
towards legal person shareholders. Investors need legal-person shareholders because 
the market relies on legal persons to monitor management but in the meantime 
minority investors also fear legal persons because too many shares in the hands of 
majority shareholders would expose them to the risks being expropriated by block 
holders. It is this mixed attitude towards legal persons that change the directions of 
the hump-shaped curve. 
Note that a U-shaped relationship between government ownership and market value 
is discovered when legal-person and state shareholding are combined together and 
when state ownership is considered alone. However, when legal-person ownership is 
separated from state ownership, the relationship between legal-person ownership and 
market value appears to be a hump shape. This is a rather interesting finding because 
it strengthens the idea that legal-person shareholders in the Chinese equity market 
actually have dual characteristics. It carries distinct features of state owners in that 
both state and legal-person shares are non-tradable and most of legal persons are 
directly and indirectly controlled by the government. It is therefore no surprise to 
discover that the U-shaped relationship between state shareholding and market value 
remains unchanged even when both state and legal-person ownership is incorporated 
into the model. Including legal-person ownership as a part of government ownership 
appears not to affect the overall relationship. On the other hand, when legal-person 
ownership is separated ftom state ownership and is treated as a stand-alone variable 
in the model, its unique feature, the resemblance to institutional investors, appears to 
emerge. That is, at low levels of ownership, legal persons tend to perform the 
monitoring role in the listed firms. When legal persons' equity shareholding exceeds 
a certain proportion they are prone to the lure to expropriate the minority 
shareholders. 
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Chapter 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study focuses on the issues of value-relevance of accounting numbers and the 
relationship between different types of shareholding and the market value of the listed 
firms in the Chinese emerging stock market. The market valuation theory suggests 
that market value is in a linear relationship with the accounting figures such as book 
value and net prorit. This theory has been widely accepted and tested in most 
developed markets such as the U. S. A, the U. K., the Netherlands, France and Germany 
etc. Generally, accounting information is found to be value relevant in these countries, 
implying that book value and net profit are playing significant roles in explaining the 
market value. Does the market valuation theory holds in emerging markets such as 
China? This is an empirical question; it is also the major objective of this thesis. 
China's economic development and institutional settings are unique in many ways. 
Firstly, the whole economic system is in a transitional period in which the planned 
economy is gradually replaced by the market economy. Secondly, the newly-emerged 
listed companies are transformed from the former SOEs and display a series of 
distinctive features. The most significant one is that the nearly two-thirds of the shares 
are controlled by the government and these shares are not tradable. Thirdly, despite 
the phenomenal expansion in size, China's stock market is still a typical emerging 
market plagued by a host of inherent problems. These problems have distorted the 
market information such as share prices. Fourthly, from the fund-based accounting 
system to the IAS-based accounting standards, Chinese accounting has undergone a 
series of revolutionary changes to bring the accounting regulations in line with both 
international conventions and the overall economic environment of China. Despite the 
fact that China has largely adopted the IASs in constructing its accounting regulatory 
regime, significant differences exist between the two. 
The whole study has been divided into two stages. In stage one, the central task is to 
investigate whether the accounting information reported by China's listed companies 
is playing a significant role in explaining the market value. Stage one tries to explore 
two questions: 
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Is accounting information provided by Chinese listed firms value relevant? If the 
answer is yes, arc there significant differences in terms of value relevance of 
Chinese accounting information existing during the studied period and across 
industrial sectors? 
2. Is there any other accounting information playing a significant role in explaining 
the market value of listed fin-ns? If yes, what is that? 
In stage two, the focus of the study is shifted on the unique ownership structure of the 
listed companies in China. The central task in this stage is to investigate whether there 
is signiricant association between the market value of listed firms and different types 
of shareholding, in particular, the state shareholding and legal-person shareholding. 
This stage attempts to answer three questions: 
1. Is the government shareholding as a whole (state and legal-person shareholding) 
playing a significant role in explaining the market values of listed firms? If yes, 
what exactly is the association between the government shareholding and market 
values? 
2. If the state oNNmership is taken alone, does it influence the market value of listed 
firms? Again, if the answer is yes, how doe it associate with the market values? 
3. Do legal persons play a significant role in explaining the market value of listed 
finns in China? If yes, does the role of legal persons differentiate from that of the 
state? 
Ile results of this study suggest that the accounting information as reflected in the 
income statement and balance sheet is highly value relevant to investors in the 
Chinese equity market. This is consistent with that of Bao and Chow (1999) and Chen 
ct al. (2001), who documented the value-relevance of Chinese accounting information 
in their studies. The finding that the accounting information plays a significant role in 
explaining the market value in the context of China is particularly intriguing. Despite 
the fact that Chinese equity market is an emerging market and despite all the criticism 
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over the quality of Chinese accounting information and the legal settings of 
accounting regulatory framework, financial reports disclosed by Chinese listed 
companies do contain significant value-relevance not only on the pooled basis, but 
also across years and sectors. In particular, the record of value-relevance of 
accounting information can be traced back to as early as 1995, when both the Chinese 
stock market and accounting regulatory system were at the early stage. The market 
valuation theory and models have been tested in the developed markets such as the 
U. S. A, the U. K., France, the Netherlands, and Germany etc. Accounting information 
has been found to be value relevance in these counties (e. g. Landman 1986; Barth 
1991; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996; Burstaher & Dichev 1997, Stark and 
Tbomas, 1998; Arce and Mora, 2002). The results of this study seem to indicate that 
the market valuation theory holds true not only in the developed markets, but also in 
emerging markets such as China. 
The results also suggest that the value relevance is on the whole in decline within the 
period studied (1994-2001). This finding comes as a bit of a surprise as one would 
expect the quality of accounting information disclosed by China's listed companies to 
improve as a result of the accounting reform. The stock market is also expected to 
gradually mature as more market regulations are introduced and investors behave 
increasingly rationally in making investing decisions. The overall decline trend of 
value relevance could be interpreted by the 'policy shocks' caused by the regulation- 
setters. Introducing a large number of accounting regulations in a short period of time 
and ftequent change of policies could produce unpredicted effects on the market and 
the investors' perception of the stock market. -Another explanation for the decline in 
the model's explanatory power is that investors in the early stage of stock market 
development tend to behave naively, at least in comparison with the investors in the 
developed markets, when making decisions based on accounting information. 
Therefore, there is not a clear pattern in terms of how much variation of the share 
prices can be explained by the accounting fundamentals such as book value and net 
profits. The decline trend of value relevance might also be attributed to the relatively 
short period being studied. Using data over the past 40 years, Collins et al. (1997) 
document the joint value-relevance of earnings and book values has increased slightly. 
However, this study covers a period of only 8 years ftorn 1994 to 2001 due to the 
short history of Chinese equity market and limited availability of the data. The short 
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period of time makes it impossible to observe a pattern without being affected by the 
noises and shocks inherent to the equity market. To obtain a better picture, the period 
being studied needs to be extended and therefore the study aiming at obtaining a long- 
term pattern should be carried out in the future. 
Apart from examining the relationship between market value and book value & net 
profit, this study has extended the line of research to the value relevance of other 
accounting information such as dividends, positive and negative net profits (losses), 
and abnormal earnings etc. All of these accounting figures have been proven to be 
significantly value relevant in the market valuation theory (e. g. Quiry, 2002; OhIson, 
1995), however they have never been tested in the emerging markets such as China 
prior to this study. The results obtained seem to lead me to believe that the accounting 
information reported by the Chinese listed firms including positive net profits, 
negative net profits, closing book value, opening book value, dividends etc together 
are playing significant roles in explaining the market value. Positive net profits and 
closing book value are found to be positively related with the market value. Negative 
net profits reported by the listed companies lead to considerable decrease in the 
market value because investors see negative net profits as an indication of poor 
performance. Opening book values are proven to be negatively related to market 
values in that they represent the capital charge element of the abnormal earnings. 
paying dividends in the Chinese equity market results in the destruction of market 
value simply since cash is expected to be retained by the companies and be re- 
invested for the future. All the above seem to further suggest that although the 
Chinese equity market is an emerging market and China is developing its share- 
holding and share-trading systems in a way that differs hugely from the rest of the 
world (Tian, 2001), the finance theory in terms of market valuation established in the 
developed market still holds firmly in the Chinese market. 
As for the unique ownership structure and its impacts on the market value, the results 
seem to suggest that when government shareholding (the combination of state 
shareholding and legal-person shareholding) is considered, a U-shaped curve is 
identified between the government shareholding and market value. This indicates that 
the market value of a firm decreases with the proportion of government shares when 
the government holds low level of ownership and increases when the government 
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shareholding is high. The turning point in the U-shaped curve is found to be between 
22 and 27 per cent, implying that the range between 22 to 27 per cent is the optimal 
government shareholding for listed companies. This finding lends a further support 
for Tian (2001) who documents that the firms are valued lower when the shareholding 
stake of the government is higher, but after the threshold corporate value increases 
with the size of the government's shareholding stakes. 
If the state shareholding is considered alone, the result from the previous test does not 
change too much. Again, a U-shaped curve is found to exist between state ownership 
and the firm's market value. 11is seems to be consistent with the finding obtained 
from the previous test when state and legal-person ownership is combined together. It 
therefore can be understood that this finding has strengthened the conclusion drawn in 
the preceding section: the U-shaped relationship exists between government 
ownership and firm value and this conclusion holds not only when state and legal- 
person ownership are combined together but also when state shareholding is 
considered alone. 
As a final point, when it comes to legal-person shareholding, however, the result 
seems to support the hump-shaped curve between market value and legal-person 
shareholding. This finding is obviously opposite to the U-shaped relation observed in 
the previous tests when the impacts of government ownership and state ownership are 
examined. It clearly suggests that the market value of a listed company goes up with 
the increase in the fraction of shares held by legal-persons and after reaching the 
turning point a further increase in the legal-person shareholding would lead to a 
decline in the market value. This finding is of particular interest as legal-person 
ownership is widely regarded as a form of government ownership because the largest 
legal persons are usually institutions ultimately controlled by the government (Hovey 
2003). And more importantly, legal-person shares, together with state shares, are in a 
same category labelled as non-tradable shares. Therefore intuitively it should be 
expected that legal-person shareholding would have the same impact on the market 
value, or at least similar to, as the government ownership. However, the hump-shaped 
curve obtained in this test suggests that although most legal persons are directly or 
indirectly controlled by the govenunent, they are playing different roles from the 
government in explaining the market value. 
- 217 - 
Clearly, the findings of this study have both theoretical and practical implications. 
First, it provides empirical evidence for the value relevance in the Chinese emerging 
market. This has undoubtedly expanded the application scope of the market valuation 
theory, implying that the market value theory holds not only in developed countries 
but also in emerging markets such as China. Secondly, the overall decline trend in 
value relevance observed in this study has triggered the alarming bell for the policy 
makers in China. NN%ile the government issues the accounting regulations with a 
&good' intention of improving the quality of financial information, the 'shock' effect 
produced by the sudden change could actually cause immediate and unexpected effect 
on the market. 1"hirdly, the significant association between the market value of listed 
firms and different types of shareholding is of particular importance in China's stock 
rnarkct. When the stock market %vas created in the early 1990s, the government's idea 
was simple: holding a majority of the shares could ensure the government to have a 
grim. grasp onto the listed companies. However, the empirical evidence of this study 
suggests that while a certain level of government ownership is beneficial to the 
company's market value, excessively high level of government shareholding damages 
the firm value. In this study, the optimal governrnent ownership (including both state 
and legal-person shares) is found to be between 22 to 27 per cent. This finding seems 
to be consistent with the government's plan to reduce the government shareholding. 
As this thesis comes to an end, the CSRC has already started to put this policy into 
practice 39 
39 The policy is termed by the CSRC as the Share Structure Reform (SSR). The detailed plan called the 
Administrative Measures on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies and was issued in 
April 2005 and now the CSRC has started to implement it on the experimental basis. 
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Appendix A 
The Consolidated Income Statement of CPCC, 31't December 2004, as prepared 
in accordance with Chinese Accounting Standards 
Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Unit: yuan 
Notes Year 2004 
RMB million 
Year 2003 
RMB million 
Turnover from main businesses 590,632 417,171 
Less: Costs on main businesses 32 459,207 323,104 
Taxes and surcharges on main businesses 33 16,203 13,371 
Profit on main businesses 115,222 80,716 
Plus: Profits on other businesses 1,102 856 
Less: Operating expenses 19,477 14,582 
Administrative expenses 23,167 21,219 
Financial expenses 34 4,331 4,129 
Drilling Costs (including dry well costs) 35 6,396 6,133 
Operating Profit 62,953 35,509 
Plus: Investment gains 36 1,088 548 
Non-operating income 665 292 
Less: Non-operating expenses 37 11,171 6,334 
Total profit 53,535 30,015 
Less: Corporate tax 38 16,060 1,886 
Minority interests 5,670 1,886 
Plus: Unrecognised investment losses 470 243 
Net profit 32,275 19,011 
Plus: Retained profis at the beginning of the year 19,975 12,569 
Distributable prorit 52,250 31,580 
Less: Appropriation to statutory surplus reserve 31 3,228 1,901 
Appropriation to statutory benefit reserve 31 3,228 1,901 
Profit distributable to shareholders 45,794 27,778 
Less: Dividends at the end of the year 39 5,202 5,202 
Dividends at the middle of the year 3,468 2,601 
Undistributed profit 39 37,124 19,975 
Sources: CPCCsfinancialreportfortheperiod ended 31 December 200 
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Appendix B 
The Consolidated Income Statement of CPCC, 31't December 2004, as prepared 
in accordance with the International Accounting Standards 
Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Unit: yuan 
Notes Year 2004 
RMB million 
Year 2003 
RMB million 
Turnover and other operating income 
Turnover 3 597,197 429,949 
Other operating income 4 22,586 19,052 
619,783 449,001 
Operating expenses 
Purchase of oil and oil products & related expense (443,590) (313,238) 
Selling, general and administrative expense 5 (31,843) (27,228) 
Depreciation, depletion and amortisation (32,342) (27,951) 
Drilling costs (including dry well costs) (6,396) (6,133) 
Employee expense 6 (18,634) (16,972) 
Redundancy costs 7 (919) (1,040) 
Taxes apart from corporate tax 8 (16,324) (13,581) 
Other operating expenses 9 (6,666) (3,975) 
Total operating expenses (556,714) (313,238) 
Operating profit 63,069 38,883 
Financial costs 
Interest expenses 10 (4,583) (4,365) 
Interest income 374 322 
Losses on translation of foreign currencies (223) (450) 
Gains on translation of foreign currencies 61 30 
Total financial costs (4,371) (4,463) 
Gains from subsidiaries issuing shares 136 
Investment gains 111 89 
Shares ofjoint ventures 797 396 
Profit on ordinary activities before taxation 59,606 35,041 
Corporate tax 11 (17,815) (10,645) 
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Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (cont. ) Unit: yuan 
Profit on ordinary activities after taxation 41,791 24,396 
Minority shareholders' interest (5,772) (1,972) 
Profit distributable to shareholders 36,019 22,424 
Basic net profit per share 15 0.42 0.26 
Dividends for the year: 16 
Dividends announced in the middle of the year 3,468 2,601 
Dividends announced after the balance sheet date 6,936 7,803 
10,404 7,803 
Sources: CPCCsfinancial reportfor the period ended 31 December 2004 
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Appendix C 
The Consolidated Balance Sheet of CPCC, 31't December 2004, as prepared in 
accordance with Chinese Accounting Standards 
Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Unit: yuan 
Notes 2004 
RMB million 
2003 
RMB million 
Assets 
Current assets 
Monetary funds 4 18,280 17,405 
Notes receivable 5 7,812 5,953 
Trade accounts receivable 6 9,756 9,284 
Other receivables 7 12,462 15,457 
Prepaid trade accounts 8 4,828 3,904 
Inventories 9 63,918 44,915 
Total current assets 117,056 96,918 
Long-term equity investments 
(Among: equity investment difference is 383 million 
yuan, and 400 million yuan for 2003) 
0 13,409 11,150 
Fixed assets 
Historical costs of fixed assets 519,462 461,128 
Less: accumulative depreciation 243,510 213,804 
Net value of fixed assets 11 275,952 247,324 
Less: Provisions for impairment of fixed assets 11 5,816 1,331 
Net amount of fixed assets 270,136 245,993 
Materials for projects 12 430 1,226 
Projects under construction 13 45,976 28,513 
Total fixed assets 316,542 275,732 
Intangible assets and other assets 
Intangible assets 14 5p345 4,564 
Prepayments expensed in a period longer than one 
year 
15 3,563 97 
Total Intangible assets and other assets 8,908 4,661 
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Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (cont. ) Unit: yuan 
Deferred tax assets 16 4,166 1,752 
Total assets 460,081 390,213 
Liabilities and owner's equity 
Current liabilities 
Short-term borrowings 17 26,723 20,904 
Notes payable 18 30,797 23,958 
Trade accounts payable 19 23,792 22,704 
Trade accounts received in advance 20 8,605 5,908 
Salaries payable 3,223 1,850 
Benefits payable 1,101 1,230 
Taxes payable 21 6,741 6,986 
Other payables to the government 22 1,519 1,237 
Other payables 23 26,459 27,537 
Accrued expenses 24 652 303 
Long-term liabilities due within one year 25 14,298 8,175 
Total current liabilities 143,910 120,792 
Long-term liabilities 
Long-term borrowings 26 94,087 79,221 
Bonds payable 27 3,500 
Other long-term liabilities 28 820 888 
Total long-term liabilities 98,407 80,109 
Deferred tax liabilities 16 198 289 
Total liabilities 242,515 201,109 
Minority interests 31,216 26,077 
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Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (cont. ) Unit: yuan 
Owner's equity 
Stock capital 29 86,702 86,702 
Capital reserve 30 37,121 36,852 
Surplus reserve 
(Among: Statutory surplus reserve is 9,588 
million yuan; 6330 million yuan for 2003) 
31 26,116 
(713) 
19,660 
(243) 
Unrecognised investment losses 
Retained profits for the financial year 
(Among: Dividends for 2004 proposed after 
the date of balance sheet are 6,936 million 
yuan; 5,202 million yuan for 2003) 
39 37,124 19,975 
Total owner's equity 186,350 162,946 
Total liabilities and owner's equity 460,081 390,213 
Resource: CPCCs Annual Reportsfor the period ended 31s'December 2004 
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Appendix D 
The Consolidated Balance Sheet of CPCC, 31't December 2004, as prepared in 
accordance with the International Accounting Standards 
Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Unit: million yuan 
Notes 2004 
RMB million 
2003 
RMB million 
Non-current Assets 
Properties, plants and equipments 17 184,123 270,731 
Projects under construction 18 46,185 29,354 
Investments 20 2,538 2,709 
Investments in joint ventures 21 10,222 8,121 
Deferred tax assets 27 4.558 3,067 
Rents paid in advance 750 810 
Long-term advanced payments and other assets 5,947 2,353 
Total non-current assets 354,323 317,145 
Current assets 
Cash funds 16,381 16,263 
Deposits in financial institutions 1,899 2,184 
Trade accounts receivable 24 9,756 9,479 
Notes receivable 24 7,812 6,283 
Inventories 25 64,329 47,916 
Advanced payments and other current assets 26 20,094 20,914 
Total current assets 12,271 103,039 
Current liabilities 
Short-term debts 28 32,307 29,181 
Loans from CPCC and other subsidies 28 8,714 4,865 
Trades payable 29 23,792 23,319 
Notes payable 29 30,797 24,267 
Accrued expenses and other payables 30 45,276 43,561 
Tax payable 5,391 4,079 
Total current liabilities 146,277 129,272 
Net total current liabilities 26,006 26,233 
Total assets less current liabilities 328,317 290,912 
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Editor: China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (cont. ) Unit: million yuan 
Non-current liabilities 
Long-term debts 28 60,822 48,257 
Loans from CPCC and other subsidies 28 36,765 39,039 
Deferred tax liabilities 27 5,636 4,599 
Other liabilities 1,008 1,451 
Total non-currcnt liabilities 104,231 93,346 
Minority interests 31,046 26,051 
Net assets 193,040 171,515 
Shareholders' equity 
Share capital 31 86,072 86,072 
Reserve 106,338 84,813 
193,040 171,515 
Resource: CPCCs Annual Reportsfor the period ended 31" December 2004 
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Appendix E 
1. Comparison between net profits and earnings before non-recurring items 
Regression models being tested 
1. MV /MV j(, -, ) = ao 
+ a, NP , /MV j(, -, ) + a2BV j, 
/MV j(, j) + 
2. MV /MV i(I-1) = ao + a, 
EBNI j, / MV j(, -, ) 
+ a2BV j, /MV j(, l) + 
ao a, a2 R2 F No. of 
' - 
observations 
1 0.78*** 2.92*** 1.50*** 16.6 71 53.38 1531 
(27.34) (5.36) (12.84) 
2 0.77*** 1.32** 1.66*** 15.3 138.76 1531 
(26.51) (1.98) (13.77) 
Notes: 
Mv it : Market value of the equity for firm j at the end of fiscal year t; 
Mv 
j (1-1) : 
Market value of the equity for firm i at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
NP 
J, 
Reported net profit for firm j for fiscal year t; 
BV 
J, 
Reported book value for firm j for fiscal year t; 
EBNl it : reported earnings before non-recurring items for firm j for fiscal year t; 
All variables are scaled by opening market values. Numbers in parenthesis arc t-statistics; *statistical signific ance at 0.10 level; ** 
statistical significance at 0.05 level; *** statistical significance at 0.01 level, 
The results presented are obtained from the two-year data covering 2000 and 2001 due to the fact that Chinese listed firms are not 
required to disclose earnings before non-recuff ing items until 2000. 
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2. Comparison between the market value at the end of the year and the market 
value at the end of the next April 
Regression models being tested 
1. MV jt /MV j(t-, ) ao + a, NP , /MV j(t-, ) + a2BV j, /MV j(, -, ) 
+ 
2. MV it 
IMV *xy-o ao + a, NP / 1"0 +a BV /MV* +6 it j(Y-1) 2 it i(Y-1) 
ao a, a2 R2 F No. of 
observations 
1 1.01*** 3.92*** 1.16*** 23.5 359.48 2333 
(39.13) (13.62) (16.26) 
2 0.81*** 4.86*** 1.96 23.4 357.03 2333 
(26.12) (11.94) (18.59)*** 
otes: 
MVj, : Market value of the equity for firmij at the end of fiscal year t; 
Mv Market value of the equity for firm j at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
MV 
j, : market value of the equity for firm j at the end of next April for the fiscal year t; 
MV j(y-, ) : markt value of the equity for firm j at the end of last April for the fiscal year t 
NP jt Reported net profit for firm j for fiscal year t; 
BV jt Reported book value for firm j for fiscal year t; 
EBNI 
j, : reported earnings before non-rccurring items for firm j for fiscal year t; 
All variables are scaled by opening market values. Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; statistical significance at 0.10 level; 
statistical significance at 0.05 level; *** statistical significance at 0.01 level. 
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